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Abstract 
 
As the title “The Electric Shaver Battle” reveals, this thesis is about a global legal dispute 
between two electric shaver manufacturers. The Dutch company Philips was the sole supplier 
in the world of triple-headed rotary shavers, and had obtained trademark and design 
protection for the shape of the top part of the shaver in several jurisdictions. Izumi, a Japanese 
company, decided to enter the triple-headed rotary shaver market with its own triple-headed 
shaver models. Philips reacted strongly against this threat to its virtual monopoly position, 
and the “shaver battle” was a fact. The dispute came to spread to eleven countries over three 
continents, and is still ongoing. Mainly Philips has sued Izumi for trademark and competition 
law infringement, while Izumi and its related companies has sought the cancellation of 
Philips’ trademarks. The main ground for invalidation and cancellation of the trademarks has 
been that the shape of the trademarks is necessary to obtain the technical result. In almost all 
jurisdictions the contested trademarks have been cancelled on this ground. Nonetheless, 
Philips has continued to sue companies selling Izumi-manufactured shavers even after the 
repetitious losses in courts of numerous countries. 
 
In this thesis I have analyzed and described twenty-five judgments and decisions of the 
dispute, which is very close to an exhaustive presentation of all the judgments rendered. In 
each judgment, I have described the parties’ claims, the grounds and argumentation and the 
court’s reasoning and decision, and also compared the different judgments with each other. 
The thesis thus comprises a thorough empirical gathering and presentation of nearly all the 
judgments of the dispute.  
 
I have also tried to determine and analyze Philips’ international legal IPR enforcement and 
competition strategy and how successful or unsuccessful the strategy has been for Philips. I 
have tried to assess what consequences the strategy has had for Philips’ competitors and the 
competition on electric shaver markets all over the world. I find it interesting that Philips 
despite repetitious expensive losses has continued to initiate litigations and take other legal 
actions, which is why I have also tried to determine what Philips has gained on the strategy, 
and what its competitors have lost. Furthermore, I have tried to see what effects Philips’ legal 
actions has had on the triple-headed shaver market, and how the market has changed after 
Philips lost its monopoly position in the various countries.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 General Introduction 
The internationalization of the market has affected and changed the trademark area of law in 
many ways. Globally there has been a serious increase of trademarks during the past decades, 
and the development does not seem to cease but rather speed up. Trademark rights have 
become a very important tool for market actors to obtain competitive advantages and create 
and control goodwill. The globalization of the market, which can be seen as a result of 
economical and technical progress, has also brought about an increased risk for conflicts 
between trademarks. Trademarks that earlier have been used only on separate national 
markets are now given an increased geographical scope and are protected through registration 
in not only national but also regional and international trademark registration systems. This 
has created a crowding of trademarks on the global market, which naturally causes an 
increased number of conflicts between trademarks.1 The fact that several unconventional 
forms of trademark protection has been introduced, such as shape, sound and scent 
trademarks, has also contributed to the increased complexity and expansion of trademark law. 
 
Intellectual property rights imply to the commercial area that the companies owning them are 
granted exclusivity as a means of competition. As monopolies often have effects on the 
competition, there is an apparent conflict between the legal protection of intellectual property 
and the wish to encourage the competition on the market. The conflict is solved in different 
ways depending on the characteristics of the particular intellectual property to be protected. 
The conflict between patents and competition has been solved in such a way that while 
fulfilling the legislators’ demand that the technical progress is made public, the legal system 
provides a protected exclusivity that is limited in time. When it comes to trademarks, it is 
important to keep in mind that the purpose of trademark law is both to prevent the public’s 
risk for confusion and to protect the economical value of the trademark. Thus, trademark law 
is at the same time a restriction and a prerequisite of a free and fair competition on the market. 
Unlike patents, trademark protection is unlimited in time, which makes it even more 
important that the negative effects on competition are minimized. Accordingly, trademark law 
provides strict criteria for granting a sign trademark protection, and absolute grounds for 
refusal of protection excludes for example trademark shapes comprising technical features 
from protection. Hence, the purpose of these legal provisions2 is a try to balance the 
protection of a shape on the one hand with the wish to avoid unfair competition advantages by 
an eternal exclusivity to technical solutions on the other hand. The exclusion from protection 
of trademark shapes that are necessary to obtain a technical result thus constitutes a 
demarcation between trademark protection and patent protection. It is the technical 
characteristics of trademark shapes that is the main question of this thesis.  
 
 
1.1 Background of Problem 
The subject matter of this thesis is the worldwide legal battle between two electric shaver 
manufacturers. In one corner of the ring we have the giant Dutch company Royal Philips 
Electronics, which is one of the worlds’ biggest electronics companies and which for decades 
                                                 
1 Wessman, Rickard: Varumärkeskonflikter, page 323-324. 
2 See for instance Article 3(1)(e) of the First Directive 89/104/EEC of the Council, of 21 December 1988, to 
Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks. 
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was the sole supplier in the world of triple-headed shavers. In the other ring corner we have 
the challenger, a Japanese electronics manufacturing company called Izumi Products 
Company, which together with its related companies has contested Philips’ long-lasting 
monopoly position by trying to enter the triple-headed shaver market.3 The dispute, which is 
still ongoing at the time of writing this, has become one of the biggest legal battles of its kind, 
so far comprising more than 30 judgments and decisions from courts in 11 countries of 3 
different continents. The litigations have mainly concerned trademark law, but also 
competition law and design law have been at issue.  
 
1.1.1 History of the Dispute 
There are mainly two kinds of electric shavers. The ‘foil’ or ‘vibra’ kind has two or more 
cutting blades arranged on top of or next to each other, which move back and forth in a 
vibrating mode under a foil with small holes that catch the hairs. The other kind is the rotary 
shaver, which on its faceplate has one or more round cutting heads with blades rotating under 
a grid with holes where the hairs are collected and cut off by the rotating cutting blades 
underneath it. The main manufacturers of the ‘vibra’ or ‘foil’ type of shaver have historically 
been Braun and Remington, and lately also Panasonic. The rotary shaver had, until Izumi 
started its manufacturing in the early 1980s only been manufactured by Philips, which had 
developed a design comprising three rotary cutting heads arranged in each corner of an 
equilateral triangle. Philips had in numerous countries successfully obtained trademark 
protection for several different kinds of representations of the top part of the shaver, picture 
trademarks as well as three-dimensional shape trademarks as illustrated in Appendix A. When 
Izumi started to market its triple-headed shavers in the United States, Philips reacted strongly 
and sued Izumi and its associated company Windmere for patent and trademark infringement 
in October 19844. With this action, the shaver battle had begun and the legal dispute between 
the parties came to spread to countries all over the world and even now, after more than 20 
years, the legal battle is still going on. Numerous courts all over the world have had to decide 
on the trademark, design and competition issues that the parties have brought before them. 
Hence, the judgments resulting from the dispute constitute a unique opportunity for 
comparison of different courts’ legal assessments based on essentially the same 
circumstances. The judgments also provide an opportunity to compare the parties’ claims and 
argumentation in different jurisdictions and how the argumentation has changed over time.  
 
As you will find out when reading this thesis, Philips has ultimately been unsuccessful in 
practically all jurisdictions5, and the trademarks have been invalidated and expunged mainly 
because of their technical nature. Even if Philips has lost in most of the litigations, the 
company has still continued to strongly defend its market position or commence new legal 
actions against Izumi and its related companies. I find the unwillingness to give up and accept 
the defeat, which characterizes Philips in this dispute, interesting to analyze. Certainly, there 
must be commercial reasons for continuing an expensive legal battle when the chances of 
winning are deemed small.  
 
                                                 
3 There is general company information about Royal Philips Electronics and Izumi Products Company in 
Chapter 1.2.2 below. 
4 See Chapter 3.3. 
5 The only country in the world where Philips has been partly successful is Germany, where Philips’ competitor 
Remington is still restricted by an interlocutory injunction from selling Izumi-manufactured triple-headed 
shavers is Germany. However, three out of five of Philips’ German trademark registrations have been invalidated 
after being contested by Remington. 
 11
 1.1.2 Company Information 
1.1.2.1 Royal Philips Electronics 
Philips was founded in the Netherlands in 1891 and initially manufactured light bulbs. 
Philips’ first electric shaver was introduced on the market in 1939. During the 1940s and 
1950s Philips invented rotary heads that led to the development of the “PHILISHAVE” 
electric shaver. 6 At first the shaver had only one or two rotary cutting heads, but in 1966 the 
triple-headed shaver was introduced. Today Royal Philips Electronics is one of the world’s 
biggest electronics companies and the largest in Europe, with 160,900 employees in over 60 
countries and sales in 2004 of €30.3 billion.7 For the moment Philips owns 115,000 patents, 
22,000 trademark registrations, 11,000 registered designs and over 2,000 domain name 
registrations.8
 
1.1.2.2 Izumi Products Company 
Izumi Products Company was founded in Japan in 1939 as a precision tool manufacturer of 
hydraulic equipment and high-tech tools for utility companies throughout Japan.  
Seventeen years later, in 1956, Izumi established its Electric Appliances Division and entered 
the shaver business by manufacturing shaver cutter blades for domestic manufacturers of 
electric shavers in Japan.9 Izumi had a big success with blade manufacturing for others, so 
three years later, in 1959, the company decided to enter the electric shaver business with its 
own brand. Today Izumi is one of the world's largest manufacturers of electric shavers, and 
markets its own line of foil and rotary shavers as well manufacturing shavers for various other 
companies and private brand retailers, such as Remington, Sears, Sunbeam and Seiko. Izumi 
is the only company in the world that manufactures a full and complete line of both men's and 
women's foil-type and rotary-type electric and battery shavers.10 In March 2004 Izumi 
Products Company had 643 employees and sales in 200311 amounting to 19,300 million Yen, 
which is approximately €150.2 million.12  
 
1.1.3 Why this Subject? 
In order to find an interesting subject for my thesis, one of my professors, Ulf Petrusson, 
advised me to contact intellectual property lawyer Håkan Sjöström at Advokatfirman 
Glimstedt in Gothenburg to see if he had any ideas of thesis topics. Håkan Sjöström presented 
                                                 
6 Philips: “History”. Published in 2004-2005, available at 
http://www.philips.com/about/company/history/index.html (2005-06-14) 
7 Philips: “Global Profile”. Published in 2004-2005, available at http://www.philips.com/about/company/article-
14054.html (2005-06-14) 
8 Philips: “Company Profile, Other activities”. Published in 2004-2005, available at 
http://www.philips.com/about/company/businesses/section-14159/ (2005-06-14) 
9 Izumi: “Izumi Products Company Electric Appliances Only Chronological Order”. Published in 2004, available 
at http://www.izumishavers.com/about/history.asp (2005-06-14) 
10 Izumi: “About Izumi”. Published in 2004, available at  http://www.izumishavers.com/about/ (2005-06-14) 
11 The sales number was measured in March 2004, but I assume it represents the total sales for 2003. 
12 Izumi: “Izumi Products Company, Company Profile”. Published in 2004, available at http://www.izumi-
products.co.jp/english/profile-e/profCompany Profilei-e.htm (2005-05-14) 
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me to the shaver dispute,13 which I had only heard about briefly before, and I instantly found 
it to be an interesting subject from many points of view. The litigations of the various 
jurisdictions have concerned trademark, design and competition law, which are areas of law 
that I find particularly interesting. Being one of the biggest international trademark disputes 
concerning the shape of goods, it is fascinating to follow the development of the dispute and 
analyze the legal discussions. It is also interesting to determine how well the IP legislation has 
fulfilled its purpose and how it has been used as a tool to compete on the market.  
 
 
1.2  Purpose and Presentation of Questions 
1.2.1 Legal Analysis 
There are two main purposes of this thesis. The first purpose is to give a complete overview 
of the legal contents of the judgments and the legal development of the dispute. Thus, my 
ambition is to provide a close-to exhaustive14 presentation of the existing judgments 
concerning the electric shaver dispute between Philips and its various counterparties. I will 
particularly discuss the parties’ claims and arguments and the courts’ findings and judgments 
concerning: 
 
- capability of trademark protection (registrability/invalidation issues):  
- capability to distinguish; 
- distinctiveness;  
- absolute grounds for refusal of registration (or reasons for invalidation) of 
certain three-dimensional shapes, with the main focus on exclusion from 
protection of trademark shape features that are necessary for obtaining the 
technical result. 
- trademark infringement 
 
- design law (infringement etc.) 
 
- competition law (unfair competition etc.) 
 
Since the judgments are from numerous different countries worldwide, I have sought to 
provide an international perspective. As most of the judgments are European, it is inevitably 
so, that EC law is the dominating source of law in the judgments.  
 
Different jurisdictions offer various kinds of protection for a product’s shape, and in order for 
readers from all parts of the world to fully understand the legal discussions in the judgments, 
it has also been my ambition to give introductions or explanations to all the kinds of 
protection that are mentioned in the judgments or decisions. 
 
                                                 
13 Håkan Sjöström was representing Philips’ counterparty Ide Line AB/Rotary Shaver AB in the two Swedish 
litigations, which might explain why he had the shaver dispute in mind. 
14 As you will see below under “delimitations”, only very few judgments are excluded from having an own 
chapter in this thesis, but all the judgments are described or mentioned in other judgments I have referred. I 
would, however, like to make a reservation against the possibility that there might be other judgments that I have 
missed. 
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1.2.2 Assessment of Philips’ Strategy 
The other purpose of the thesis is a try to determine and analyze Philips’ international legal 
IPR enforcement and competition strategy and how successful or unsuccessful the strategy 
has been for Philips. I will also try to assess what consequences the strategy has had for 
Philips’ competitors and the competition on electric shaver markets all over the world. As I 
expressed above, it is interesting that Philips despite repetitious expensive losses has 
continued to initiate litigations and take other legal actions. What has Philips gained on this, 
and what has its competitors lost? What effects has Philips’ legal actions had on the triple-
headed shaver market, and how has the market changed since Philips lost its monopoly in 
certain countries? How well has the intellectual property legislation fulfilled its purpose in 
this case, and in what way has the competition been affected?  
 
 
1.3  Method and Material 
The method for this thesis is both descriptive and analytical. I have used an extensive case 
study to determine how courts of different jurisdictions view functionality aspects of 
trademarks, other related trademark matters and design and competition issues. The various 
legal assessments and the parties’ arguments have then been analyzed and compared with 
each other. Practically, the method used has been to read the original or translated judgments 
from the different countries, whereupon I have determined the most relevant or interesting 
parts of them and described and commented those. Obviously, I have had an extensive 
material to work with, which is also reflected by the number of pages of this thesis. I did not 
want to exclude any judgment since I wanted my comparison and analysis to be as 
comprehensive as possible and encompass the relevant parts of all the judgments between the 
parties concerning the electric shaver dispute, from a global perspective. The main purpose of 
having an exhaustive presentation of the judgments of the dispute is that in order to make an 
accurate assessment of Philips’ litigation strategy, it was of interest to include and discuss all 
the judgments, not just a few. Another purpose of not excluding any judgment was to provide 
information to readers only interested in the judgments of a particular jurisdiction.  
 
It is often difficult to get a hold of court decisions and judgments from other countries, and 
fortunately I have had a lot of help from Håkan Sjöström here in Sweden and the American 
lawyer William Androlia in the United States to collect those. William Androlia is the outside 
general legal council for Izumi and the international coordinator of Izumi’s worldwide 
litigations against Philips. Most of the judgments and decisions I have used are translations 
from the national language into English made by certified professional translators. During my 
work with this thesis, I have also had a sometimes-frequent email correspondence with Håkan 
Sjöström, who has kindly shared his legal knowledge and own experience of the matter.15  
 
For the chapter comprising information about various ways of legally protecting a product’s 
shape, but also other parts of the thesis, the knowledge sources used have been books, journal 
articles and the invaluable information sources of the Internet.  
 
Håkan Sjöström helped me to arrange two telephone interviews. The first interview was with 
Bengt Bohman, who was the owner of the company that was Philips’ opponent in the two 
Swedish litigations, Ide Line AB which later changed its name to Rotary Shaver Sweden AB. 
                                                 
15 As explained above, Håkan Sjöström represented Philips’ opponent Ide Line AB/Rotary Shaver AB in the two 
Swedish litigations. 
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Ide Line lost against Philips in 1997, but appealed and won the case in October 2004, when 
Philips’ trademark was invalidated and cancelled. The purpose of the interview was to hear 
what view one of Philips’ counterparties had on the dispute and what consequences the 
litigation had had for the business. I also wanted to find out how the situation on the Swedish 
shaver market had changed since the appeal judgment in Rotary Shaver’s favor was 
announced in 2004.16
 
The second telephone interview was with the American lawyer William Androlia, who, as 
mentioned above, is the outside general legal council for Izumi and the international 
coordinator of Izumi’s worldwide litigations against Philips. As William Androlia is certainly 
one of the persons in the world with the best knowledge of the shaver dispute, the interview 
was of great interest for many reasons. A main purpose of the interview was to determine the 
current situation of the shaver dispute in the various jurisdictions; where there are still 
pending cases and where the Izumi-manufactured shavers have actually been introduced to 
the market and are currently sold. I also intended to get further information on how the 
electric shaver markets has changed since the legal support of Philips’ monopoly position has 
been taken away. I also sought to determine how Philips from a business point of view had 
prepared for the coming competition from Izumi-made shavers and how the companies are 
competing now.17
 
I have tried to get in contact with Philips for comments and interviews, but as there are still 
litigations going on, Philips did not want to comment any of the litigations.18
 
 
1.4  Delimitations 
First of all, the reader is assumed to be familiar with intellectual property law, as basic 
knowledge has been excluded. Since I have made a nearly exhaustive presentation of all the 
cases of the dispute, there is naturally little delimitation when it comes to the case study. I 
have in this thesis referred all the judgments regarding the shaver dispute between the parties 
that I know of from the last ten years, being between 1995 and early 2005. Thus, I have not 
given the early US judgments from 1984 to 1995 any own chapters, but the cases are 
described in the last US judgment, which is referred in Chapter 3.3. Furthermore, there are a 
few German PTO decisions regarding cancellation cases that I miss, but as I have the appeals 
of those cases from the Federal Patent Court, the PTO decisions are not too important.  
Moreover, I have excluded any Japanese legal decisions that might have been the result of 
when Philips sued Izumi in Japan 1978. This Japanese lawsuit is mentioned in the American 
judgment, but I have found no further information about it. 
 
I have in the referred judgments excluded irrelevant details and tried to bring up only what is 
relevant and interesting in the context of the thesis. Of course, what is interesting is a 
subjective assessment and there might be parts of the thesis that some readers do not find 
interesting. However, I have in the beginning of nearly all of the judgment chapters pointed 
out what matters of the judgment I find particularly interesting, so that the reader gets an 
                                                 
16 The telephone interview with Bengt Bohman was held on April 29, 2005. 
17 The telephone interview with William Androlia was held on May 11, 2005. 
18 Philips’ representative in the two Swedish litigations, lawyer Ulf Dahlgren, was not able to give any comments 
to the litigations due to his secrecy obligation towards Philips, but he helpfully contacted Philips’ lawyers at the 
head office in the Netherlands and asked if they had any possibility to answer some of my questions. As 
explained above, that was impossible as there were still litigations going on.  
 15
implication of what to observe specifically when reading about the case. The main focus has 
been put on the technical aspects of trademark shapes, since that has been the main question 
discussed by the various courts. Naturally, less emphasis is put on other trademark matters.  
 
As I seek to provide a global perspective, I have not excluded any particular geographic area. 
The dispute has taken place in North America, Australia, New Zealand and Europe. Since 
most of the cases are concentrated to Europe, and the European Court of Justice has given a 
preliminary ruling on the matter, it has inevitably been a lot of focus on the European cases 
and the applicable EC law. This has, however, not been any intended delimitation.  
 
 
1.5  Outline and Reading Suggestions 
1.5.1 Outline 
In Chapter 2 I have chosen to describe the intellectual property rights and the competition law 
matters that have been discussed in the various litigations. There are many different ways of 
protecting a product’s shape and to ensure fair competition, and the possibilities vary in 
different jurisdictions and depend on the existing legislation, the current case law and the 
legal culture. Since I want readers mainly familiar with the law of a particular jurisdiction to 
understand the current law of other jurisdictions, I found reason to give an introduction to the 
various jurisdictions’ legal framework on the matter of shape protection and the relevant 
competition law.  
 
Chapter 3 comprises a complete overview of all the judgments of the dispute, presented in 
individual sub-chapters. The judgments are put in chronological order, with the exception of 
the appeal judgments, which are described in connection to the first instance decisions. In the 
cases where I have disregarded the chronological order, I have commented that in the text. My 
personal comments to the referred judgment are mainly put in the beginning of each chapter, 
in the end of it or in the footnotes.  
 
In Chapter 4 and 5 there are comparative legal discussions of the referred judgments, in which 
the various matters of the dispute are approached from each particular legal point of view; 
trademark distinctiveness, technical function, unfair competition etc. Under each sub-chapter 
is described what country’s court has dealt with the particular legal matter, the parties’ claims 
and arguments and the court’s findings. My ambition has been to describe both the courts’ 
and the parties’ views of the matter, as well as the development of the dispute in terms of a 
party’s changed argumentation over time or one court’s influence over the decision of another 
court. As the technical function of a trademark has been the major subject matter of the whole 
dispute, I have commented it particularly. In Chapter 4 the trademark-related matters are 
brought up, and in Chapter 5 the design right and competition law issues are discussed.  
 
Chapter 6 contains my findings regarding Philips’ strategy and what effects it has had on the 
competition on the triple-headed rotary shaver market. I also discuss the changes of the 
electric shaver market since Philips’ legal protection of its virtual monopoly position had been 
contested and taken away. Furthermore, the development and effects of the dispute is 
compared with the purpose of intellectual property law, and a few findings on the matter are 
presented. 
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In the end of the thesis there is an appendix with illustrations of Philips’ trademarks, based on 
their International IR Registrations. 
 
1.5.2 Reading Suggestions 
Being a quite extensive thesis, I find it appropriate to provide a suggestion on how to read it. 
Obviously, the reading manner depends on the reader’s interest, time or purpose with the 
reading. Since almost 90 pages of the thesis consist of referred cases, some readers might not 
have the possibility to read all the cases. For that reason, there is a “short-cut” way of 
comprehending the contents of this thesis; it is possible to pass over Chapter 3 with all the 
cases and read the legal analysis in Chapters 4 and 5 straight away.  
 
For readers already possessing good knowledge of various jurisdictions’ different ways of 
protecting a product’s shape, it is possible to skip Chapter 2 or read only some parts of it. 
Readers only interested in the assessment of Philips’ strategy and the market and competition 
effects of it can go straight to Chapter 6. If only wanting to read about one of the judgments, I 
suggest reading the ECJ preliminary ruling in Chapter 3.17, as it is certainly one the most 
influential judgments of the dispute. Also Chapter 3.26 regarding the situation in other 
countries is informative. 
 
To avoid any misunderstandings I also want to clarify the intended meaning of some 
frequently used words, even though their meaning is usually obvious. First of all, when I refer 
to “the Directive”, it is always the EC Trademark Directive that I mean (First Directive 
89/104/EEC of the Council, of 21 December 1988, to Approximate the Laws of the Member 
States Relating to Trade Marks.) With the “ECJ ruling” or ”ECJ decision” I mean no other 
ECJ case but the C-299/99 Philips v Remington preliminary ruling from June 18, 2002. 
Moreover, when referring to “Philips’ trademarks”, it is only the Philips trademarks 
concerning the triple-headed shaver that I mean, no other Philips trademarks. When 
discussing “Philips’ actions” or my conclusions regarding Philips’ conduct, it is only Philips’ 
actions in this particular dispute that I refer to, not Philips generally. 
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2 Legal Protection of a Product Shape  
 
2.1 Possibilities to Protect a Three-Dimensional Shape 
There are many different ways of protecting a product’s shape, and the possibilities vary in 
different jurisdictions and depend on the legal tradition expressed in the existing legislation or 
the current case law. All the jurisdictions that I have come across during the course of this 
thesis offer trademark protection for the shape of a product, as long as certain criteria are 
fulfilled. In the USA there is also “trade dress” protection, which is further described below. 
Often there are also possibilities to obtain design protection, as well as protection of the shape 
of product from confusingly similar imitations under competition law.  
 
2.2 Trademark Protection 
2.2.1 The Increasing Importance of Trademarks 
The importance and complexity of trademarks has undoubtedly increased during the past 
decades because of the internationalization of the market and the introduction of new types of 
trademarks, such as shape, scent and sound marks. There has been a dramatic increase of 
trademarks, and the development does not seem to cease but rather speed up. The escalating 
number of trademarks and the internationalization of markets have created a crowding of 
trademarks on the global market, which significantly has increased the risk for trademark 
conflicts.19 The special character of trademark protection in relation to other intellectual 
property rights is mainly due to the time scope of protection. Theoretically, a trademark can 
last forever as long as it is actively used, which is also a factor that adds to the crowding of 
trademark registrations. 
 
The increasing importance of trademarks on the market can be explained by the companies 
becoming more and more aware of the possibility to extract value from trademarks by 
building strong brands and protecting these in every possible ways; in some cases the brand is 
considered even more important and valuable than the product itself. The economical 
potential of trademarks is enormous, and the value of a trademark has in some cases reached 
astronomical figures, as in the case of the COCA-COLA brand name. According to 
BusinessWeek online’s “2004 Global Brands Scoreboard”, the COCA-COLA brand is 
currently valued at $ 67.3 billion! 
 
Regarding the terminology, ‘brand’ is a very common term used in the context of trademarks. 
Brand and trademark does not, however, have the same meaning, even if the two words cover 
partly the same area. While ‘trademark’ mainly is used to describe the legal construction, 
‘brand’ covers a wider scope and is usually defined as a trademark’s image; the experience 
connected and associated with the trademark.   
 
2.2.2 The Paris Convention 
The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property was established in 1883, and 
was the first major international treaty designed to help the people of one member country to 
                                                 
19 Wessman, Rickard: Varumärkeskonflikter, pages 323-324. 
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obtain protection in other countries for their intellectual property. The Directive as well as 
many national trademark legislations are originally based on the Article 6 bis and 6 quinquies 
of the Paris Convention. The articles of the Convention mentioned in the judgments of this 
thesis are Article 3, Article 6 bis and Article 6 quinquies B. Article 3 provides:  
 
Nationals of countries outside the Union [i.e. the Paris Convention member countries] who are domiciled or who 
have real and effective industrial or commercial establishments in the territory of one of the countries of the 
Union shall be treated in the same manner as nationals of the countries of the Union.  
 
 
Article 6 bis concerns protection of well-known marks, and provides: 
 
(1) The countries of the Union undertake, ex officio if their legislation so permits, or at the request of an 
interested party, to refuse or to cancel the registration, and to prohibit the use, of a trademark which 
constitutes a reproduction, an imitation, or a translation, liable to create confusion, of a mark considered 
by the competent authority of the country of registration or use to be well known in that country as 
being already the mark of a person entitled to the benefits of this Convention and used for identical or 
similar goods. These provisions shall also apply when the essential part of the mark constitutes a 
reproduction of any such well-known mark or an imitation liable to cause confusion therewith. 
(2) A period of at least five years from the date of registration shall be allowed for requesting the 
cancellation of such mark. The countries of the Union may provide for a period within which the 
prohibition of use must be requested. 
(3) No time limit shall be fixed for requesting the cancellation or the prohibition of the use of marks 
registered or used in bad faith.  
 
 
Article 6 quinquies regulates the protection of marks registered in one country of the Union in 
other countries of the Union and provides: 
 
Trademarks covered by this Article may be neither denied registration nor invalidated except in the following 
cases: 
 
(i) when they are of such a nature as to infringe rights acquired by third parties in the country where 
protection is claimed; 
(ii) when they are devoid of any distinctive character, or consists exclusively of signs or indications 
which may serve, in trade, to designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, place of 
origin, of the goods, or the time of production, or have become customary in the current language 
or in the bona fide and established practices of the trade of the country where protection is claimed; 
(iii) when they are contrary to morality or public order and, in particular, of such nature as to deceive 
the public. It is understood that a mark may not be considered contrary to public order for the sole 
reason that it does not conform to a provision of the legislation on marks, except if such provision 
itself relates to public order.  
 
2.2.3 European Community Trademark Legislation 
The European Community members are all obliged to comply with the current EC legislation 
on the areas of law which are harmonized, trademark law being one of them. In 1989 a 
Directive came into force, which had the purpose of approximating the laws of the Member 
States relating to trademarks20. The objective was to remove existing disparities which might 
impede the free movement of goods and freedom to provide services and might distort 
competition within the common market.21 As a result, the EC member states have very similar 
                                                 
20 First Directive 89/104/EEC of the Council, of 21 December 1988, to Approximate the Laws of the Member 
States Relating to Trade Marks. 
21 ECJ preliminary ruling (C-299/99) of June 18, 2002, paragraph 3. 
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trademark legislations and are all obliged to interpret the legislation in the light of the current 
community law and to comply with ECJ case law.  
 
Thus, trademark protection can be granted according to the national legislation in the EC 
member states, which is mainly based on the Directive. National trademark law often offers 
protection by registration as well as protection for unregistered trademarks which have 
acquired distinctiveness. Protection of a trademark can also be obtained by registration of the 
mark as a Community Trademark in accordance with Council Regulation (EC) 40/94 of 20 
December 1993 on Community Trademark (Community Trade Mark Regulation, “CTMR”). 
Hence, the Community Trademark can only be obtained through registration, which makes it 
easier to know who owns what trademarks in respect of what kind of goods. The registered 
information is of interest both for competitors and in the case of infringement, as the 
exclusivity and the scope of the trademark right is then easier to prove.  
 
Hence, the Directive and the Regulation does not regulate the same matters but represents two 
parallel existing trademark systems. The Directive co-ordinates the national trademark 
legislations in order to eliminate any obstacles to free trade within the union that any 
disparities may cause. The Regulation, on the other hand, has introduced a new trademark 
system with a direct applicability in the EC member states, administered by the Office for 
Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trademarks and Designs) (OHIM). Neither the 
Directive nor the Regulation is comprehensive, and for example sanctions for infringement of 
a trademark right are always regulated nationally.22 As a consequence of the similarity of the 
sanctions, i.e. the legal consequence, the national registration offices and courts are 
undoubtedly affected by the legal development by both the ECJ and the OHIM.23  
 
The most common definition of a trademark is that it may consist of any sign which is capable 
of being presented graphically, provided that such sign is capable of distinguishing the goods 
of one undertaking from those of others.24 Hence, the exclusivity granted by trademark 
protection gives the proprietor of the mark the right to impede the use or registration of 
identical or similar marks if there is a risk for confusion regarding the corporate origin of the 
products.  
 
The provisions of the Directive and the Regulation which exclude from trademark registration 
shapes with technical functions are substantially identical, and I will therefore refer only to 
the Directive hereinafter. Article 3(1)(b) to (d) of the Directive lists grounds for refusal of 
registration or invalidity of a registration, which according to Article 3(3) can be overcome 
only if the mark has acquired a distinctive character through use. Subsection (e) provides 
three absolute grounds for refusal of some shape of goods, which cannot be overcome by any 
evidence of acquired distinctiveness. Article 3(1)(e) of the Directive provides: 
 
The following shall not be registered or if registered shall be liable to be declared invalid: 
(e) signs which consists exclusively of: 
- the shape which results from the nature of the goods themselves, or 
- the shape of goods which is necessary to obtain a technical result, or 
- the shape which gives substantial value to the goods; 
                                                 
22 Tufegdzic, Goran: EG-varumärke –en sammanställning av praxis avseende tolkningen av artikel 7(1) CTMR, 
page 9. 
23 Tufegdzic, Goran: EG-varumärke –en sammanställning av praxis avseende tolkningen av artikel 7(1) CTMR, 
page 80. 
24 This definition in more detail can be found in Article 4 of the CTMR Regulation and Article 2 of the 
Directive. 
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How this provision, in particular the second indent, was applied and interpreted by the ECJ in 
a preliminary ruling is described in Chapter 3.27 below. You will also in the descriptions of 
the various judgments find several European courts’ interpretations of these provisions of the 
Directive.  
 
2.2.4 Madrid System for the International Registration of Marks 
The Madrid system for the international registration of marks established in 1891 functions 
under the Madrid Agreement (1891) and the Madrid Protocol (1989) and is administered by 
the WIPO, which is a UN organ. The Madrid system offers a trademark owner the possibility 
to have his trademark registered in several member countries by simply filing one application 
to his national or regional trademark office and designating which countries he wishes to 
obtain protection in. An international mark applied for through the Madrid system is 
equivalent to an application of the same mark filed directly to the trademark office each of the 
countries designated, which obviously saves both time and effort for the applicant. If the 
trademark office of a designated country does not refuse protection, the national protection of 
the mark is the same as for the marks registered directly at the national trademark office. The 
Madrid system also simplifies the management of the mark, as it is possible to renew the 
registration through one single procedural step and thus avoid having to renew the mark in 
each of the designated countries.25 In this thesis I refer to all the registrations by the Madrid 
system as international IR registrations.  
 
2.2.5 Trade Dress and the Functionality Doctrine in the USA 
In the US judgment described in Chapter 3.3 the matter of trade dress is mentioned, and 
therefore I will give a brief introduction to the matter. The United States Lanham Act 
provides protection both for registered trademarks and for unregistered marks, including trade 
dress. Trade dress applies to the total image and overall appearance that distinguishes a 
product or service. Hence, trade dress is the totality of elements in which a product or service 
is packaged or presented. These elements combine to create the whole visual image presented 
to customers, and are capable of acquiring exclusive legal rights as a type of trademark or 
identifying symbol of origin. For Lanham Act purposes, trade dress is broader in scope than 
trademark protection and may consist of a symbol, design, device, texture, color, shape, 
graphics, or combinations of those, provided that the trade dress identifies the product’s or 
service’s origin.  
 
Trade dress protection is time-limited and can be obtained by registration. Also un-registered 
trade dress can enjoy protection through usage as long as it, in case of infringement, fulfills 
the requirements under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)26. In order to register 
a trade dress, it needs to be distinctive and non-functional, and in an infringement case it also 
needs to be shown that the trade dress of the two competing products are confusingly similar. 
Regarding the requirement of distinctiveness, trade dress can be either shown to be inherently 
distinctive or that it has acquired secondary meaning by established use on the market. A 
                                                 
25 WIPO: “Madrid System for the International Registration of Marks”, available on 
http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/ (2005-06-14) 
26 § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) provides that “a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence: (1) that its trade dress has obtained ‘secondary meaning’ in the marketplace; (2) that the trade dress 
of the two competing products is confusingly similar; and (3) that the appropriated features of the trade dress are 
primarily nonfunctional.” 
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trade dress is inherently distinctive if it is arbitrary, fanciful or suggestive. Distinctiveness 
through secondary meaning has been obtained when the public recognizes that the primary 
significance of the trade dress is identification of the product’s source, not the product itself27.  
 
Most interesting in the context of this work is the requirement for non-functionality. A feature 
is functional as a matter of law if it is “essential to the use or purpose of the product or if it 
affects the cost or quality of the product” as the Supreme Court explained it in TrafFix 
Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.28. The American functionality doctrine, which 
prohibits registration of functional product features, is intended to encourage legitimate 
competition by maintaining the proper balance between trademark law and patent law. In 
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co. Inc., the US Supreme Court explained that: 
 
The functionality doctrine prevents trademark law, which seeks to promote competition by protecting 
a firm’s reputation, from instead inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to control a 
useful product feature. It is the province of patent law, not trademark law, to encourage invention by 
granting inventors a monopoly over new product designs or functions for a limited time, 35 U.S.C. 
§§154, 173, after which competitors are free to use the innovation. If a product’s functional features 
could be used as trademarks, however, a monopoly over such features could be obtained without 
regard to whether they qualify as patents and could be extended forever (because trademarks may be 
renewed in perpetuity).29
 
In TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., the Supreme Court decided that the 
functionality doctrine is not affected by evidence of acquired distinctiveness: 
 
The Lanham Act does not exist to reward manufacturers for their innovation in creating a particular 
device; that is the purpose of the patent law and its period of exclusivity. The Lanham Act, 
furthermore, does not protect trade dress in a functional design simply because an investment has 
been made to encourage the public to associate a particular functional feature with a single 
manufacturer or seller. 30
 
This means that even when evidence establishes that consumers have come to associate a 
functional product feature with a single source, trade dress protection will not be granted.  
 
2.2.6 Trademarks and Distinguishing Guises in Canada 
In Canada there are three categories of trademarks: ordinary marks, which are words or 
symbols (including two-dimensional “design marks”), category marks which identify goods 
or services which meet a defined standard, and distinguishing guise marks. Distinguishing 
guise marks identify the shaping of goods31 or their containers, and can also be a mode of 
wrapping or packaging goods. A decisive requirement for registration is that the purpose of 
the shaping or packaging has to be to distinguish the goods or services from those of others.32 
However, if a three-dimensional mark does not fall within the definition of a distinguishing 
guise, it can be registered as an ordinary, but three-dimensional, trademark as long as it is 
capable of distinguishing the goods. Trademarks that contain color as an element are 
                                                 
27 Daley, Annamarie: “Supreme Court Defines Scope of Trade Dress Protection for Product Design” (Robins, 
Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi L.L.P.) Published in 2000, available at http://www.rkmc.com/article.asp?articleId=108 
(2005-06-14) 
28 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 58 USPQ2d 1001, 1006 (2001). 
29 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995). 
30 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34-35 (2001). 
31 In the Canadian Trademarks Act the word “wares” is used instead of “goods”. 
32 Canadian Intellectual Property Office: “A Guide to Trade-marks: The Basics.” Published on 2005-04-11, 
available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc_mrksv/cipo/tm/tm_gd_basic-e.html#section01 (2005-06-14) 
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considered to be distinguishing guises if the color forms part of a mode of wrapping or 
packaging goods which is used to distinguish the goods or services from others’.   
 
It appears to be an important objective of the distinguishing guise provisions of the Canadian 
Trademarks Act to prevent the registration of marks that would interfere with the use of any 
utilitarian feature or would unreasonably interfere with the development of any art or 
industry. A distinguishing guise is only registrable if it has been so used in Canada by the 
applicant (or his predecessor in title) as to have become distinctive, i.e. has acquired 
distinctiveness. To be distinctive, the guise must have come to mean to purchasers that the 
goods or services sold in association with the guise come from one source; it must function in 
the marketplace to distinguish the goods or services of the undertaking from those of others’. 
Hence, the onus on the applicant to establish that a distinguishing guise has become 
distinctive in respect of particular goods or services is quite heavy. It is particularly severe in 
cases where the guise is inherently weak such as where the guise has a significant utilitarian 
function. Sufficient evidence has to be provided to establish the acquired distinctiveness, such 
as survey evidence or affidavits from actual purchasers, evidence of very significant sales and 
advertising, evidence that no-one else is using a similar mark etc. A mark or guise that is 
primarily functional from either an ornamental or a utilitarian point of view cannot be 
registered if the functionality relates primarily or essentially to the goods or services covered 
by the application. Furthermore, a distinguishing guise is registrable only if the exclusive use 
by the applicant of the distinguishing guise is not likely to limit the development of any art or 
industry.33  
 
Another interesting way of protecting shape in Canada is offered by the Industrial Design Act, 
which may protect a design from unlawful imitation.34 An industrial design is the features of 
shape, configuration, pattern or ornament (or any combination of those) applied to a finished 
article made by hand, tool or machine. The design must be original and have features that 
appeal to the eye in order to be registered.35 It is important to notice that an industrial design 
is an own intellectual property right and has nothing to do with trademark protection. An 
industrial design needs to be registered, and is valid for ten years from the date of registration 
subject to payment of a maintenance fee.36
 
2.3 Design Right Protection 
A design right protects the visual look of a design, giving the proprietor of the design 
protection from competitors starting to market products with an identical or similar shape. 
Design protection is a fast growing intellectual property right, especially in Europe. It differs 
from trademark protection in many ways, but there are also some similarities such as the 
European exclusion from protection of functional features of the shape. Also design law is a 
harmonized area of law within the EU, which means that all the member states are obliged to 
interpret the harmonized national legislation in the light of the current community law and to 
                                                 
33 Canadian Intellectual Property Office: “Practice Notice: Three-dimensional Marks”. Published on 2004-06-14, 
available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc_mrksv/cipo/tm/tm_notice/tmn2000-12-06-e.html (2005-06-14) 
34 Canadian Intellectual Property Office: “A Guide to Industrial Designs: Introduction”. Published on 2004-06-
14, available at  http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc_mrksv/cipo/id/id_gd_intro-e.html#section01 (2005-06-14) 
35 Canadian Intellectual Property Office: “A Guide to Industrial Designs: the Basics”. Published on 2004-06-14, 
available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc_mrksv/cipo/id/id_gd_basic-e.html#section01 (2005-06-14) 
36 Canadian Intellectual Property Office: “A Guide to Industrial Designs: the Process”. Published on 2004-06-14, 
available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc_mrksv/cipo/id/id_gd_process-e.html#section08 (2005-06-14) 
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comply with ECJ case law. Design rights were only claimed in two of the judgments, namely 
the first UK judgment and the Australian decision. 
 
In this context I also find it interesting to add that in the USA, there is yet another way of 
protecting design and ornamental aspects, namely by obtaining a design patent37, which is 
actually a part of the US patent legislation.38 A design patent requires that the design is novel, 
original, ornamental, non-functional and unobvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art. 
Design patents are valid for 14 years from the date of issue, and are relatively expensive to 
obtain. Under US law, the rights pertaining to design patent and trademark or trade dress 
protection exist independently. The existence or termination of either right has no legal effect 
on the availability or continuance of the other.39  
 
2.3.1 European Community Design Legislation 
The harmonization within the European Community of design protection has been carried out 
mainly by the adoption of Directive 98/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 13 October 1998 on the legal protection of designs (“the Design Directive”). There is also a 
EC Regulation concerning the Community Design, Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 of 12 
December, 2001 on Community Designs (“the Community Designs Regulation”). In both the 
Design Directive and the Community Designs Regulation, a design is defined as “the 
appearance of the whole or a part of a product resulting from the features of, in particular, the 
lines, contours, colors, shape, texture and/or materials of the product itself and/or its 
ornamentation”. Hence, design protection is given to the outward appearance of the product, 
not to its function, which can only be protected through a patent registration. 
 
It is thus possible to get a national design protection under the national legislation harmonized 
by the Design Directive. The national legal protection of designs provides for a term of 
protection that may be renewed up to a total term of 25 years40. Since January 2003 design 
protection can also be applied for at the OHIM41 in order to obtain protection in all member 
states as a registered Community Design under the Community Designs Regulation. The 
Community Design right is valid throughout the EU market, and the protection allows the 
proprietor to forbid unauthorized production of the protected design in all the EU countries 
and to stop violating imports into the EU at all possible entry points.42 The term of protection 
of a registered Community Design is a period of five years as from the filing of the 
application, with a possibility to have the term of protection renewed with five years at the 
time up to a total of 25 years.43 With the adoption of the Community Designs Regulation, also 
protection of unregistered Community Designs has been available as from 6 March 200244. A 
                                                 
37 The terminology “industrial design” is used in some other jurisdictions. 
38 Koktvedgaard, Mogens and Levin, Marianne: Lärobok i immaterialrätt, page 288. 
39 International Association for the Protection of Intellectual Property (AIPPI): “Three-dimensional Marks: the 
borderline between trademarks and industrial designs”. AIPPI Reports Q 148 (no publishing date), available on  
http://www.aippi.org/reports/q148/gr-q148-e-usa.htm (2005-06-14) 
40 See Article 10 of the Design Directive. 
41 Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trademarks and Designs) (OHIM): “Community design” (no 
publishing date), available at http://www.ohim.eu.int/en/design/default.htm (2005-06-14) 
42 Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trademarks and Designs) (OHIM): “The registered 
Community design –leaflet” (no publishing date),available at http://www.ohim.eu.int/en/design/pdf/leaflet1.pdf 
(2005-06-14) 
43 See Article 12 of the Design Directive. 
44 Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trademarks and Designs) (OHIM): “Community design” (no 
publishing date), available at http://www.ohim.eu.int/en/design/default.htm (2005-06-14) 
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design has an unregistered protection for a period of three years as from the date on which the 
design was first made available to the public within the Community, provided that the design 
fulfills certain requirements set out in Section 1 of the Designs Regulation45.  
In order to register a design, the design needs to be new and have an individual character.46 
There is an interesting exception to the criterion on novelty. A twelve months grace period 
allows design owners to market or otherwise exhibit their product a full year before applying 
for protection, without destroying the novelty. Because of the unregistered protection 
described above, the design is protected also during the grace period.47
Three-dimensional marks:  
the borderline between trademarks and industrial designs  
 
2.3.2 Technical Functions of Designs and Trademarks in Comparison 
Most interesting in the context of this work is, however, the functionality aspects, which are 
somewhat similar to those of trademark protection. Common for the both the Design 
Directive and the Design Regulation is the exception from registration of features of 
appearance solely dictated by its technical function.48 In the preamble to the Designs 
Regulation, which serves as a ground for interpretation explaining the purpose behind the 
provisions, the Council held that: 
 
Technological innovation should not be hampered by granting design protection to features dictated 
solely by a technical function. It is understood that this does not entail that a design must have an 
aesthetic quality.49
 
When the Philips shaver case was referred to the ECJ by the UK Court of Appeal, the 
Advocate-General brought up the matter of design protection in his Opinion50, when trying to 
clarify and grasp the scope of the trademark exclusion paragraphs. He compared trademark 
protection with design protection, and held that the Designs Directive refuses to recognize 
external features “which are solely dictated by its technical function”, while the Trademarks 
Directive excludes from protection “signs which consists exclusively of the shape of goods 
which is necessary to obtain a technical result”. The Advocate-General concluded that the 
level of “functionality” must be greater in order to be able to assess the ground for refusal in 
the context of designs. He further held that a functional design might nonetheless be eligible 
for protection if it can be shown that the same technical function could be achieved by a 
different form. He concluded that the bar for assessing whether a ground for excluding a 
functional form applies is set higher for designs than for trademarks, since the nature and 
scope of their protection is so different. While trademarks protect the goods’ identity, origin 
and goodwill, designs protect the substantial value of the goods, which makes it easier to give 
protection to designs that combine functional and aesthetic features than to trademarks. The 
ECJ later decided in its judgment that evidence of other shapes that could obtain the same 
technical result was irrelevant when it comes to excluding from or invalidating trademark 
protection. This constitutes a clear difference in comparison to design protection, since the 
exclusions from design registration of the Design Directive and Design Regulation almost 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
45 See Section 2 Article 11(1) of the Designs Regulation. 
46 See Section 1 Articles 4-6 of the Designs Regulation. 
47 Regarding the grace period, see Section 1 Article 7 of the Designs Regulation. 
48 Article 7 of the Design Directive and Section 1 Article 8 of the Designs Regulation. 
49 Paragraph 10 of the Preamble of the Designs Regulation. 
50 Opinion of General-Advocate Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, delivered on January 23, 2001, Case No C-299/99. 
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certainly are to be interpreted to be used only when there are no possible alternative variations 
of the shape. If that is a correct interpretation, it could in design cases be of decisive 
importance if the owner of the design can show alternative shapes for obtaining the same 
technical result51.  
 
2.3.3 Design Right and Passing Off in Australia 
In Australia a design can be registered under the new Designs Act 2003, which came into 
force as recently as on June 17, 2004. The Australian judgment described in Chapter 3.8 
concerns, inter alia, a design registration registered under the previous act, Designs Act 1906. 
According to IP Australia, which is the Australian Government IP organization, a design 
relates to the features of shape, configuration, pattern or ornamentation which, when applied 
to a product, gives the product a unique appearance.52 In order to be registered a design must 
be new, meaning that it the design, or a very similar design, has not been publicly used in 
Australia or published in a document within or outside Australia. To be registered, the design 
also needs to be distinctive, which is a criterion that is fulfilled if the design is substantially 
different in the overall appearance compared to other designs already in the public domain.53 
A registered design gives the proprietor protection for the visual appearance of the product, 
but not how the product works.54 The maximum term of registration is ten years from the 
filing date, if the registration is renewed after the fifth year.55
 
In this work, the technical aspect of shapes is in focus, and in the Australian Designs Act there 
are no explicit provisions excluding technical features from registration. However, indirectly, 
a technical function of a product is not protected, since the protection covers only the visual 
features of the design. The overall appearance of a design can consist of one or more visual 
features of the product.56 In the definition of a visual feature is stated that a visual feature 
may, but need not, serve a functional purpose.57 Hence, even though a certain design or part 
of it may have a functional purpose, it is not the function but the way it looks that is protected, 
if it is new and distinctive. 
 
Passing off, being a tort, is not directly governed by legislation since the area of law arises out 
of the common law rather than statute. Australia’s law of passing off is based on UK law, so 
UK case law is likely to be persuasive in Australia. The tort of passing off is an action used to 
prevent one trader from misusing and damaging another trader's goodwill or reputation by 
misrepresenting that the first trader’s goods or services are those of or related to the other 
trader, and thus conceive the consumers. Most passing off actions are brought in conjunction 
with an action under Section 52 of Part V of the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974, which 
prohibits corporations from engaging in misleading and deceptive conduct58 that would result 
                                                 
51 Kylhammar, Anders: “Teknisk funktion som utesluter varumärkes- och mönsterskydd”, Festskrift till Kaj 
Sandart, page 74. 
52 Australian Government -IP Australia: “Designs”. Published in 2005, available at 
http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/designs/index.shtml (2005-06-14) 
53Australian Government -IP Australia: “What is a design?” Published in 2005, available at 
http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/designs/what_index.shtml (2005-06-14) 
54 Australian Government -IP Australia: “Designs”. Published in 2005, available at 
http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/designs/index.shtml (2005-06-14) 
55 See Division 3 Section 46-50 of the Australian Designs Act 2003. 
56 Part 2 Section 5 of the Australian Designs Act 2003. 
57 Part 2 Section 7 of the Australian Designs Act 2003. 
58 Australian Intellectual Property Locus: “Passing Off”. Published in 1995/6, available at 
http://members.ozemail.com.au/~pxc/iplocus/passing_off.html#materials (2005-06-14) 
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in unfair competition. The two actions are similar, but for a certain conduct to amount to 
passing off it is necessary to prove that customers have actually been misled, which is not a 
requirement under the trade practices provision.59 Passing off has to be distinguished from 
infringement of registered trademarks, which is another tort. However, passing off is often 
used as a form of intellectual property enforcement, particularly for unregistered trademarks 
or against trademarks that are only marginally different from registered trademarks.60
 
 
2.4  Philips’ Protection of Shape 
Philips has a considerable portfolio of intellectual property rights comprising 115,000 patents, 
22,000 trademark registrations, 11,000 registered designs and over 2,000 domain name 
registrations.61 Obviously, Philips has realized the value of protecting and exploiting its 
intellectual property, and seems to have a very active IP organization. The working parts of 
Philips’ triple-headed shaver was originally protected by patents in both the US and Europe. 
After the patents expired, Philips has focused on obtaining various kinds of trademark 
protection for the shape of the top part of its triple-headed shaver, both figurative picture 
marks and three-dimensional marks. Philips managed to get the shaver shape registered as a 
trademark in numerous countries, and as a registered design in some other jurisdictions. In the 
USA it was registered as a trade dress and in Canada as a distinguishing guise mark. Many of 
the registrations have now been invalidated and expunged, which you will read about in the 
next chapter.  
 
                                                 
59 Oz Netlaw: “Fact sheets: Trademarks, Domain Names and Passing Off”. Published on 2003-04-15, available 
at http://www.oznetlaw.net/facts.asp?action=content&categoryid=239 (2005-06-14) 
60 Wikipedia –The Free Encyclopedia: “passing off”. Published on 2005-04-01, available at   
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Passing_off (2005-06-14) 
61 Philips: “Company Profile, Other activities”. Published in 2004-2005, available at 
http://www.philips.com/about/company/businesses/section-14159/ (2005-06-14) 
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3 The Judgments  
3.1 The Chronological Order 
The judgments or decisions are presented in chronological order, except the appeal 
judgments, which are put directly after the first instance decisions. This is the correct 
chronological order of the judgments described in this chapter: 
3.1.1 Jurisdiction / Country Date 
1. Canada  December 12, 1995  
2. USA   May 21, 1996 
3. Sweden (1)  June 25, 1997 
4. UK (1)  December 22, 1997 
5. UK (2 –appeal)  May 5, 1999 
6. Australia  June 18, 1999 
7. Opinion of Advocate-General January 23, 2001 
8. Germany (1 -PTO)  October 18, 2001 
9. ECJ preliminary ruling June 18, 2002 
10. Germany (2)  November 5, 2002 
11. Germany (3 – appeal) May 9, 2003 
12. France (1)  June 13, 2003 
13. Spain (1 –prel. resolution) July 31, 2003 
14. New Zealand  August 4, 2003 
15. Sweden (2 –appeal) January 28, 2004 
16. Italy    February 26, 2004 
17. Germany (4 -FPC appeal) April 14, 2004 
18. Germany (5 -FPC appeal) April 14, 2004 
19. Germany (6 -FPC appeal) May 4, 2004 
20. Germany (7- FPC appeal) May 4, 2004 
21. Spain (2 –judgment) May 6, 2004 
22. UK (3)  June 21, 2004 
23. Portugal   June 23, 2004 
24. Germany (8 -PTO)  November 12, 2004 
25. France (2 –appeal)  February 16, 2005 
 
 
Many of the judgments are very extensive, and I have therefore brought up only matters that I 
have found relevant in the context of this work or otherwise interesting. In most judgments I 
have described the dispute background, the parties’ claims and arguments, the relevant 
legislation and the court’s legal reasoning and final decision. There is also either a description 
of the registered trademark or a referral to one of the illustrations of Philips’ trademarks in 
Appendix A. 
 
In cases where there is an appeal judgment, the focus is put on the final decision, but relevant 
parts of the first instance decision are also discussed. As mentioned above, the judgments are 
presented in chronological order with the exception of the appeal judgments, which usually 
are put in connection with the first instance decisions. In some cases there has been other 
interesting judgments in between two national judgments, which might have affected the 
appeal judgment. I am mainly thinking of the ECJ preliminary judgment, which affected the 
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adjudication of many national EC member courts which are all obliged to follow the ECJ’s 
precedent interpretation of harmonized EC legislation. In most cases where I have disregarded 
the chronological order, I have commented it in a note.  
 
 
 
3.2  CANADA: Federal Court of Appeal, Ottawa, Ontario  
Date of judgment62: December 12, 1995  
3.2.1 Dispute Background 
Canada was the second country, after the United States, where the shaver dispute between 
Philips and Remington was brought up to justice63. Remington64 intended to import and 
market in Canada Izumi-manufactured triple-headed rotary electric shaver similar to the 
Philips shavers already existing on the market. In the first instance, Remington had claimed 
four Philips’65 trademark registrations to be invalid as functional features of the electric 
shaver. Remington’s claim for invalidation of the trademarks had been refused by the court, 
and Remington appealed the judgment.  
 
3.2.2 The Main Question 
The court clarified that the descriptions of the two trademarks under appeal were pictorial, 
and both cases concerned the effect of functionality of the registered marks. The main 
question was thus whether a pictorial description of a manufactured article, in particular of 
some of its working parts, could be the subject of a trademark registration. I find the judgment 
interesting as it shows in what way the Canadian court has reasoned about functionality 
aspects, supported by case law since there was no express statutory legislation basis. Some of 
the referred case law is worthy of note from a functional point of view, since it gives good 
examples of different kinds of functional features. In Europe it seems like most of the focus 
has been put on technical functions, while the Canadian functionality doctrine expressly 
invalidates trademarks which are primarily functional from either an aesthetical/decorative or 
utilitarian point of view66. An example of the Canadian view on functionality is the case that 
concerned the functional element of a telephone number used to distinguish a certain pizza 
take-out business, which you will read about below. 
                                                 
62 Case No. A-633-93. 
63 In October 1984 Philips had commenced proceedings in the United States alleging patent and trademark 
infringement against Izumi and its associated company Windmere. I have chosen not to describe those early US 
decisions in own chapters, which is why this Canadian judgment is presented first. 
64 Remington Rand Corporation and Remington Product (Canada) Inc.  
65 Philips Electronics N.V. 
66 The Canadian aesthetical functionality can be seen to correspond to the third indent of Article 3(1)(e) of the 
Directive, which excludes from protection shapes that give the product “substantial value”, a provision intended 
to exclude exclusively ornamental shapes. The utilitarian functionality discussed in Canadian law most likely 
corresponds to the second indent of Article 3(1)(e), which excludes technically determined shapes from 
registration. 
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3.2.3  The Registered Trademarks 
The appeal related to two of the four trademark registrations that Remington initially had 
claimed to be invalid.67 One of the registrations in issue was registered as a distinguishing 
guise68 and was a representation of an actual three-dimensional, triple-headed rotary shaver 
head assembly. The other registration was registered as a design trademark69 and consisted of 
a two-dimensional mark of almost the same triple-headed rotary shaver head assembly. The 
only difference in appearance between the marks was the “clover-leaf” shaped rim 
surrounding the rotary heads on the distinguishing guise mark. This difference was, however, 
not given any relevance in the judgment. 
 
The court handled the two trademarks separately, so I will first go through the judgment on 
the design mark and then the court’s decision on the distinguishing guise. 
 
3.2.4 The Design Mark 
3.2.4.1  Case Law 
The Court of Appeal, as well as the first instance Trial Judge, found it to be common ground 
that the invalidity of a trademark registration on the basis of functionality had no express 
statutory basis and thus had to be found in the case law. I will therefore bring up some of the 
relevant cases that led to the court’s decision, starting with Imperial Tobacco Company of 
Canada Limited v. The Registrar of Trade Marks70. A design mark registration had been 
sought for a cellophane outer wrapper for tobacco products with a narrow colored band 
extended around the package. Registration was refused on the grounds that the colored band 
performed the function of indicating where the tear strip was located, thus facilitating the 
opening of the wrapper, and since such wrapper was used also by other manufacturers, it 
would not identify the wares wrapped as those of the applicant. The judge concluded that any 
combination of elements which was primarily designed to perform a function was not fit 
subject matter for a trademark and if permitted would lead to serious abuses. 
 
A similar issue was considered by the Supreme Court of Canada in Parke, Davis & Company 
v. Empire Laboratories Limited71. The case concerned colored gelatin bands encircling 
capsules containing pharmaceuticals. The bands were placed where the two halves of the 
capsules were joined, and the Supreme Court found the bands to have a functional use or 
characteristic and hence could not be subject of a trademark. 
 
In Pizza Pizza Limited v. the Registrar of Trade Marks72 the issue was whether a telephone 
number, which was used for all Toronto-area outlets, was registrable as a trademark for a 
pizza take-out business. The registrar and the trial judge both held that such a numerical 
combination was not registrable. In the higher instance the court had another opinion and 
concluded that the functional element of a telephone number was to relate to its identification 
of the source and quality of the wares. The number was not a part of the ware, and it was 
                                                 
67 Canadian Trademark registrations no. 283,451, which is quite similar to international trademark registrations 
IR 587.254 and IR 638.663, and no. 286,487, which corresponds to international registration IR 430.837. See 
Appendix A for illustrations of the international “IR” registrations. 
68 A distinguishing guise identifies the shaping of goods or its container or wrapping. See Chapter 2.2.6. 
69 A Canadian design mark is just a variety of a regular trademark. See Chapter 2.2.6. 
70 (1939) Ex. C.R. 141. 
71 (1964) S.C.R. 351. 27 Fox Pat. C. 67. 
72 (1989) 3 F.C. 379. 
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therefore not functional in the same sense as in previous case law. Consequently, the 
telephone number could be registered as a trademark. 
 
3.2.4.2  The Court’s Reasoning and Judgment 
The Court of Appeal established that if functionality goes either to the trademark itself (as in 
Imperial Tobacco and Parke, Davis) or to the goods, then it is essentially or primarily 
inconsistent with registration. The court further held that if the functionality is merely 
secondary or peripheral, like a telephone number with no essential connection to the wares, it 
is not a bar to registration.   
 
The court agreed with the Pizza Pizza judgment that if a mark is primarily functional by being 
a part of the goods, registering such trademark would give the applicant a monopoly on 
functional elements or characteristics of the goods. That would mean that the applicant would 
actually get a kind of patent granted, under the guise of a trademark. According to the Court 
of Appeal, that would be the case if Philips were to keep the trademark registration of the 
electric rotary head assembly. The court further held that the design trademark has an intrinsic 
reference to the principal functional feature of the Philips shaver, namely its cutting heads, 
which the mark depicts. The court continued:  
 
Shaver heads in general are utilitarian by nature, and the Trial Judge found that the ‘equilateral 
triangular configuration is one of the better designs for a triple headed shaver’. Here, the shaver heads 
are functional and the three-headed equilateral triangular configuration is functional. The design mark, 
by depicting those functional elements, is primarily functional.73
 
The court also established that it was irrelevant that Remington‘s inhibition to compete would 
be only as to the triple-headed shaver market, which was a smaller part of the total Canadian 
shaver market. The Court of Appeal concluded that whatever the portion of the sales market 
in question, registration of a primarily functional mark is a restraint on manufacturing and 
trade, since it effectively amounts to a patent or industrial design in the guise of a trademark. 
Accordingly, the appellant Remington succeeded in the appeal and the registration of the 
design mark was declared invalid and expunged.  
 
3.2.5 The Distinguishing Guise Mark 
3.2.5.1  The Court’s Reasoning and Judgment 
As to the distinguishing guise mark, the court declared that there was no case law on the 
matter to refer to. The court also established that neither British nor American law was of any 
help, since such a statutory concept as a distinguishing guise was, so far, unknown in their 
law. The court concluded, however, that the matter could be resolved on the basis of the Pizza 
Pizza decision referred above. 
 
The essence of a trademark is to distinguish goods or services of a registered owner from 
those sold by others, which is defined in Section 2 of the Canadian Trademarks Act. A 
distinguishing guise is a distinct kind of trademark, and is in the same Section 2 defined as “a 
shaping of wares or their containers or a mode of wrapping or packaging wares the 
appearance of which is used by a person for the purpose of distinguishing or so as to 
                                                 
73  Page 11 of the judgment. 
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distinguish wares or services manufactured, sold, leased, hired or performed by him from 
those […] by others”74. 
 
The court established that every form of trademark, including a distinguishing guise, is 
characterized by its distinctiveness, and therefore a distinguishing guise should be governed 
by the same considerations of functionality as, for instance, a design mark. Hence, the public 
policy basis is the same, i.e. to distinguish goods from those of competitors by monopolizing 
not the goods but the mark used in relation to them. If the functionality of a distinguishing 
guise relates primarily or essentially to the goods themselves, it will invalidate the mark. 
 
The Court of Appeal decided that Philips’ registered distinguishing guise was invalid as 
extending to the functional aspects of the Philips shaver. The court concluded, “a mark which 
goes beyond distinguishing the wares of its owner to the functional structure of the wares 
themselves is transgressing the legitimate bounds of a trademark”75. Hence, the appeal was 
allowed and Philips’ distinguishing guise mark was declared invalid and expunged. 
 
 
 
3.3  THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: United States District 
Court, Northern District of Illinois 
Date of judgment76: May 21, 1996.  
3.3.1 Dispute Background 
In the USA the shaver dispute between Philips and Izumi77 went on for decades, and common 
for all the litigations is that Philips has not been successful in any of the litigations it has 
initiated. In the most recent judgment, which is the one I will describe below, the court made 
a retrospect of the history of the dispute, and analyzed Philips’ actions and intentions. I have 
chosen to tell the dispute background in the way that the court interpreted it, as I find the 
court’s view interesting from a litigation strategy point of view. I am completely aware of the 
fact that it is not an objective account of the dispute background, but I believe that all readers 
will be able to separate the very facts from the court’s opinion.  
 
The Illinois court showed no mercy when concluding that Philips essentially had been out to 
kill its competition on the shaver market during the previous 18 years and that the current law 
suit as well as others were designed to serve as a means to that end. The court found it 
apparent that Philips was actually attempting to stop competition in the market and harass 
those who posed a threat to its strong position on the electric shaver market. Philips’ attempt 
to retain its market share began as early as in 1977, when Philips first found out that Izumi 
was going to enter the US market by selling rotary shavers to an American company. Philips’ 
executives were worried about the competition this would bring and, according to the court, 
“began its crusade to maintain its monopoly”78.  
 
                                                 
74 Page 13 of the judgment. 
75 Page 14 of the judgment.  
76 Case No. 85 C S366. 
77 In the USA Izumi’s products were marketed and sold by Sears Roebuck & Company. 
78 Page 5 of the judgment. 
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The court further held that it was decided within the company that Philips would file lawsuits 
to intimidate others into not entering the market. In 1978 Philips filed a lawsuit against Izumi 
in Japan.79 Later on, in 1984, Philips found out that Izumi was going to sell triple-headed 
electric shavers to Windmere, a company active on the US market. Philips then worked out a 
litigation strategy that would make it difficult for Windmere to compete on the market. The 
aggressive litigation strategy resulted in two unfair competition suits brought by Philips: one 
against Windmere and one against Sears, which you will read more about below. The first suit 
Philips filed in the United States was in Florida in October 1984, charging Windmere, in 
material part, with unfair competition regarding the Philips design impression. Philips lost the 
case as the jury found that Philips did not possess any cognizable trade dress80 right. 
However, Philips won a motion for a new trial, but also the second jury’s decision resulted in 
a defeat for Philips. 
 
While the Florida litigation was pending, Philips filed a suit in Illinois, charging Sears for 
unfair competition on the same grounds as in the Florida litigation. Since Philips had been 
unsuccessful in its earlier litigations concerning the same matter, the Illinois court advised 
Philips to settle. Philips refused, the court dealt with the case and Philips lost its case once 
again. It had taken the court only two hours to conclude that Philips did not prove any 
cognizable trade dress claims that could rebut Sears’ strong evidence on functionality81. In the 
most recent Illinois judgment, described below, the Illinois court explained that the first trial 
was allowed to proceed only because a technicality in the law. The Florida judgment was 
vacated due to a settlement between Philips and Windmere, which negated the estoppel effect 
a Florida judgment would have had on the law suit in Illinois.  
 
3.3.1.1  The Motions 
The first Illinois judgment in favor for Sears and Izumi was followed by four new motions:  
 
1. (Plaintiff) Philips’82 motion for a new trial. 
2. Philips’ motion for entry of judgment on the functionality defense against the defendant. 
3. (Defendants) Sears and Izumi’s83 motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285. 
4. Sears and Izumi’s motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). 
 
3.3.2 The Court’s Reasoning and Judgments 
3.3.2.1  Philips’ Motions 
Regarding the motion for a new trial, Philips claimed that the court in the first Illinois 
judgment had committed several errors, which motivated a new trial. The court did not agree 
and saw no reason to revisit any of the issues that Philips challenged. Hence, the court was 
confident that it had ruled correctly on each of the issues and that no fundamental errors of 
law had been made. Accordingly, Philips’ motion for a new trial was denied. 
 
Concerning its motion for entry of judgment on the functionality defense, Philips claimed that 
it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the functionality defense. The court did not 
                                                 
79 Unfortunately, I do not have any further information about the Japanese lawsuit. 
80 An introduction to the matter of trade dress is given in Chapter 2.2.5. 
81 The essence of the American functionality doctrine is described in Chapter 2.2.5. 
82 U.S. Philips Corporation and North American Philips Corporation. 
83 Sears Roebuck & Company and Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha. 
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agree, as it had found the evidence on functionality overwhelming due to a “plethora of 
convincing evidence which supports Sears’ position”84.  Consequently, Philips’ motion for an 
entry of judgment on the functionality defense was denied. 
 
3.3.2.2  Sears and Izumi’s Motions 
With the motion for attorneys’ fees and expenses pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285, Sears sought to 
recover attorneys’ fees for costs spent on defending itself on a patent infringement claim that 
was eventually voluntarily dismissed by Philips right before the trial. The referred provision 
gives the court discretion to award attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party in patent cases with 
exceptional circumstances where it would be grossly unjust for the prevailing party to bear the 
cost. Sears argued that the 10-year pursuit of the patent infringement claim, which was 
ultimately dismissed, was clear evidence of Philips’ vexatious litigation strategy. Philips 
opposed the allegations and held that the patent claims were not frivolous. Even though the 
court was dubious of one of Philips’ contentions, it finally concluded that the patent claims 
were not frivolous and that the pursuit of the patent infringement claim did not constitute such 
“exceptional circumstances” that would justify the granting of attorney’s fees under the 
referred provision. Hence, the defendants’ motion was denied. 
 
Sears’ second motion was for attorneys’ fees pursuant to the Lanham Act. Through this 
motion, Sears sought to retrieve attorneys’ fees that were spent on the long defense of Philips’ 
trade dress claims. According to the last sentence of 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) the court may award 
attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in exceptional cases, which are within the court’s 
discretion to decide. The court established that when addressing such attorneys’ fees, there are 
two different standards to apply: according to the Noxell85 doctrine the prevailing party need 
only to show “something less than bad faith”, while the Seventh Circuit had repeatedly held 
that an “exceptional case” is one in which the conduct is “malicious, fraudulent, deliberate 
and willful” 86. The court concluded, however, that attorneys’ fees should be awarded to Sears 
under either of the two standards. The court held that Philips’ intention during the whole 
dispute had been to kill its competition in order to maintain its virtual monopoly on the 
electric shaver market. Philips had lost its case before three juries in a row, and had 
vexatiously pursued those claims in an effort to harass and intimidate other companies into 
staying out of the market. The court concluded that Philips’ motives and actions clearly 
constituted a malicious, fraudulent, deliberate and willful behavior. Philips had forced other 
companies, like Sears, into spending large sums of money to defend themselves against the 
unsupported claims. Accordingly, the court decided that Philips should be required to pay for 
the consequences of its actions and recover Sears’ attorneys’ fees. The motion for attorneys’ 
fees pursuant to the Lanham Act was thus granted. 
 
3.3.3 Comments 
First of all, it should be noted that the litigation in the USA has exclusively involved claims of 
unfair competition and trade dress protection but no trademark matters. There is no other 
country than the USA where the dispute between Philips and its counterparty has not 
                                                 
84 Page 8 of the judgment. 
85 Noxell Corp. v. Firehouse No. 1 Bar-B-Que Rest., 771 F.2d 521 (D.C.Circuit 1985). 
86 NuPulse. Inc. v. Schlueter Co., 853 F.2d 545, 547 (7th Circuit 1988). 
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concerned trademark law but has been focused on competition law.87 However, the discussion 
about protection of trade dress is sometimes similar to the assessments made in trademark 
law, as trade dress also excludes protection of functional features.88 However, compared to 
trademark protection, trade dress protection differs significantly as it is time-limited, applies 
to the overall appearance of the product or service and is broader in scope by allowing for 
example a texture or device to be protected. 
 
The judgment described in this chapter is unique as it came to be more about Philips’ strategy 
than anything else. The court had a strong conviction that Philips deliberately and maliciously 
has used a very aggressive litigation strategy in order to kill any competition that posed a 
threat to its monopoly on the triple-headed shaver market. This judgment was pronounced 
almost a decade ago, and since then it has obviously been so, that Philips has continued its 
quite active litigation strategy. In Chapter 6 I will discuss my findings regarding Philips’ 
tactics, and try to assess how successful the strategy has been in keeping the competitors out 
of the triple-headed electric shaver market.  
 
 
 
3.4  SWEDEN (1): Stockholm District Court 
Date of judgment89: June 25, 1997 
3.4.1 Dispute Background 
The Swedish company Ide Line Aktiebolag90 wished to start importing to Sweden electric 
triple-headed shavers from Japanese Izumi Products Company. The appearance of the top part 
of the Izumi shaver was, mainly because of the arrangement of the three rotary heads in an 
equilateral triangle, similar to Philips’ trademark depicting its PHILISHAVE electric shaver. 
In December 1994 Ide Line filed a suit against Philips Electronics N.V., for the reasons given 
in Chapter 3.4.3 below. 
 
This was the first European judgment regarding the electric shaver dispute between Philips 
and Izumi. I will refer it quite thoroughly as I find the parties’ arguments interesting. The 
court’s reasoning and decision is given less space, and it is important to keep in mind that the 
judgment was appealed, and the Court of Appeal came to another conclusion than the first 
instance court, as you will see in the following chapter.  
 
3.4.2 The Registered Trademark 
Philips’ registered trademark91 covering the three-dimensional top part of the electric shaver 
was originally registered in 1993 as a shape trademark92. The mark consisted of a drawn 
depiction of a unit comprising three round rotary heads placed in each corner of an equilateral 
                                                 
87 There is a German decision from Cologne District Court where an interlocutory injunction was upheld on the 
grounds of unfair competition, but those grounds were changed by the appeal court, which instead upheld the 
injunction on the basis of trademark law (see Chapters 3.10 and 3.11). 
88 Trade dress is further described in Chapter 2.2.5.   
89 Case No. T 7-1316-94 and T 7-249-97. 
90 The company has since changed its name to Rotary Shaver Sweden AB. 
91 Registration number 253 139, corresponding to the three-dimensional international registration IR 587.254, 
which is illustrated in Appendix A. 
92 In Swedish: “varumärke avseende utstyrsel”. 
 35
triangular faceplate. The three rotary heads were closely surrounded by a rim, which raised 
the three rotary cutting heads a couple of millimeters above the underlying triangular 
faceplate (see note below and Appendix A for illustration). The linear rim design around the 
rotary heads has often been referred to as the “cloverleaf” design. 
 
3.4.3 Claims and Legal Grounds 
Ide Line sought a declaratory judgment declaring that Ide Line would not infringe Philips’ 
registered trademark right by importing and selling the Izumi shavers in Sweden. The legal 
ground referred to was § 44 of the Swedish Trademarks Act93 which provides that a 
declaratory judgment can be decided by the court in order to clarify whether a certain conduct 
constitutes a trademark infringement or not. The reason why Ide Line found a declaratory 
judgment to be necessary was obviously the fact that Izumi and its related companies94 since 
197895 had been involved in several litigations against Philips concerning the companies’ 
three-headed rotary shavers, as described in the previous chapters. Hence, Ide Line was aware 
of the risk that Philips might sue it for trademark infringement when starting to import and 
sell the Izumi shavers in Sweden, which explains why Ide Line took the initiative. 
 
Right before the trial in April 1997, Ide Line presented a new claim; that Philips’ trademark 
registration should be revoked in accordance with § 25 of the Swedish Trademarks Act. The 
provision states that if a trademark has been registered in contravention of the Trademarks 
Act and the reason for not registering the trademark still remains, the trademark should be 
revoked. The court decided to join the two claims and deal with them in one trial.  
 
Ide Line thus claimed: firstly, that the court revokes Philips’ trademark registration, and 
secondly, in case the registration is considered still valid, that the court declares that Ide 
Line’s use of its three-headed rotary electric shaver in Sweden does not infringe Philips’ 
trademark right according to the registration. Philips opposed the claims. 
 
3.4.4 Ide Line’s Further Grounds   
The grounds for Ide Line’s claim for revocation were that the electric shaver unit according to 
the registration consisted exclusively of a shape that was necessary to obtain a technical (i.e. 
practical and appropriate) result, which related to the shaving and the use, construction and 
production of the shaving device. In each case, Ide Line held, the shape of the shaver was to 
such extent decided by those technical demands that the mark lacked distinctiveness. The 
trademark neither had any inherent nor acquired distinctiveness that is required for a 
trademark to be protected according the Swedish Trademarks Act. 
 
As grounds for the claim for declaratory judgment, Ide Line held that its electric shaver unit 
was not confusingly similar to the registered trademark, as it differed from the trademark 
                                                 
93 Swedish Trademarks Act (1960:644). 
94 Izumi often operates as a subcontractor, which is why its shavers are sold by many different companies and 
under various brands. 
95 As previously mentioned: In 1978 Philips filed a lawsuit against Izumi in Japan, and in 1984 in the USA. 
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regarding several features of the shape, which were carefully described96. Since the registered 
trademark’s shape elements regarding the stated differences were mainly functional and 
served to make the product more adapted to its purpose or otherwise fulfilled a different 
purpose than to be a sign, Ide Line held argued that those shape elements were not a part of 
the registered trademark. Ide Line further held that the overall design and all the separate 
shape elements its shaver consisted of was motivated by one or several technical functions. 
For instance the arrangement of three rotary cutting heads placed in an equilateral triangle 
was, in regards to the number of cutters and configuration, the optimal solution for obtaining a 
comfortable shave with a big and efficient shaving surface, as well as for production- and 
construction-technical demands. The legal ground Ide Line referred to was § 13 of the 
Swedish Trademarks Act, providing that a trademark which exclusively consists of a shape 
that is necessary to obtain a technical result can not be registered97.  
 
3.4.5 Philips’ Further Grounds  
Philips argued that its registered trademark consisted of a non-functional, arbitrarily chosen 
shape. Regarding the claim for revocation, Philips held that the trademark had an inherent 
distinctiveness and did not exclusively consist of a shape that was necessary to obtain a 
technical result. The only features of the trademark that were functional elements were the 
three rotary heads as such. The other elements of the mark were arbitrarily chosen, and Philips 
meant that the chosen design did not give the shaver any actual technical advantages. Philips 
argued that since the shape of the registered trademark was not technically optimal, that exact 
shape could not be freely used by others. Elements that could be arbitrarily varied without 
altering the technical performance were the number of rotary heads, their size and placement 
and the shape of the faceplate. The possibility of variation was according to Philips an 
indication of the freedom for any competitor to choose other shapes providing a high 
technical performance, a freedom that reflected the fact that the shape of the shaver was not 
dependant on the technical features.  
 
Regarding the claim for declaratory judgment, Philips held that Ide Line’s electric shaver unit 
was confusingly similar to Philip’s registered trademark. As Ide Line had referred, its shaver 
differed from the trademark in regards to details on the faceplate and the rotary heads. Philips 
held that those deviations of the details had no relevance for the risk for confusion. The main 
visual impression of the trademark was the cloverleaf shape on the top part of the faceplate, 
which was enhanced by the cloverleaf shaped relief consisting of a difference in level 
between the inner and the outer part of the faceplate’s top part. Philips argued that the 
cloverleaf impression of the Ide Line shaver made it even more confusingly similar to the 
registered trademark. The issue of the shape elements fulfilling a technical or functional 
purpose lacked according to Philips legal relevance since the trademark registration –given 
that it was still valid – protected against such an almost identical imitation of the protected 
shape of goods that Ide Line’s electric shaver unit was. 
 
                                                 
96 The features that differed was partly the side rim of the faceplate which on the trademark was somewhat bent 
outwards in contrast to Ide Line’s faceplate rim which was straight, partly on the half-moon shaped indentations 
of Ide Line’s faceplate’s three side rims, partly the rotary heads which according to the trademark was angled 
upwards towards the middle in contrast to Ide Line’s rotary heads which were flat and parallel with the top of the 
faceplate and partly the so called clover leaf which according to the trademark consisted of solely a line in 
contrast to Ide Line’s which was raised above the faceplate. As to the rest, Ide Line held that the two designs 
corresponded. 
97 Corresponding to Article 3(1)(e), second indent of the Directive.  
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3.4.6 The Court’s Reasoning 
The Swedish Trademarks Act provides that when assessing whether a sign has distinctiveness, 
consideration shall be taken to all circumstances and particularly to which extent and time the 
sign has been used on the market.98 The court found that a market survey presented by Philips 
showed that the electric shaver unit had been extensively used as a trademark by Philips and 
therefore had acquired distinctiveness. 
 
The Swedish trademark legislation had in 1993 been harmonized with the EC legislation 
through the implementation of the Trademark Directive99. However, no material changes of 
the Swedish Trademarks Act needed to be made, since there was already conformity between 
the two legislations as both were based on Article 6 quinquies (B)/ 6bis of the Paris 
Convention100. The court noted that, being a question of harmonized community law not yet 
commented by the ECJ, a preliminary ruling from the ECJ would be motivated. Since none of 
the parties had proposed such actions, the court decided not to request any preliminary ruling. 
The court held though, that in case its judgment would be appealed it might be appropriate for 
the court of appeal to apply for a preliminary ruling.101
 
The court clarified that the purpose of a trademark is to associate goods or services with a 
certain company. According to the Swedish Trademarks Act, as well as the Directive, a sign 
cannot be registered if it consists exclusively of a shape which is necessary to obtain a 
technical result102. The intentions with the provision is to try to achieve a balance between 
trademark protection for the shape of goods on the one side, and the need to avoid unfair 
competition advantages by an everlasting monopoly on a technical solution on the other side.   
 
Furthermore, the court held that according to the above stated provision it was not enough that 
the shape serves a functional purpose; it also needs to be necessary for obtaining the technical 
result. The court therefore found it necessary to assess whether there were alternative ways to 
obtain the same technical result; if such alternatives existed, the ‘Philips shape’ was not 
necessary for obtaining the technical result. Hence, the assessment of alternative shapes was 
given a decisive importance. The court also declared that all the individual shape elements 
should be analyzed separately, not as a whole. If a certain part of the shape was necessary to 
obtain a technical result, that part should be disregarded and an assessment should then be 
made to see if the sign had distinctiveness.  
 
Ide Line had presented evidence intending to show that the arrangement of three rotary heads 
on a triangular faceplate was undoubtedly the best and most efficient way to place them; 
fewer rotary heads would lower the efficiency and more than three heads would imply a larger 
surface of the faceplate which covers the skin but does not shave, which would make the 
shaver less precise and more difficult to operate. Ide Line had also contended that the 
faceplate surrounding the rotary heads needed to be raised and in line with the rotary heads in 
order to avoid that the skin got pinched between the heads. The clover-leaf shaped raised 
faceplate had according to Ide Line the function of stretching the skin and raising the hairs to 
be cut, at the same time as it allowed an easier control of which area was being shaved. On the 
                                                 
98 See § 13 paragraph 1 of the Swedish Trademarks Act.  
99 First Directive 89/104/EEC of the Council, on 21 December 1988, to Approximate the Laws of the Member 
States Relating to Trade Marks.  
100 The Paris Convention is further described in Chapter 2.2.2. 
101 As you will read below, an English court later requested a preliminary ruling from the ECJ on the matter, and 
the ECJ ruling came to affect the appeal of this judgment. 
102 See § 13 paragraph 2 of the Swedish Trademarks Act and Section 3(1)(e) second indent of the Directive. 
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contrary, Philips meant that the cloverleaf design was only a matter of an arbitrarily chosen 
decoration that served no technical purpose. Philips also presented evidence to show 
alternative shapes that could obtain the same technical result; Philips had even developed a 
prototype of a three-headed rotary shaver where the rotary cutters were placed in a slightly 
bent row, resembling of the shape of a boomerang.  
 
3.4.7 The Judgment 
The court was convinced by a limited test which showed that the Philips prototype with the 
three cutting heads placed in a different angle than the trademark gave the same technical 
result as the Philips shaver. The court thus decided that, without altering the cost or 
efficiency, the same technical result could be obtained by using another shape and a different 
amount of rotary heads or number of cutting blades. Accordingly, Philips’ trademark 
registered shape of goods was not necessary to obtain the technical result. Ide Line’s claim to 
revoke the registered trademark was hence not accepted, and the trademark was considered 
still valid and in force. 
 
In case the trademark was declared still valid, Ide Line had requested a declaratory judgment 
stating that use of its three-headed shaver in Sweden did not constitute an infringement of 
Philips’ registered trademark right. The court declared that it was inconsistent with a loyal 
interpretation of the Directive to accept a registration of a shape of goods without giving the 
registered trademark any exclusivity, i.e. protection against infringing imitations. Moreover, 
the court found the differences of the two shaver head units insignificant and concluded that 
Ide Line’s shaver was confusingly similar to Philips’ registered trademark. Consequently, the 
court accepted neither the second claim, which implied that any importing or selling of the Ide 
Line shavers in Sweden would be a trademark infringement. 
 
However, one judge dissented to the judgment.103 He argued that since there were no ECJ 
judgments concerning the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Directive, the 
interpretation should be made in accordance with the Treaty on European Union as well as the 
legal principles common for all EC member states. He emphasized that a central objective of 
the European Union was to create an open and healthy common market by ensuring fair 
competition within the union. It was therefore obvious that the Directive did not aim to hinder 
the competition by accepting that trademark protection was used to create production 
monopolies for technical solutions, which could not be legally protected otherwise.  
 
The dissenting judge further argued that a sign which consists exclusively of the shape of 
goods which is needed to obtain a technical result cannot enjoy trademark protection, even if 
there are alternative ways to reach the same result. Moreover, he argued that the shape of the 
trademark should be divided into the different shape elements it consisted of, and then an 
assessment should be made of each and one of those elements in order to decide if the 
individual shape element was functional in itself or arbitrary in relation to the technical result. 
Hence, he divided the shape into three elements; the placement of the rotary heads, the shape 
of the faceplate, and the cloverleaf shaped rim on the faceplate surrounding the rotary heads, 
and found that all the three shape elements were necessary to obtain the technical result. 
Accordingly, he concluded that Philips’ trademark had been registered in contradiction to the 
                                                 
103 Mr. Göran Nilsson. 
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Swedish Trademarks Act and the Directive,104 and as the obstruction for registration still 
existed the registration should be revoked.105  
 
 
 
3.5  SWEDEN (2): Svea Court of Appeal, Stockholm 
Date of judgment106: January 28, 2004  
3.5.1 Dispute Background 
The decision by Stockholm District Court on April 25, 1997 described in the previous chapter 
was appealed by Ide Line, which since had changed its name to Rotary Shaver Sweden AB. 
As concluded in the previous chapter, Ide Line had been unsuccessful in both claims; neither 
was the Philips trademark revoked nor was any declaratory judgment of non-infringement 
given. Important to observe is that there was a long gap in time between the first instance 
decision and the appeal, almost seven years. The reason it took so long was that the case was 
kept pending before Court of Appeal in order to await the preliminary ruling of the ECJ,107 
which is described in Chapter 3.17 below. During those seven years there had been a lot of 
litigation between Philips and Izumi which had resulted in decisions from several countries; 
there had been two judgments from the UK, one from Australia, three from Germany, one 
from France and one from Spain.108 The most important judgment was the preliminary ruling 
of the ECJ, the influence of which is obvious in this judgment.109  
 
3.5.2 The Parties’ Claims and Additional Grounds 
Rotary Shaver referred to the same claims as in the first instance, but added another ground 
for supporting the argument of lack of distinctiveness of the Philips mark. The new ground 
was Article 3(1)(c) 110 of the Directive, and Philips counterclaimed that the court should not 
accept the new ground since it had not been presented during the first instance proceedings.  
 
Rotary Shaver argued that there were still two obstacles for registration of the Philips mark: 
the shape was necessary to obtain a technical result and it lacked distinctiveness. Rotary 
Shaver held that Philips’ trademark was not capable of distinguishing Philips’ shavers from 
those of others, that it lacked both an inherent and an acquired distinctiveness111 and that the 
mark served to designate the kind and intended purpose of the goods.  
 
Philips still argued that the trademark registration concerned a mainly non-functional, 
arbitrarily chosen shape. The number of rotary cutting heads, their placement in a triangle and 
                                                 
104 § 13 Paragraph 2 of the Swedish Trademarks Act and Section 3(1)(e) second indent of the Directive. 
105 In accordance with § 25 of the Swedish Trademarks Act and Section 3(1) of the Directive. 
106 Case No. T 7-1316-94 and T 7-249-97.  
107 Brand News 06/2002: “Svårare med design som varumärke”, page 16. 
108 All these judgments are described in the coming chapters. 
109 Please observe that since I put this appeal judgment right after the first instance decision, this judgment is not 
presented in its correct chronological order. In Chapter 3.1 is a list of the correct chronological order. 
110 Article 3(1)(c) of the Directive provides: The following shall not be registered or if registered shall be liable 
to be declared invalid: … (c) trade marks which consist exclusively of signs or indications which may serve, in 
trade, to designate the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin, or the time of 
production of the goods or of rendering of the service, or other characteristics of the goods. 
111 Regarding its claim for non-distinctiveness, Rotary Shaver referred to Articles 2, 3(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the 
Directive. 
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the shape of the top part and the sides of the faceplate were all results of completely arbitrary 
choices. Philips held, however, that the shape did include two shape elements necessary for 
the technical function: the existence of grids on top of the round cutting heads under which 
the cutting knives rotate, and the linear reference surface right next to the cutting heads. 
Philips argued that all other shape elements were arbitrarily chosen and reflected an aesthetic 
thinking intending to distinguish the Philips shavers. Philips thus claimed that the mark did 
not consist of essentially functional shape elements, and the shape elements were in any case 
not exclusively determined by the technical result. Philips also claimed that that the mark had 
an inherent distinctiveness, or that it in any case had acquired distinctiveness as a result of the 
long-time and extensive exposure of it in marketing and sales.  
 
3.5.3 The Court’s Reasoning 
The court established that Rotary Shaver’s referred ground in terms of Article 3(1)(c) of the 
Directive was not a new circumstance; Rotary Shaver had only specified in what way the 
mark lacked distinctiveness, and the court rejected Philips’ claim not to accept the ground. 
 
The court established that a sign can not be registered as a trademark if it consists exclusively 
of a shape that is necessary to obtain a technical result, in accordance with § 13 second 
paragraph of the Swedish Trademarks Act and Article 3(1)(e) second indent of the Directive. 
The court called attention to the ECJ preliminary judgment from June 18, 2002112, in which 
the ECJ provided guidance regarding the interpretation of Article 3(1)(e) of the Directive. The 
court noted that the ECJ had stressed the importance of the purpose of the exclusion in Article 
3(1)(e), which is to avoid that trademark protection gives the proprietor exclusive rights to 
technical solutions or functional features of goods. The ECJ had held that the said article 
aimed to satisfy a common interest, being that if a shape’s essential features fulfill a technical 
function, that shape should be possible to use for all actors on the market. The court also 
established that the ECJ had stated that it made no difference for the assessment if there were 
alternative shapes that could obtain the same technical result.  
 
In the light of the ECJ judgment, the court declared that there was no reason to determine if 
there were any alternative shapes. What the court had to decide was instead whether the 
essential features of the registered shape were functional and chosen to fulfill the technical 
result. If arbitrary considerations could be shown in the design of the essential shape 
elements, there was no reason for revocation of the trademark.  
 
3.5.3.1  Assessment of the Shape Elements 
The registered shape trademark consisted of mainly three shape elements; three rotary cutting 
heads placed in an equilateral triangle, a triangular faceplate with rounded angles and a raised, 
linear cloverleaf shaped rim surrounding the cutting heads. The court found the three cutting 
heads arranged in a triangle to be the most obvious essential feature of the shaver. Regarding 
the cloverleaf shaped rim, the court held that the mere arrangement of the three cutting heads 
associated with a cloverleaf and that the rim around them, even though it enhanced the 
cloverleaf impression slightly, was obviously insignificant and devoid of any individual 
importance for the visual impression of the shaver. The cloverleaf shaped rim could therefore 
not be considered as an essential shape element of the shaver unit. 
 
                                                 
112 See Chapter 3.17 below. 
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Hence, the court had to assess whether the two remaining essential features, the cutting heads 
in an equilateral triangle and the faceplate with rounded angles, were solely attributable to the 
technical result. The relevant technical result depends on the particular purpose the individual 
shape element is supposed to fulfill, and the court found that the technical result to be 
obtained by both essential features was an efficient and comfortable shave of hair on a 
human’s face.   
 
The court established that the rotary cutting heads constituted the shaver unit’s cutting 
function, with grids that caught and held the hair until the underlying rotary cutting blade cut 
it off. The grids’ purpose were obviously also to avoid direct skin contact with the knives. The 
court found that the arrangement of the cutting heads in an equilateral triangle had been 
chosen to create a compact shaver unit and at the same time obtain the best shaving result. 
The court found no evidence of any arbitrary considerations of the shape element, and the 
three cutting heads arranged in an equilateral triangle was therefore found to be attributable 
solely to the technical result.  
 
Regarding the triangular faceplate with rounded angles, the court found its function to be to 
hold the cutting heads on place and to constitute a reference surface for the cutting heads so 
that the skin did not get pinched. The shape of the faceplate followed the shape of the rotary 
cutting heads. The court found that the rounded angles and the slightly bent sides were 
obviously chosen to give a comfortable, close, and efficient shave also of parts of the face that 
could be difficult to reach. Hence, the court found no arbitrary elements of the faceplate, and 
the shape element was to be seen as attributable only to the technical result.   
 
3.5.4 The Court’s Conclusion 
The court concluded that the all the essential shape elements of the shaver unit were solely 
attributable to the achievement of the technical result. Accordingly, the court’s conclusion 
was that Philips’ trademark had been registered in contradiction to § 13, second paragraph of 
the Swedish Trademarks Act, and that the obstacle for registration still existed. The court thus 
accepted Rotary Shaver’s claim for revocation and Philips’ three-dimensional trademark 
registration was declared invalid and revoked. Since the trademark was cancelled, there was 
no reason for the court to consider Rotary Shaver’s second claim regarding a declaratory 
judgment of non-infringement.  
 
Philips appealed the judgment, but did not get any review permit by the Supreme Court of 
Sweden. 
 
3.5.5 Comments 
This judgment clearly shows how important community law and ECJ guidance can be for a 
national court’s decision. If the court had not kept the case pending until the ECJ judgment 
was given, it is very likely that the court would have come to another decision, particularly in 
terms of the importance of alternative shapes. In Sweden the doctrine on alternative shapes 
had been a useful help in the assessment of a trademark’s technical features. In the first 
instance decision it was a decisive factor for the court that other shapes existed which could 
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obtain the same technical result, which made the exclusionary provision inapplicable.113 But 
since then the ECJ had clearly stated that the provisions of the Directive supported no such 
interpretation, which obviously had effects on the decision of the Swedish appeal court.  
 
The guidance on the interpretation of the Directive given by the ECJ also instructed the court 
to distinguish the essential shape elements and make an assessment for each of those shape 
elements. This made it easier for the court to make the right considerations and focus on the 
essential shape features. Compared to other courts, I think the Swedish appeal court made a 
very logical interpretation of the ECJ decision when first determining which the essential 
shape features were, and then one by one assessing whether those were necessary for the 
technical result. Many other courts did not as clear as the Swedish appeal court distinguish the 
being of several different essential shape elements, and treated the whole design as one shape 
or just mentioned the different shape elements briefly. 
 
 
 
3.6  UNITED KINGDOM (1): (Patents Court, Chancery Division, 
England & Wales) 
Date of judgment114: December 22, 1997  
3.6.1 Dispute Background 
The court115 began its judgment with elucidating the being of a worldwide battle between 
Philips and Remington/Izumi. It concluded that the principal issue of the global dispute was 
whether Philips by trademark registration could obtain a permanent monopoly of a desirable 
form of manufacture, namely triple-headed rotary shavers with the three heads arranged in an 
equilateral triangle.  
 
The court established that Philips116 had been selling triple-headed rotary shavers in the UK 
since 1966, with the three heads placed in each corner of a triangle. There had been minor 
variants of it; some models had for instance had the “cloverleaf” design described in the 
Swedish judgment above, with a raised linear rim around the rotary cutting heads. There had 
also been models with three thin indented radii in between the rotary heads, reminding of the 
central part of the Mercedes star, and many different color variations had been used, mostly in 
black and metal.  
 
Remington117 had for many years sold electric shavers of the “vibration” kind, with a row of 
cutters that moves from side to side underneath a thin perforated foil. The court established 
that Remington had just started making a three-headed rotary shaver, which in at least one 
aspect was even more advanced than the Philips shavers since it could be used both wet and 
                                                 
113 The doctrine on alternative shapes is originally a German practice, and during the proceedings that practice 
was recommended by the Swedish Professor of Law Marianne Levin, who was engaged by Philips to submit an 
expert opinion on the matter. 
114 Case No: Ch. 1995-P-No.7585. 
115 Common law judgments are often written in a more personal way, and my private opinion is that they are 
usually quite amusing to read, mainly because of that personal touch. In the UK, the first instance judgments are 
decided by one sole judge, who also writes the judgment. This case was held before Mr. Justice Jacob, and for 
reasons of consistency, I will refer to him as “the court”.  
116 Philips Electronics N.V. 
117 Remington Consumer Products. 
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dry. It was this shaver, Remington’s model “DT55” that was alleged of infringing Philips’ 
intellectual property rights.  
 
3.6.2 The Registered Trademark 
The registered trademark118 that Philips claimed to be infringed by Remington consisted of a 
triangular shaver head with three rotary heads placed in each corner of the triangle. There was 
also a triangular rim following the edge of the triangular faceplate (see Appendix A for 
illustration). It was undisputed that the mark was to be treated as a three-dimensional 
trademark. The court concluded that it was the validity and, if valid, the scope of the 
trademark registration which was its principal issue to decide.  
 
The court divided the infringement allegations into three different cases to decide upon: the 
Trademark Case, the Paris Convention Case and the Registered Design Case. I will put most 
focus on the Trademark Case, but the decisions on the other two cases are worth mentioning 
briefly. 
 
3.6.3 The Paris Convention Case 
Philips claimed to be able to prevent the manufacture of triple-headed rotary shavers with a 
top part similar to that of the Philips shavers pursuant to Article 6bis of the Paris Convention 
(1927) pursuant to Section 56 of the UK Trade Marks Act 1994. Philips argued that it was 
proved that the top part of the Philips shaver was not only well known in the UK, but well 
known as denoting Philips. The claim was relied upon only if the trademark case failed, which 
it did, as you will see below. Section 56 of the Trade Marks Act and Article 6bis of the Paris 
Convention concerns protection of well-known marks. The court found that the three-
dimensional shape could not possibly be regarded as a trademark for the purposes of the 
Trade Marks Act and the Paris Convention. Furthermore, Philips had not managed to show 
that Remington’s use was likely to cause confusion, and the court thus established that it did 
not. Consequently, Philips claim under Section 56 and the Paris Convention failed. 
 
3.6.4 The Registered Design Case 
Philips was the proprietor of registered design119 representing a whole triple-headed rotary 
shaver from four different angles. Philips claimed that Remington’s DT55 was within the 
scope of protection of the registered design, and thus infringed it. Remington denied any 
infringement and counterclaimed for revocation of the registered design on the grounds of 
invalidity.  
 
In the infringement assessment, the court took guidance in previous case law, in particular 
Judge Russell LJ’s decision in Benchairs v. Chair Centre120. The differences and similarities 
of the two products should be observed in detail, but consideration should also be taken to the 
respective designs as a whole. The court described and compared in detail the various 
elements of the designs, and then concluded that the two designs were different. The 
                                                 
118 UK trademark registration No. 1254208, identical with the still existing German trademark registration 
1034262 and similar to international trademark registration IR 430.837 (see Appendix A). 
119 UK design registration No. 1,025,204. 
120 (1974) RCP 429. 
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differences between the designs excluded the possibility of infringement of the registered 
design, and Philips’ infringement claim thus failed.  
 
Regarding the validity, Remington was only interested in the revocation attack if its defense 
of non-infringement failed. As you have seen above, it succeeded, and the court therefore 
dealt with the matter briefly. It concluded that even if the scope of the protection of the 
registered design did not cover the DT55, there was no reason to invalidate the registration. 
Hence, Philips’ case on design infringement failed, and the design registration was considered 
still valid but of limited scope. 
 
3.6.5 The Trademark Case 
The court established that the matter of trademark infringement was to be decided in 
accordance to the Directive, which was implemented in the UK by the Trade Marks Act 1994. 
Hence all relevant provisions of the Trade Marks Act correspond to provisions of the 
Directive. Remington claimed exceptionally many grounds for invalidating Philips’ 
trademark, which makes the judgment extensive but also interesting as the court expresses its 
view on several provisions of the Directive. 
  
3.6.5.1  The Parties’ Claims and Legal Grounds  
Philips claimed that Remington was infringing its registered trademark by manufacturing and 
selling the Remington triple-headed shavers. Remington counterclaimed that Philips’ 
trademark registration was invalid121 for the following reasons (the British provisions are put 
in square brackets after the Article of the Directive): 
 
1. That the mark was not capable of distinguishing the goods of Philips from those of other 
undertakings, as required in Article 2 of the Directive [s. 1(1)]; 
 
2. That the mark was devoid of any distinctive character, contrary to Article 3(1)(b) [s. 
3(1)(b)]; 
 
3. That the mark consisted exclusively of a sign or indication which serves, in trade, the kind 
… or intended purpose of the goods, contrary to Article 3(1)(b) [s. 3(1)(c)]; 
 
4. That the mark consisted exclusively of one or more of the matters identified in Article 
3(1)(e) [s. 3(2)(a)-(c)]: the shape which results from the nature of the goods themselves, the 
shape of goods which is necessary to obtain a technical result or the shape which gives 
substantial value to the goods; 
 
5. That the mark was registered contrary to public policy contrary to Article 3(1)(f) [s. 3(3)]. 
 
Regarding grounds (2) and (3) stated above, Philips sought to justify the registration on the 
grounds that the mark had acquired a distinctive character as a result of the use made of it122, 
as provided for by Article 3(3) [s. 3(1)]. 
 
                                                 
121 As set out in Article 3(1) of the Directive: […] or if registered shall be liable to be declared invalid […]. 
122 In American terminology the expression obtaining secondary meaning is used to describe when a trademark 
has acquired distinctiveness through use. 
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3.6.5.2  Distinctiveness and Capability of Distinguishing 
Philips claimed that the mark had acquired distinctiveness through extensive advertising and 
argued that the appearance of the top part123 of its triple-headed shaver was distinctive of 
Philips as “the face of Philips”. To establish the shaver’s acquired distinctiveness, Philips had 
called one trade witness and thirteen public witnesses124, which were all shown the alleged 
infringing Remington DT55 shaver. The public witnesses’ general reaction to the DT55 was 
that they thought of Philips, and most of them would have thought that the shaver was made 
by Philips if it had not been marked “Remington”; the DT55 was associated with Philips. The 
court established that the presented evidence had not shown that Philips’ advertising had been 
concentrated on promoting the trademark as such, but rather the shaver itself. The court also 
noted that the name “Remington” appeared in large letters along the side of the handle of the 
DT55, as well as on some other parts of the shaver.  
 
Regarding the engineering considerations, Philips argued that it was not necessary to use a 
shape like the registered trademark to make a rotary shaver; you do not have to use exactly 
three heads, and if you do, you do not have to arrange them in an equilateral triangle. And 
even if you were to arrange them in a triangle, you do not have to have a flat faceplate or any 
faceplate at all. Philips had an engineer and an industrial designer showing some alternative 
possible designs. The court concluded, however, that the engineering scope for variation 
outside the trademark was possible but very limited. The court also found that the evidence 
established that the triple-headed shape was one of the best possible ways of making a rotary 
shaver since it is simpler from an engineering point of view to arrange the cutting heads in an 
equilateral triangle if you are making a three-headed device. 
 
As to the significance of the case at issue, the court stated that if Philips was right in its 
infringement claims, the corporation would have obtained a permanent monopoly in respect 
of matters of significant engineering design by virtue of a trademark registration. The court 
observed that the Federal Court of Appeal of Canada in Remington Rand v. Philips125 took the 
same view of the importance of what was at stake when declaring that Philips’ corresponding 
Canadian trademark registration was invalid. The court also noted that the Canadian court had 
made much of the same findings of facts.  
 
The court concluded that the preamble of the Directive strongly held that the capability of 
distinguishing was a fundamental requirement for a sign to be registered as a trademark; 
particular importance was placed on the purpose of a trademark, which is to guarantee trade 
origin. A sign that does not denote trade origin cannot be regarded as capable of 
distinguishing, which the court meant was the case regarding Philips’ trademark. The court 
further held that Philips could never get away from the fact that the sign primarily denoted 
function, a fact that more use could not change. The sign could never denote only triple-
headed shavers made by Philips and no one else, because the sign primarily showed a triple-
headed shaver. Consequently, the court concluded that the sign of a triple-headed shaver was 
incapable of distinguishing the goods of Philips from those of others and it was devoid of any 
distinctive character. 
 
The court noted that by holding that view, it departed from the majority conclusion of the 
Swedish “Court of Appeal” in IdeLine v. Philips126. I find it remarkable that the court’s 
                                                 
123 The top part of the shaver is in the judgment referred to as the “face”. 
124 Philips originally sought to rely upon eight trade and seventeen public witnesses. 
125 See Chapter 3.2 above. 
126 See Chapter 3.4 above. 
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Honorable Mr. Justice Jacob referred to the wrong instance; the case he meant to refer to was 
the first instance decision from Stockholm District Court, not the appeal judgment. The court 
observed that the Swedish court had found that market surveys showed that Philips’ shaving 
unit was strongly established on the market, which proved that the trademark had acquired 
distinctiveness. The court commented the belief on market surveys by holding that such 
researches may not be reliable since, for instance, leading and non-leading questions often 
produce different answers. Such polls therefore require detailed scrutiny.  
 
3.6.5.3 Denote the Kind of Goods or Intended Purpose 
As described above, Remington had as a third ground for invalidation argued that the 
trademark consisted exclusively of a sign or indication, which served in trade to denote the 
kind of goods or intended purpose of the goods127. Remington argued that the Philips mark 
was just a two-dimensional reproduction of a three-dimensional working part of a shaver. The 
court thus found that the mark did serve to denote the kind of goods or intended purpose of 
the goods, and accordingly declared the trademark invalid on this ground as well.   
 
If there had not been any more grounds for invalidation (but there is, as you will soon find 
out), the mark could have been saved if Philips could prove that it had acquired 
distinctiveness through use according to Article 3(3) of the Directive [s. 3(1)]. Philips would 
have had to proof that the public took the shape of the shaver top part as a trademark of 
Philips and not as a picture of the goods. The court concluded, however, that Philips had 
provided no such evidence on acquired distinctiveness. 
 
3.6.5.4 Shape of Goods Exclusions in Article 3(1)(e) 
The court discussed the first indention of Article 3(1)(e) of the Directive, which provides a 
bar to registration for signs consisting exclusively of the shape which results from the nature 
of the goods themselves. In order to apply the provision, the “goods themselves” need to be 
defined, preferably by assessing how the goods are viewed in practice as articles of 
commerce. The court came, after some reasoning, to the conclusion that the right definition 
must be “electric shavers”, since such shavers generally are seen as one type of commercial 
article, even though there are different variants128. The court therefore concluded that the 
trademark did not result from the nature of the goods themselves, since the “goods 
themselves” referred to electric shavers in general, of any kind. Consequently, there was no 
reason to invalidate the existing registration on this ground.  
 
The next ground for invalidation brought up was the “shape of goods which is necessary to 
obtain a technical result”, provided by the second indent of Article 3(1)(e). The court found 
this ground for invalidation to be the most important issue to decide upon. Philips had argued 
that since there were alternative ways of obtaining the same technical result, the registered 
sign was not within the exclusion, even if the sign was functional as such. The court once 
again referred to the Swedish judgment and established that it was this argument, usually 
denoted as the “doctrine on alternative shapes”, that had found favor with the majority of the 
Swedish first instance court in Ide Line v. Philips129. The dissenting Swedish judge had 
instead concluded that all shape elements of the shaver were functional and that it made no 
                                                 
127 Article 3(1)(c) of the Directive [s. 3(1)(c)]. 
128 The most obvious subset is the rotary cutting head shavers on the one side, and the “foil” shavers with 
vibrating cutters on the other. 
129 See Chapter 3.4 above. 
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difference if there were alternative ways to obtain the result, which was an opinion that the 
UK court agreed with. Thus, the court quite understood that Ide Line appealed the decision to 
the “Swedish Supreme Court”, which correctly should be the Court of Appeal. The court also 
noted that it was tempting to refer the case to the ECJ, but left that decision to the UK Court 
of Appeal, in case of an appeal.  
 
Moreover, the court found that the difficulty with Philips’ argumentation on the matter was 
that it gives the provision no or almost no scope at all; it seems impossible to think of any 
object that must be of a particular shape to perform a function. The court further held that it 
seemed unlikely that the Council and the Commission when writing the Directive had any 
intentions of making it possible to obtain permanent monopolies in matters of significant 
engineering design.  
 
The court proposed that when applying the provision of Article 3(1)(e) second indent, a test 
could be used asking: In substance does the shape solely achieve a technical result? The 
reason for adding “in substance” was to make sure that also shapes with trivial 
embellishments or variants could be within the scope of the exclusionary provision. When the 
court had applied the test, it concluded that the shape registered as a trademark consisted 
exclusively of a shape which was necessary to obtain a technical result. The court established 
that that was the substance of the Philips shaver head, as the head was the “business end” of 
the shaver and had a shaving shape. Accordingly, Philips’ trademark registration was declared 
invalid on this ground. 
 
The next ground for invalidation brought up was the assessment of whether the shape gave 
substantial value to the goods, as set out in the third indent of Article 3(1)(e). The court 
established that adding value to the goods is the main function of a good trademark, but 
proposed that the purpose of the, somewhat unclear, provision was to exclude shapes which 
exclusively added some sort of value to the goods, disregarding any value attributable to the 
trademark function, i.e. the source identification. The court concluded that the triple-headed 
shape was primarily recognized by the public as having an engineering function130, and for 
that reason it added substantial value to the product. Consequently, the registered trademark 
was declared invalid on this ground as well.  
 
3.6.5.5 Contrary to Public Policy 
The court finally discussed Remington’s fifth ground for invalidation: that the mark was 
registered contrary to public policy contrary to Article 3(1)(f) [s. 3(3)]. The court held that the 
provision did not refer to monopoly situations as in the case at hand, but was intended to be 
used in matters involving some sort of question of morality. That was not the case, and this 
provision did not constitute any ground for invalidation. 
 
                                                 
130 The court found that Philips in its advertising over the years had clearly focused on educating the public in 
how well its rotary shaver and its triple-headed shape works.  
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3.6.5.6  Infringement 
Even if the matter of infringement131 was irrelevant, as the trademark was deemed invalid on 
several grounds, the court mentioned it briefly by holding a discussion about Article 5(1) 
[s. 10]. The provisions state that a trademark is infringed if an identical or similar sign is used 
in the course of trade for identical or similar goods, and there is likelihood for confusion 
and/or association with the trademark. Philips had argued that the top part of Remington’s 
DT55 was identical with the registered mark. The court found this argument “hopeless”, and 
stressed the fact that even if both sides correctly had treated the registered mark as covering a 
three-dimensional shape, the actual mark registered is only a picture. The court’s Judge Jacob 
J made his point clear when concluding “I think a consumer would notice the difference 
between shaving with the DT55 and doing so with a picture”. The court found that there were 
visual differences between the trademark picture and the top part of the DT55, and even 
though the differences were slight, the Philips trademark and the DT55 shaver were not 
identical and no infringement had occurred on that ground.  
 
As to if the DT55 and the trademark were similar, the court found the top part of the DT55 to 
be confusingly similar to the registered trademark, but held that it was so in a “non-trademark 
manner”. Since the registration was already declared invalid, the court saw no reason to get 
into whether the infringement provisions also covered such “non-trademark” similarity. I find 
it a bit unfortunate that the court gave no explanation to its expression “non-trademark 
manner”, which at least I would have welcomed. 
 
When it came to Remington’s infringement defense under Article 6(1)132 [s. 11(2)], the court 
found that the DT55 top part was an indication as to the kind, quality, intended purpose etc. of 
the goods. The court concluded that Remington’s use of the DT55 was merely descriptive, 
since it just denoted a triple-headed shaver. Hence, the top part of Remington’s DT55 did not 
denote trade origin and accordingly was within the legal scope of non-infringement. 
 
3.6.5.7  Final Judgment and Summery  
Hence, the court invalidated the Philips trademark on five different grounds: The mark was 
not capable of distinguishing the goods; it was devoid of any inherent or acquired 
distinctiveness; it indicated the kind or intended purpose of the goods; it had a shape 
necessary for the technical result and finally, it had a shape that added substantial value to the 
goods. Accordingly, the trademark was declared invalid and expunged. The only grounds for 
invalidation that was not accepted by the court were that the mark had a shape resulting from 
the nature of the goods themselves and that the mark was contrary to public policy.  
 
 
 
                                                 
131 The court first discussed Remington’s submission that it had not used the DT55 shaver as a trademark 
denoting trade origin, and held that any “use” of the sign in the course of trade is enough for infringement. The 
court concluded that Remington had not used the sign of the shaver head as a trademark to denote trade origin, 
but held that there was no reason to further consider the issue since Philips’ registration had been declared 
invalid. 
132 Article 6(1) of the Directive provides that: The trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit a third 
party from using, in the course of trade, (a) his own name or address; (b) indications concerning the kind, 
quality, quantity, intended purpose, value […] or other characteristics of the goods or services […].   
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3.7  UNITED KINGDOM (2): Court of Appeal (England and 
Wales), London  
Date of judgment133: May 5, 1999  
3.7.1 Dispute Background 
Since defeated, Philips appealed the judgment of the first instance court by contending that 
the trademark was valid and infringed, whereupon the case was referred to the Court of 
Appeal in London134. The background of the dispute has already been described in the 
previous chapter, as well as the grounds of invalidity Remington claimed for its defense.135 
Thus, it was only the invalidity and the non-infringement of the trademark that was appealed; 
the decision on the Design case or the Paris Convention case was not appealed.   
 
The court initially expressed its provisional view that the first instance court was right to hold 
the trademark invalid. The court further held that the issue at dispute had brought up many 
difficult questions concerning the interpretation of the Directive. Therefore, the court found it 
necessary to refer the case to the European Court of Justice under Article 177136 of the EC 
Treaty before a final decision could be reached. A preliminary ruling by the ECJ was, inter 
alia, motivated by the fact that the Swedish first instance court had come to another 
conclusion than the UK first instance court, as the Directive had been interpreted in different 
ways by the two courts. At this time, the Swedish case was pending before the Swedish Court 
of Appeal.  
 
3.7.2 The Court’s Reasoning 
Also the Court of Appeal chose to deal with Remington’s grounds for invalidation separately. 
I will only bring up the arguments or conclusions that differed from the opinion of the first 
instance court. Just like the first instance decision, this judgment is interesting from the point 
of view that so many of the articles of the Directive were discussed by the court. It is also 
interesting to see how the Court of Appeal dealt with the problems compared to the first 
instance court. As you will see, the two courts often come to the same conclusions but with 
sometimes-different approaches to the problem. 
 
3.7.2.1 Capability of Distinguishing 
Regarding the first ground, Article 3(1)(a)137 provides that a sign which is not capable of 
distinguishing the goods of one undertaking from those of other undertakings cannot 
constitute a trademark. The court established that Philips had carried out extensive advertising 
for its popular triple-headed shaver in the UK, and that both traders and the public recognize 
the trademark as being a representation of the head of Philips’ rotary shaver. The fact that the 
shape of such shaver was associated with Philips and nobody else was according to the court 
not surprising, since Philips until 1995 had been the only company selling rotary shavers in 
the UK. In addition, the Philips rotary shaver was the most popular electric shaver on the 
                                                 
133 Case No. 98/0103. 
134 The case was held before the judges Lord Justice Simon Brown, Lord Justice Aldous and Lord Justice 
Mantell. 
135 See Chapter 3.6 above. 
136 Now Article 234 of the Treaty on European Union. 
137 All referred Articles are from the Directive; the corresponding British provisions are expressed in the 
previous chapter. 
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market, constituting the majority of all electric shaver sales in the country. The court 
concluded that Philips in fact had had a monopoly in the UK in rotary shavers, and that the 
public’s perception reflected that fact. However, the capability of distinguishing depended 
upon the features of the trademark itself, not on the result of its use. It was therefore irrelevant 
if the trademark of a monopoly holder denoted his goods exclusively, since that did not mean 
that its features could distinguish the goods from those of a competitor who came into the 
market. The court declared that the more a trademark describes the goods, whether it consists 
of a word or shape, the less likely it will be capable of distinguishing those goods from similar 
goods of another trader. The shape shown in the trademark was a pictorial description of a 
product that other traders were entitled to make, and the court accordingly concluded that the 
trademark was not capable of distinguishing Philips’ shavers from those of other traders who 
produce shavers with a similar shaped head. The court further established that a shape of an 
article could not be registered in respect of goods of that shape unless it contains some 
addition to the shape of the article that has trademark significance. It is that addition that 
makes it capable of distinguishing the trademark owner’s goods from the same sort of goods 
sold by another trader. Thus, the court concluded that the first instance court had been right 
when invalidating the trademark on this ground.  
 
3.7.2.2 Distinctiveness 
The second ground for invalidation Remington had contended was Article 3(1)(b), which 
provides that a mark cannot be registered if it is devoid of any distinctive character, unless it 
has acquired a distinctive character as a result of the use made of it138. Philips held that the 
trademark had an inherent distinctiveness, or otherwise had acquired a distinctive character by 
use. Remington argued that the trademark denoted the origin of the goods only because 
Philips had been the sole trader of rotary shavers, and since the mark was purely descriptive 
of the goods it represented, it could not acquire and it had not acquired a distinctive character 
by use. The court found that the evidence clearly showed that the shape of the mark was 
exclusively associated with Philips. However, the court concluded that such a purely 
descriptive mark could not in any way acquire a secondary meaning, and in circumstances 
where Philips had been the sole supplier of rotary shavers in the UK, Philips’ evidence on 
acquired distinctiveness fell short. The court declared that it could not point to any feature of 
the trademark that could be other than descriptive of a particular design of a rotary shaver 
head, and which would have enabled the trademark to acquire a distinctive character. The 
court found the trademark to be devoid of any feature which had trademark significance that 
could become a distinctive character. Thus, the court agreed with the first instance court that 
also this was a ground for invalidation of the trademark.   
 
In addition, the third ground for invalidation was accepted by the court, which referred to the 
conclusions of the two previous grounds that the mark was devoid of any distinctive 
character. The trademark remained, even after use, a mark consisting exclusively of an 
indication of the kind of goods for which it was registered and of the intended purpose of 
those goods, which was contrary to Article 3(1)(c).  
 
                                                 
138 Article 3(3) of the Directive provides that the distinctive character can be acquired as a result of the use which 
has been made of the mark. 
 51
3.7.2.3  Shapes which Result from the Nature of the Goods Themselves 
Remington had also argued that Philips’ trademark was invalid on the ground that it consisted 
exclusively of the shape which resulted from the nature of the goods themselves, as provided 
in Section 3(1)(e), first indent. The court agreed with the first instance court, which had 
established that the trademark was not prevented from registration under this provision. This 
was because the words “the goods themselves” referred to electric shavers in general, 
comprising all the different types of electric shavers, with rotating as well vibrating cutters. 
 
3.7.2.4  Shapes Necessary to Obtain a Technical Result 
The first instance court had held that the trademark consisted exclusively of the shape which 
was necessary to obtain a technical result as provided in Article 3(1)(e) second indent, thus 
agreeing with the dissenting judge in the Swedish first instance decision.  
 
Philips sought to establish by evidence that the shape depicted in the trademark was not 
necessary to achieve a particular standard of shaving. As in the first instance, Philips argued 
that there were other designs that would have equal technical performance and could be 
produced at equivalent cost. Philips contended that there was no need to have exactly three 
rotary heads or that there was any technical reason to put the rotary heads in an equilateral 
triangle configuration. Philips also pointed to the word “exclusively” to support its 
submission that it is the whole of the shape that must obtain a technical result. Thus, as the 
majority of the Swedish district court had found, Philips held that if there are other equally 
good shapes available, the provision did not exclude registration.  
 
Remington submitted that the evidence established that the essential features139 of the shape 
shown in the trademark was designed to achieve, and did achieve, a technical result. 
Therefore, Article 3(1)(e) second indent provided a ground for invalidation of the trademark. 
Remington thus argued that if a total analysis of all the essential features of the shape 
conclude that they are there for technical reasons, namely to obtain the technical result, the 
shape is not registrable. Since that was the case with the Philips trademark, it should be 
invalidated. The submission had also formed the basis of the dissenting judgment in the 
Swedish district court and had been accepted by the UK first instance court. 
 
The court established that the provision must be interpreted in the light of its purpose. The 
purpose is to exclude from registration shapes which are merely functional in the sense that 
they are motivated by and are the result of technical considerations. The court concluded that 
it is a fact that monopoly rights, other than trademarks, granted by the state are anti-
competitive and can only be justified for a limited term and on well-known grounds. So far, 
trademarks have been seen as an exception provided that they only monopolize indications of 
origin and not inventions and designs. The court established that to enable monopolies 
granted in respect of patents, registered designs and the like to be extended by trademark 
registrations would be contrary to the public interest. Therefore, shapes that have a technical 
character should not be monopolized for an unlimited period by reason of trademark 
registration, since that would stifle the competition and be contrary to the public good. 
 
                                                 
139 This was the first time the phrase essential features was used, and later those two words would play a central 
role in the ECJ decision, as the ECJ adopted the term from the referred questions of the UK Court of Appeal. 
Thus, it was Remington who first used the expression, which later would be established to be the correct way of 
interpreting the second indent of Article 3.1(e) of the Directive. 
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As regards the parties’ arguments, the court held that the restriction upon registration imposed 
by the words “which is necessary to obtain a technical result” is not overcome by establishing 
that there are other shapes which can obtain the same technical result. All that has to be 
shown is that the essential features of the shape are attributable only to the technical result. It 
is in that sense that the shape is necessary to obtain the technical result. The court held that if 
the meaning suggested by Philips would be adopted, a trader would be enabled to obtain 
registration of all possible alternative shapes that could achieve the same technical result. That 
would be to give the provision a meaning which would not at all be in accordance with the 
purpose for which it was intended, as it would enable unfair monopolies and stifle 
competition. 
 
Finally, the court concluded that the trademark did not contain any feature that had trademark 
significance. The trademark was a combination of technical features produced to achieve a 
good practical design, and should therefore be invalidated, as decided by the first instance 
court.  
 
3.7.2.5  Shapes which give Substantial Value to the Goods 
Remington’s next ground for invalidation is found in the third indent of Article 3(1)(e), which 
provides that a sign shall not be registered if it consists exclusively of the shape which gives 
substantial value to the goods. The first instance court had decided that the shape had an 
engineering function which added substantial value to the product and therefore was 
unregistrable. On this matter, the Court of Appeal for the first time dissented with the first 
instance court by holding that the provision was intended to exclude aesthetic-type shapes, not 
functional shapes as in the previous provision, even though the two provisions may overlap. 
The court established that the fact that the technical result of a shape is excellent and the 
product therefore can command a high price does not mean that it is excluded from 
registration by this provision. Instead an assessment was required to determine whether the 
value was substantial, by making a comparison between the shape sought to be registered (or 
invalidated) and the shapes of equivalent products. It was only if the shape sought to be 
registered had, in relative terms, substantial value, that it would be excluded from registration. 
It was therefore irrelevant that Philips’ registered shape had a substantial reputation built up 
by advertising. The court came to the conclusion that the registered shape did not have any 
more value than other shapes that were established to be as good as, and as cheap to produce 
as, the shape which was registered. Accordingly, the court decided that there was no reason 
for invalidation on this ground, and thus changed the decision of the first instance court on 
this matter. 
 
3.7.3 Infringement 
As the trademark registration was declared invalid according to several provisions, the court 
found no need to consider the dispute on infringement. However, the court established that if 
the ECJ would conclude that the court’s decision regarding Article 3 was not correct and the 
registration was considered still valid, it was appropriate to consider the infringement issue.  
 
As defense against Philips’ allegations of infringement, Remington had argued that they had 
not used its DT55 shaver as a trademark denoting trade origin, and thus had not infringed 
Philips’ trademark.  On this matter, the first instance court had concluded that Remington had 
not used the top part of its DT55 to denote trade origin, but had further held that any use of a 
sign in the course of trade could constitute an infringement. However, the first instance court 
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had chosen not to further consider this ground, as the trademark had been invalidated. The 
Court of Appeal agreed with the first instance court on the matter, and held that nothing in the 
relevant provisions140 required an infringing use to be trademark use. But unlike the first 
instance court, the Court of Appeal made a decision on the matter and rejected Remington’s 
defense on this ground, which means that Remington would have been guilty of infringement 
if the trademark had not been declared invalid.  
 
Article 6(1)(b) provides that the proprietor of a registered trademark may not prohibit a third 
party from using in the course of trade indications concerning the kind, quality, quantity, 
intended purpose, or other characteristics of goods. The court held that the head of the 
Remington shaver depicted a triple-headed rotary shaver, a use that was and would be seen as 
an indication as to the kind of shaver and its intended purpose. The court also established that 
Remington’s use was in accordance with honest practice in industrial or commercial matters. 
Hence, the court agreed with the first instance court and concluded that no infringement 
would have occurred under these grounds, had the mark been valid141. 
 
3.7.4 Preliminary Ruling by the European Court of Justice 
According to Article 234142 of the Treaty on European Union, a member state court can 
request a preliminary ruling by the European Court of Justice if it considers that an ECJ 
decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment. As set out in subsection 
(b) of Article 234, the preliminary ruling may concern the interpretation of acts of the 
institutions of the Community, such as a directive. 
 
The court decided that it was necessary to draft questions to be referred to the ECJ, and the 
parties were given an opportunity to put forward their views on appropriate questions before 
they were drafted by the court and referred to the ECJ. The ECJ preliminary ruling of the 
Court of Appeal’s referred questions is described and discussed in Chapter 3.17 below. 
 
 
 
3.8  AUSTRALIA: Federal Court of Australia –New South Wales 
District Registry (Sydney) 
Date of judgment143: June 18, 1999 
3.8.1 Dispute Background 
Philips had sold triple-headed dry rotary shavers in Australia since 1956. In June 1997 
Remington introduced on the Australian market its Izumi-made model RR DT 55, which was 
a triple-headed wet/dry rotary shaver that could be used dry or with lather and could be rinsed 
in water. Before that, the only rotary shavers sold in Australia were those made by Philips. 
Remington had sold electric shavers on the Australian market for many years, but those were 
the foil type of shavers, with vibrating blades instead of rotary. On the pleadings of the court 
                                                 
140 Articles 5 and 6 of the Directive. 
141 The court also agreed with the first instance court that Article 6(1)(c) did not provide Remington any defense 
as the intended purpose of the provision was to allow such use as “This film is suitable for a Kodak Camera”. 
This ground for invalidation was thus not applicable.  
142 Former Article 177 of the Treaty on European Union. 
143 Case No. NG 637 OF 1997. 
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proceedings Remington made clear that it intended to continue to import and distribute its 
rotary shaver on the Australian market. At the time of the court proceedings, Remington had 
since 1997 been restrained by interlocutory injunction144 from selling, advertising for sale, 
promoting or marketing the Izumi-made rotary shavers in Australia.  
 
This Australian judgment is very extensive and covers numerous possible aspects of the case; 
trademark infringement, design infringement, unfair competition and passing off145. 
Particularly interesting is the alleged design right infringement since there is only one other 
judgment146 discussing design issues, namely the first UK judgment. Also the competition law 
matters are special, since competition law was only referred to in five other jurisdictions147. In 
most other judgments, distinctiveness and technical aspects of Philips’ shaver were the main 
issues discussed. In this judgment, Remington did not claim the Philips trademarks to be 
invalid, so the court had no reason to get into any of the registrability or invalidation matters. 
Hence, the main question for the court was whether Remington had used the mark as a 
trademark, which was a decisive factor when assessing the alleged trademark infringement. 
Furthermore, a disclaimer attached to one of the trademark registrations caused the court 
some puzzlement, which you will soon read more about. 
 
3.8.2 The Parties’ Claims 
Philips148 sought orders consisting of permanent injunctions and declarations that Remington 
had infringed Philips’ registered design and trademarks. Philips sought the relief on the basis 
that Remington’s conduct, as well as infringing the registered design and trademarks, 
amounted to passing off and infringed Sections 52 and 53149 of the Australian Trade Practices 
Act 1974.    
 
Remington150 cross-claimed and sought a declaration that the mark subject to the “shape” 
trademark application (further described below) was not registrable and requested an order 
directing Philips to withdraw the application. Remington also sought an order for rectification 
of the Register of Designs by expunging Philips’ registered design, or, if the design were to be 
considered still valid, that the Remington shaver did not infringe it. An unusual aspect of the 
claims compared to most other judgments of the dispute is that Remington did not claim any 
of Philips’ trademarks to be invalid.   
 
3.8.3 The Court’s View on the Judgments in other Jurisdictions 
The court151 noted that there had been much litigation in a number of jurisdictions between 
Philips and Izumi or the companies, including Remington, which had distributed Izumi’s 
triple-headed rotary shavers. The court referred particularly to the judgments of two other 
common wealth jurisdictions, the two decisions from the UK and the Canadian appeal 
judgment. The court concluded, however, that even though there was a degree of overlap, the 
                                                 
144 Interlocutory injunction reported at (1997) 39 IPR 283. 
145 Passing off is described in Chapter 2.3.3. 
146 Also the General-Advocate discussed design matters in his Opinion before the ECJ, but such ‘Opinion’ is 
obviously not a judgment. 
147 In the United States, Germany, Spain, Portugal and Italy. 
148 The claimants/applicants were Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V.. and Philips Electronics Australia 
Limited. I will refer to them as “Philips”. 
149 These provisions are described in Chapter 3.8.6 below as well as in Chapter 2.3.3 above. 
150 The respondent and cross-claimant was Remington Products Australia PTY Limited. 
151 The case was held before Judge Lehane J. 
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issues in those cases were not at all identical with the issues the Australia court had to decide 
upon, and the English and Canadian trademarks legislations differed significantly from the 
Australian Trade Marks Act 1995. As a result, the court concluded that the English and 
Canadian decisions were interesting and in some respect instructive, but offered only limited 
assistance in the resolution of the matters in issue between the parties in the Australian 
proceedings.  
 
In the following I will use the same disposition as the Australian court and discuss; first the 
trademark issues, then the design matters and finally the trade practices and passing off 
concerns. 
 
3.8.4 Trademark Infringement  
3.8.4.1  The Registered Trademarks 
Philips was the owner of two trademarks registered under the Australian Trade Marks Act 
1955, today registered trademarks for the purposes of the Trade Marks Act 1995. Each of the 
trademarks was registered as device marks in class 8 for shaving apparatus. One of the marks 
was a two-dimensional mark consisting only of a very simple picture of an equilateral triangle 
with rounded corners enclosing three identical circles.152 The other mark was the same three-
dimensional mark that had been at issue in the United Kingdom litigation, and represented a 
more detailed picture of the top part of a three-headed shaver.153 The registration of the three-
dimensional mark also incorporated a disclaimer expressing that “Registration of this 
trademark shall neither confer nor recognize any right to the use of its features as a design 
applied to an article of manufacture”. 
 
Philips had also applied for registration of a trademark in class 8 comprising a “shape”. On 
the application, the shape was described as “a shape of a shaving unit consisting of a 
substantially equilateral triangularly shaped housing containing three circular shaving heads”.  
 
3.8.4.2  The Parties’ Grounds  
Philips contended that its two trademarks were infringed by the use of the triple-headed 
configuration of the Remington shaver, as well as the use of photographs or images of the 
triple-headed faceplate on packages and in brochures and advertisements. Philips argued that 
all those matters were to be seen as use as a trademark of a sign that is substantially identical 
with or deceptively similar to one or both of the Philips’ registered trademarks.  
 
Remington, on the other hand, contended that the registered marks did not give Philips the 
exclusive right to, in a trademark sense, use the mark as the design of the faceplate of a 
shaver. Remington argued that in any event the design of the head of the Remington shaver 
had not been used as a trademark of the triple-headed shaver. Remington further contended 
that the disclaimer attached to the three-dimensional mark registration had the result that 
Philips was not entitled to complain of the use of its mark, or use of a mark similar to it, as a 
feature of the design of a part of the Remington shaver.  
 
                                                 
152 Australian Registration No. 308424, corresponding to the international trademark registration IR 430.836 
illustrated in Appendix A. 
153 Australian Registration No. 309250, identical with the (still existing) German trademark registration 1034262 
and similar to international trademark registration IR 430.837 all illustrated in Appendix A.  
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Moreover, Remington submitted that a mark registered as a device, as both of the Philips 
marks were, did not confer on its owner the same exclusive rights as of the owner of a 
“shape” mark. To hold otherwise, Remington argued, would result in a “massive retrospective 
vesting of rights in device marks with potentially catastrophic consequences for the 
manufacturing industries”, as the owner of a mark could obtain something close to an ever-
lasting monopoly in an industrial design. 
 
3.8.4.3  Infringement by Trademark Use 
In no other judgment was the matter of trademark use discussed so extensively. I find it quite 
interesting as it brings up questions that more often are discussed in relation to competition 
law issues, such as advertising material and packaging.   
 
According to Section 120(1) of the Australian Trade Marks Act 1995, infringement of a 
trademark is when a person uses as a trademark a sign that is substantially identical with, or 
deceptively similar to, the trademark in relation to the goods in respect of which the 
trademark is registered. The court established that there was no implied requirement that the 
sign used by the alleged infringer need to be in the same category of marks as the infringed 
sign, but the sign and the trademark must concern the same type of goods. 
 
Philips complained of the use Remington had made of the sign, the shaver and its packaging. 
The court described the visual appearance of the Remington DT 55 shaver and its packaging 
in meticulous detail, and observed that the word “Remington” occurred on numerous places154 
on both the shaver and the package. Towards the bottom of the front of the package was 
printed “worlds only wet/dry dual track rotary shaving system”. On the back of the package 
there was, inter alia, a picture of the faceplate with the words “three heads ensure no gaps 
when shaving” written underneath, and a picture representing the faceplate with a cut-away 
portion showing segments of the “dual track” cutters. The frequent use of the words “dual 
track” referred to the two rows of cutters on each of the three rotary heads, which according to 
the court was the most particular difference between the Remington shaver head and the 
Philips trademark, as Philips had only one row of cutters. 
 
Philips had also complained on Remington’s product brochure, which was a “trade” 
publication not addressed directly to consumers. The court described the brochure in detail, 
which contained several pictures of the shaver and a text obviously intending to create 
associations with cars155. The three rotary cutting heads were also mentioned in an, also 
vehicle-associating, advertisement where the shaver was described as “the quickest, 
smoothest thing on three wheels”. The word “Remington” was clearly visible on the pictures 
of the shaver on both the product brochure and the advertisement.  
 
Philips submitted that the message of the Remington shaver itself, its packaging and the way 
it was presented was calculated to tell prospective buyers that the Remington shaver was to be 
distinguished from the products of other traders because it was described by the appearance of 
                                                 
154 On the shaver it was printed in large letters on the whole front of the handle and in smaller letters beneath the 
switch, and across the whole plastic blister package it was enclosed in, as well as on the side, “REMINGTON” 
was printed in large letters. 
155 The aim of the brochure text was obviously to create “masculine” associations with powerful cars: “Handle 
really close shaves with confidence, knowing that you’re in total control of the smoothest ride of your life”, “RR 
55 takes the toughest conditions wet or dry […] for long life without maintenance” and “RR 55 smoothes the 
toughest terrain”. 
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the three “dual track” cutting heads in a triangular configuration. Philips held that the constant 
emphasis on the shaving surface and its appearance was clearly aiming to draw attention to 
the rotary shaving heads, in close association with the name “Remington”. Philips held that 
the triple-head configuration was a striking and powerful image which was very advantageous 
for marketing reasons. Philips also argued that the design of the Remington shaver was not a 
result of own research showing the best functional arrangement to be to put three cutting 
heads in an equilateral triangle, but rather to “copy the market leader” thus trade off Philips’ 
marketing success.  
 
Remington, on the other hand, submitted that it had not used the appearance of the faceplate 
as a badge of the origin of the Remington shaver. Furthermore, the shaver was prominently 
labeled “Remington”, and there was nothing to suggest that it was a case of multiple 
trademark use. Remington held that the packaging design and the depiction of the shaver in 
the advertising material were calculated simply to demonstrate what sort of shaver it was; 
unlike the foil shavers that Remington had previously sold in Australia, this was a rotary 
shaver. The court established that both sides had evidence demonstrating that it was 
customary in the advertising of electric shavers to show its faceplate, which obviously is the 
“business end” of the shaver.  
 
3.8.4.4  The Court’s Findings regarding the Infringement 
The court established that it was relevant to know, as demonstrated by the evidence, that the 
conventional way to advertise an electric shaver is to give some prominence, in any depiction 
of it, to its faceplate. The main question to ask was whether the use of the mark suggested 
commercial origin or if it rather conveyed some other message, as describing the goods or its 
characteristics. The court held that even if Remington/Izumi had not made any independent 
investigation of possible alternative shapes but merely had adopted Philips’ shape, that did not 
in any way indicate that the Remington’s use of the shape denoted trade origin.  
 
To say that the shaver is “the quickest, smoothest thing on three wheels” was, according to the 
court, not to suggest that three “wheels” were an exclusive or distinctive characteristic of 
Remington shavers. Furthermore, the court held that much more emphasis was put on the 
feature of the dual track cutters and the wet/dry function than on the fact that the faceplate 
was triangular and had three rotary cutting heads. The court established that depicting and 
describing the shaver head was common use and the emphasis on the shaver head was not 
intended to suggest a distinctive association with the shaver’s origin, Remington. 
Accordingly, the court concluded that the use by Remington was not a use of either of Philips’ 
marks as a trademark, and Remington had therefore not infringed Philips’ trademark rights.  
 
3.8.4.5  The Disclaimer 
The court declared that since there was no infringement, the consideration of the effect of the 
disclaimer156 attached to the three-dimensional mark was unnecessary, but nonetheless 
expressed its views on the matter. Philips had argued that the disclaimer had little practical 
effect and none which affected the outcome of the case. The court was a bit puzzled regarding 
the meaning of the disclaimer, particularly since it was written before the Trade Marks Act 
1995 came to effect. The court concluded, however, that if Remington’s use of the shaver was 
                                                 
156 “Registration of this trademark shall neither confer nor recognize any right to the use of its features as a 
design applied to an article of manufacture.” 
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trademark use of a shape deceptively similar to the three-dimensional mark, the disclaimer 
would not prevent the use of the shape from amounting to infringement. 
 
3.8.4.6  The Cross-claim regarding the Trademark Application 
Remington cross-claimed and sought a declaration that the mark subject to Philips’ pending 
trademark application comprising a “shape” was not registrable for numerous reasons, and 
sought an order directing Philips to withdraw the application. The court concluded that it had 
no authority to intervene, at the suit of a potential opponent, before the Registrar had 
completed the examination of the application, so the declaration sought was refused.  
 
3.8.5 The Registered Design 
Philips was the owner of a design157 registered under the Australian Designs Act in 1989. The 
article in respect of which it was registered was described as “dry shaver”, and a monopoly 
was claimed in respect of “the features of shape and configuration” appearing in seven 
representations (drawn pictures) showing the shaver from different angles.  
 
Philips had sought orders consisting of permanent injunction and a declaration that 
Remington had infringed Philips’ registered design. Philips claimed that the Remington 
shaver was nothing but an obvious or fraudulent imitation of the registered design, 
inconsistent with the relevant provisions158 of the Designs Act. Remington cross-claimed for 
rectification of the Register of Design by expunging Philips’ design registration. Remington’s 
primary case was that Philips’ design was valid but the Remington shaver was not infringing 
it. Remington sought an order to expunge the registered design only in the event that it was 
held that, assuming validity, there was infringement. 
 
3.8.5.1  The Court’s Reasoning and Conclusion 
The court established that fraudulent imitation presupposes (by contrast with obvious 
imitation) knowledge of the registered design; one cannot copy, or consciously base one’s 
design upon, another design of which one is ignorant. Hence, neither dishonest intent nor 
deliberate or conscious intention to copy is a necessary element of fraudulent imitation, which 
had been established by case law. Furthermore, the court held that it is not necessary that the 
imitator knows that the design imitated is an Australian registered design; it is sufficient that 
the imitator had reason to believe that an application for registration of the design was 
pending. The court declared that the essential questions were, first, whether the allegedly 
infringing design was based on or derived from the registered design and, second, whether the 
differences were so substantial that the result was not to be described as an imitation. 
 
The court found that Remington had had knowledge of the Philips shavers when designing the 
Remington model DT45, the model on which the DT55 was based. There had been samples of 
Philips shavers in the Izumi factory, and on internal notes and drawings from Izumi, the 
Philips shavers were mentioned and compared with. It was also clear that Remington was 
aware of the United States registered design equivalent of the design in suit. 
 
                                                 
157 Australian Design Registration No. 105780. 
158 Section 30(1) of the Australian Designs Act. 
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The court held that it was not an infringement to produce a product that was close in design to 
a registered design, if the design of the product was not an imitation. It would, however, be an 
imitation if the element of “fraud” was proved, which it could be even if the copy showed 
apparent differences, as long as it could be shown that the differences had been made merely 
to disguise the copying. However, if there were substantial differences of a material kind 
between the article and the registered design, there was no imitation and no infringement. The 
evidence in the case established that Remington would have preferred a smaller head of the 
DT55 but could not achieve it because of the size of the internal components and the need to 
waterproof the machinery. That difference, the size of the head, existed not because 
Remington wished to disguise any copying but because the character of the particular 
machine dictated it. 
  
Furthermore, the court established that there were significant similarities between the design 
in suit and the Remington shaver, the most striking being the “chin” of the shavers. However, 
another feature, the faceplate, was found strikingly different in comparison since the 
Remington one was substantially narrower, and also the size of the heads differed. The court 
held that it was important and necessary to compare particular features of the products, but 
monopoly was claimed in respect of shape and configuration of the whole of the 
representations of the design, and it was therefore the design as a whole that must be 
compared. The court found substantial differences of a material kind between the registered 
design and the Remington shaver, which gave the latter a distinctively different appearance 
from the former159. The court finally concluded that there had been no imitation, neither 
fraudulent nor obvious. Philips’ registered design was still valid but had not been infringed by 
the Remington shaver. 
 
3.8.6 Trade Practices Act and Passing Off 
3.8.6.1  Philips’ Claims 
Philips alleged in its claims that either by reason of the appearance and/or the packaging or 
marketing, the Remington shaver was likely to be taken by the trade and by the public 
generally as being the shaver of Philips, manufactured and distributed by Philips, or 
manufactured and distributed with the license or approval from Philips. Philips held that to 
sell or import for sale the Remington shaver in Australia would be to engage in conduct 
infringing Section 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974, to make representations prohibited by s 
53(c) or 53(d) of the same Act and would also amount to passing off160. 
 
3.8.6.2  The Court’s Reasoning 
The court established that Philips until 1997 had been the only supplier of triple-headed rotary 
shavers on the Australian market, and that Philips had made extensive advertising in Australia 
mainly consisting of a picture showing the shaver head in connection with the name “Philips” 
or the trademark “PHILISHAVE”. It was undisputed that these facts had made consumers 
very likely to associate the triangular shape of the shaving head with Philips shavers.  
 
                                                 
159 The differences found were principally the size of the head base, the size and shape of the handle and the look 
of the faceplate. 
160 The matter of ‘passing off’ is described in Chapter 2.3.3 above.  
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Remington had been a well-known brand in Australia for many years. The evidence showed 
that Remington at the time had a larger share of the overall market in Australia for “personal 
care” products than Philips did, but had a substantially lesser share of the total electric shaver 
market. 
 
The court had in the interlocutory judgment161 held that there was no question to be tried as to 
a breach of s 52 or s 53 of the Australian Trade Practices Act. The court brought up the case 
of Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v. Puxu Pty Ltd 162(1982) 149 CLR 191, in which 
the respondent produced chairs very similar in appearance with the applicant’s, but clearly 
labeled with the own brand. The majority of the High Court held that the presence of the label 
was sufficient to exclude a breach of s 52. It was not misleading or deceptive conduct merely 
to manufacture and sell products similar or identical with an existing product, especially since 
the label was calculated to correct any confusion as to source.  
 
Philips submitted that even though the shape of electric shavers of all brands had changed 
significantly on many occasions, the configuration of the head of the Philips rotary shaver had 
been constant and therefore emphasized in the marketing as distinguishing Philips’ shavers 
from those of others. Philips further argued that the particular image of the triangular shaving 
head depicted in Philips’ advertising was “striking and memorable”. Philips held that 
consumers of today are used to an environment of mergers and acquisitions, co-branding and 
distribution arrangements, which increases the risk of confusion of products’ origin. Finally, 
Philips had called a marketing expert, Dr Beaton, who expressed the opinion that Philips 
triangular shaver head had for many years formed part of the Philips “brand”. Another 
marketing expert, Dr Bednall who was called by Remington, agreed that consumers were 
likely to associate the shaver head with Philips, but regarded it as significant that all Philips’ 
advertising had associated the name “Philips” or “PHILISHAVE” with the shape. He held 
that the use of the “REMINGTON” brand on the Remington shaver and its packaging and 
advertising material would clearly indicate that the source of the Remington product was not 
Philips.  
 
The court established that it was important to keep in mind the special nature of electric 
shavers; that they are not items which are picked up from the shelves of a supermarket but are 
usually sold in specialty shops and department stores, often displayed in locked cabinets. It 
was very likely that Remington products and Philips products were to be found in close 
proximity, with good possibilities for comparison. The use of the well-known name 
“Remington” emblazoned on the Remington product, packaging and advertising material 
would ensure that the consumer would appreciate that the shaver was a Remington, not a 
Philips. This would apply even to consumers who were familiar with the Philips triangular 
head and associated it with Philips’ shavers. The court found that Remington’s conduct was 
not calculated to mislead or deceive consumers, particularly since it was very likely that the 
consumer would be faced with a display including both brands. 
 
3.8.6.3  The Court’s Conclusion 
The court declared that the evidence showed that Philips triangular shaver head through 
intense marketing was strongly associated with Philips by the consumers. The evidence did 
not, however, establish that Remington’s conduct would suggest to consumers that there was 
                                                 
161 Reported at (1997) 39 IPR 283. 
162 (1982) 149 CLR 191. 
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only one source of triangular triple-headed rotary shavers and that that source was Remington. 
Certainly, the court held, the evidence did not establish that the Remington shaver was likely 
to be taken by the trade and the public generally as being neither the shaver of Philips nor 
manufactured and distributed by Philips. The last of Philips’ claims was the possibility that 
the Remington shaver was likely to be taken as produced with the license or approval of 
Philips. The court concluded that even though the image of the shaver head was powerful and 
associated with Philips, its use in the particular context in relation to a shaver clearly marked 
“Remington” would make it clear that, of the products of two substantial competitors, this 
was a Remington.  
 
Accordingly, the case based on s 52 and s 53 of the Trade Practices Act failed. The claim of 
passing off had the same basis as the Trade Practices Act claim, and the court found the 
alleged misrepresentation that is an essential element of passing off non-existing. 
Accordingly, the passing off claim failed as well.  
 
3.8.7 Comments 
This judgment is very extensive and is the judgment that includes the most alternative aspects 
of the case; trademark infringement issues, design infringement, unfair competition, and 
passing off. The judgment therefore provides an interesting possibility to compare how the 
court handled the two in some aspects overlapping legal areas of intellectual property law and 
competition law. Since Remington did not claim Philips’ trademarks to be invalid, the court 
did not have to discuss the invalidation matters that were the central parts of most other 
judgments. As a consequence of that, none of the registrations were expunged but were 
considered still valid, as opposed to many of the other judgments. 
 
 
 
3.9 GERMANY (1): German Patent and Trademark Office, 
Trademark Division 
Date of judgment163: October 18, 2001  
3.9.1 Dispute Background 
Remington had in early December 2000 filed an application for cancellation164 of Philips’ 
trademark 1034262 (see Appendix A for illustration) to the German Patent and Trademark 
Office (“the PTO”). The reason for Remington’s application might very well have been that 
the opinion of the ECJ’s General-Advocate had been announced earlier that year, on January 
23, 2001.165 The opinion, which is described in Chapter 3.16 (after all the German 
decisions)166, concerned the referred questions on the matter from the UK Court of Appeal.  
As you will read more about in Chapter 3.16 below, the General-Advocate found that if the 
essential features of the trademark’s shape served the achievement of the technical result, it 
                                                 
163 Ref. No. S 279/00 Lösch. 
164 Pursuant to sections 50(1) No. 1 and 3(2) No. 2 of the German Trademark Act. 
165 According to the German Cologne District Court, the decision of which is described in Chapter 3.10 below, 
Remington filed the application “in the course of the proceedings before the [ECJ]”. 
166 I temporarily disregarded the chronological order and put the General-Advocate’s opinion after the German 
chapters so that the opinion could be read in connection with the ECJ decision. Chronologically, the opinion 
should have been put before this chapter. 
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was unregistrable irrespective of whether there were alternative shapes that could achieve the 
same result. It was not difficult to interpret this as a victory for Remington, and in the context 
of that, it is understandable that Remington decided to apply for a cancellation of Philips’ 
trademark. 
 
The case concerned a picture trademark, registered in class 8 as shaving apparatus. It had been 
registered in February 1980 on the basis of market recognition, and thus had acquired 
distinctiveness. The mark depicted the head of an electric shaver with three rotary cutting 
heads arranged on an equilateral, triangular faceplate, which was raised from the handle and 
had rounded corners (see the illustration of German trademark 1034262 in Appendix A).  
 
The reason why this decision is interesting is because it is one of the few cases where Philips 
“wins”, as you will soon find out. Here you can follow the reasoning of the PTO, and why it 
found Remington’s grounds for cancellation to be unfounded. It is important to notice that this 
decision came a year before the ECJ preliminary ruling was announced. It is possible that the 
PTO would have come to another conclusion had this been after the ECJ judgment. This 
judgment was appealed, and the appeal judgment of the Federal Patent Court is described in 
Chapter 3.12 below.  
 
3.9.2 The Parties’ Requests and Submissions 
Remington, the petitioner, submitted that Philips’ trademark consisted exclusively of the 
pictorial representation of a part of the product. Remington also argued that even if other 
designs were conceivable, the configuration reproduced in the registered trademark 
constituted the optimum solution to the technical problem. Furthermore, the specific 
arrangement of the three cutting heads in an equilateral triangle was necessary to obtain the 
technical result. Therefore, Remington concluded that the trademark in question consisted 
exclusively of a shape necessary to obtain a technical result within the meaning of Sec. 3(2) 
No. 2167 of the German Trademark Act, thus requested a cancellation of the trademark. 
 
The respondent, Philips, petitioned that Remington’s request for cancellation should be 
dismissed, and held that the element “necessary” was to be interpreted narrowly, meaning that 
since the same technical result could be achieved in alternative ways, the provision did not 
apply. Philips argued that sufficient reasonable possibilities remained to competitors for 
obtaining a comparable result. Finally, Philips stressed the point that the trademark had 
acquired market recognition. 
 
3.9.3 The PTO’s Reasoning and Decision 
The PTO established that Remington’s petition was unfounded and should be dismissed, as 
the trademark did not lack capacity for protection according to the provisions of the German 
Trademark Act. The PTO further held that there had been no violation of Sec. 3(2) No. 2 of 
the Trademark Act, since the shape was not “exclusively” necessary to obtain a technical 
result. Remington had, according to the PTO, not submitted any statements of fact that the 
trademark was merely a shape that contained no special features going beyond the basic 
elements intended to achieve the technical function of “shaving”. The PTO was convinced by 
Philips’ arguments, and held that the specific three-head system was not necessary in order to 
obtain a the technical result, since a large number of alternative shapes were conceivable, for 
                                                 
167 Corresponding to Article 3(1)(e) of the Directive. 
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example configurations with one, two or eight cutting heads. For a system with three rotary 
cutting heads, there were many other ways to place the heads, for example in a banana shape.  
 
The PTO further established that the arrangement of three cutting heads in a triangle was not 
necessary for the technical result, but was partially determined by non-technical 
considerations. Remington argued the opposite, and held that the configuration reproduced in 
the trademark was the optimum technical solution in terms of shaving speed and quality, in 
terms of arrangement and design of the cutter heads and faceplate, and in terms of allowing 
the smallest possible number of cogwheels. The PTO was, however, not convinced that those 
points established the technical nature of the shape168.  
 
Remington also argued that the faceplate, on which the cutters were mounted, had convex 
sides and rounded corners to make the shave safer and more comfortable, thus served a 
technical purpose. The PTO disagreed with Remington and held that the faceplate had no 
technical function and that there were no facts or evidence showing that the faceplate made 
the shaving safer or gentler. The PTO therefore concluded that since the faceplate was a part 
of the trademark and did not serve a technical purpose, the sign did not consist exclusively of 
a shape necessary to obtain a technical result. Hence, Remington’s petition for cancellation of 
Philips’ trademark was dismissed, and the trademark was considered still valid and in force. 
 
As mentioned above, the PTO’s decision was appealed by Remington and a decision by the 
German Federal Patent Court was given on April 14, 2004, referred below in Chapter 3.12. 
 
 
 
3.10 GERMANY (2): Cologne District Court 
Date of judgment169: November 5, 2002  
3.10.1  Dispute Background 
The court started with establishing the facts of the case, of which the following are the most 
interesting. Philips had marketed its triple-headed electric shaver in Germany since 1966, and 
the shaver was subject of several trademark registrations170. The number of sold triple-headed 
Philips shavers in Germany had increased significantly during the last seven years before the 
proceedings, with almost a million sold shavers in the year of 2001. Philips had during those 
seven years invested in average €5-6 million per year for the advertising of the triple-headed 
shaver in Germany. Furthermore, an opinion poll carried out in 1994 by the GFM-GETAS 
institute showed that 93,8% of the persons polled were able to ascribe the three-cutter head 
system of the shavers to Philips as distributor and manufacturer.  
 
Remington had developed a triple-headed shaver which, at that time in late 2002, was being 
marketed in the neighboring European countries Italy, France, the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Spain and Portugal. The court mentioned the two UK litigations and the ECJ preliminary 
ruling, and concluded that the ECJ decision “by the press had been interpreted as a victory for 
                                                 
168 Unfortunately the PTO did not further explain why those arguments did not establish the technical nature of 
the shape. 
169 Case No. 33 O 325/02. 
170 Since 1980 the design of the cutting surface had been registered as a picture trademark in the Netherlands, 
and in Germany it had been registered as a three-dimensional trademark since 1995 and as three different picture 
trademarks with priorities dated from 1977, 1996 and 1999. 
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Remington”. Hence, this was the first European judgment after the ECJ preliminary ruling 
had been pronounced. The court further brought up the case of Remington’s previous 
application to the German PTO for the cancellation of Philips’ three-dimensional 
trademark.171  
 
On July 10, 2002 Remington launched a series of triple-headed shavers on the German 
market. On August 20 the same year Philips172 was granted an interlocutory injunction issued 
by the Cologne District Court. The interlocutory injunction was issued without oral hearing 
on the grounds of urgency and forbade Remington173 from offering for sale, advertising or 
putting into circulation such electric shavers with three cutter heads that was illustrated in the 
injunction decision. The legal grounds referred were four sections174 of the German Act 
against Unfair Competition. Remington lodged an objection to the interlocutory injunction, as 
you will see below. Thus, the court had to decide whether to confirm or dismiss the 
interlocutory injunction already issued on the grounds of urgency. 
 
Please note that this is a first instance decision, and in the next chapter you find the appeal. I 
find both of these judgments interesting from a legal point of view, as one of them refers 
exclusively to competition law and the other refers only to trademark law. These German 
decisions are also unique since they find favor for Philips; in most other cases Remington is 
the succeeding party. 
 
3.10.2  Philips’ Claims and Legal Grounds 
The petitioner, Philips, argued that the distribution of the Remington shavers infringed 
Philips’ trademark rights pursuant to relevant provisions175 of the German Trademark Act. 
Philips held that the design of the three-cutter head shape was capable of trademark 
protection, since even against the background of the ECJ ruling the shape was not exclusively 
necessary to obtain a technical effect but also had characterizing and aesthetic features. 
Accordingly, Philips argued that the shape had competitive individuality, i.e. features capable 
of distinguishing the shavers from those of others. In addition, Philips contended that 
Remington’s distribution of its new shavers was a breach of competition law from the point of 
view of an avoidable deception of origin and exploitation of reputation. 
 
Philips further held that dry shaving, which was the relevant technical effect, could be 
achieved not only by using a triangular faceplate with three rotary cutters, but also by means 
of a different design176, such as with two or four cutter heads arranged in a round, 
cloverleaf177 or banana shaped formation. On the question of urgency, which is further 
discussed below, Philips claimed that they first acquired notice of the marketing and 
advertising for Remington’s shavers in the middle of July 2002. 
                                                 
171 As described in Chapter 3.9 above, the PTO dismissed the application. The decision was  appealed by 
Remington, and the Federal Patent Court decision is described in Chapter 3.12. 
172 The 1st petitioner, Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V, is the Netherland parent company of the 2nd petitioner, 
Philips GmbH, which is the marketing company in Germany of the Philips Group operating worldwide. 
173 The respondent was the German company Remington Products GmbH, which is a subsidiary of Remington 
Product Company L.L.C. in the USA.  
174 Sections 1, 13, 24 and 25 of the German Act against Unfair Competition. 
175 Sections 4 and 14 Paragraph 2 of the German Trademark Act. 
176 I find it a bit strange that Philips argued that the technical effect could be reached also with alternative shapes; 
this was according to the ECJ decision irrelevant for the application of the Article 3(1)(e).  
177 Philips failed to explain what was meant with “cloverleaf” shape; the cutting heads of the trademarks at issue 
were already placed in each corner of a triangle, i.e. in the shape of a cloverleaf with three leaves. 
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 3.10.3  Remington’s Claims and Legal Grounds 
Being the respondent, Remington petitioned that the assumption of urgency required for the 
issue of an interlocutory injunction was refuted, thus proven to be false. Remington argued 
that Philips had acquired positive knowledge of Remington’s marketing and advertising of its 
new shaver series immediately after the launch on July 10, 2002. Remington also held that 
Philips had been well prepared for the marketing of the new Remington shavers in Germany 
in the light of the recent ECJ decision as well as the marketing of the shavers in the 
neighboring countries of Europe. 
 
Furthermore, Remington argued that Philips could not derive any claims regarding 
supplementary protection of achievement under competition law178, since the provisions of 
trademark law applied and were exhaustive. Therefore, account was to be taken to the part of 
the ECJ decision concerning trademark capacity of design shapes, from which it followed that 
the three-cutter-head shape was exclusively determined by technical reasons and accordingly 
should be denied trademark protection. In addition, Remington held that on the same grounds 
the Philips design lacked competitive individuality. Regarding the fact that there might be 
alternative shapes that could give the same shaving result, Remington argued that amongst 
systems with rotating cutters, a triangular shape of the faceplate was the optimum technical 
solution179. Finally, Remington contended that competition law protection of achievement 
was not applicable, since by applying the name “Remington” to the shavers, it had done 
everything reasonable to avoid a likelihood of confusion between the shavers.  
 
3.10.4  Competition Law 
3.10.4.1 The Assumption of Urgency 
The court decided that the ground for the interlocutory injunction was to be upheld, as the 
assumption of urgency in Section 25 of the Act against Unfair Competition was not refuted, 
which Remington wrongfully had claimed. The court established that the fact that Philips was 
well prepared for the Remington launch due to the recent ECJ decision and the marketing in 
the neighboring countries was not a suitable approach for refuting urgency. An application for 
an interlocutory injunction ceases to be urgent if the applicant, despite knowledge of the 
infringement, waits too long before asserting his rights. The court found it unclear when 
Philips actually found out about the launch of the new Remington shavers, but even if it had 
taken Philips more than five weeks between its acquisition of knowledge and its filing of the 
application for interlocutory injunction, that was no reason for canceling urgency. This was 
because an additional period of time had to be included because of the size of the Philips’ 
enterprise.180  
 
                                                 
178 Pursuant to Section 1 of the German Act against Unfair Competition. 
179 Some other possible shaver shapes had been excluded by Remington due to cost-benefit considerations. 
180 The court held that an enterprise of that size needed a lot of time to identify anti-competitive conduct, 
communicating that knowledge to the competent decision makers and to concretize that conduct for summary 
proceedings, why an additional period had to be included. In the context of the history of this global dispute and 
the numerous infringement cases from several jurisdictions, I doubt that it would take Philips a very long time to 
identify and commence actions against a possible infringement of its rights pursuant to competition or trademark 
law. Hence, I do not agree with the court that Philips would need an additional period of time for applying for an 
interlocutory injunction. 
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3.10.4.2 Non-Applicability of Trademark Law  
The court found no need to determine whether there had been any trademark infringement, or 
to discuss the question of trademark capacity. The court established that trademark law did 
not apply to the case and that Philips’ trademark protection therefore had no effect. Thus, the 
court held that if protection of famous trademarks pursuant to the exhaustive provisions of 
Sections 14 and 15 of the German Trademark Act was denied, it nevertheless permitted 
supplementary protection through the provisions of competition law. The court further stated 
that if it upheld Remington’s view following the ECJ decision according to which the shape 
of a three-cutter-head system could not have effect as a protectable trademark if it was 
technically determined, it was even more obvious that trademark law did not apply. Hence, as 
a consequence of the non-applicability of trademark law, supplementary competition law 
applied, granting protection of achievement.  
 
3.10.4.3 Deception of Origin and Exploitation of Reputation 
The court decided that the marketing in Germany of the new Remington shavers since July 10 
2002 was an infringement of Section 1 of the Act against Unfair Competition, as Remington’s 
design was considered to be an imitation of Philips’ triple-headed shaver. The imitation 
constituted unfair competition for the reasons of an avoidable deception of origin and 
exploitation of reputation. The court clarified that anyone who imitates another’s product by 
adopting features with which the public associates a notion of business origin, and puts the 
imitating product into circulation without having done everything possible and reasonable to 
prevent that the public gets misled, has committed an avoidable deception of origin.  
 
The court further established that Philips’ shavers had competitive individuality, i.e. features 
capable of enabling the public to distinguish them from similar products by other 
manufacturers. Being a competition law term, the competitive individuality related to the 
external aesthetic design of the cutting surface, which through the interaction of several 
individual shape elements of the Philips shaver acquired a character indicating origin.  
 
3.10.4.4 Technical Reasons 
The court agreed with Remington that features that must necessarily be used for technical 
reasons in similar products do not establish competitive individuality in the light of the 
principle of the freedom of the state of the art. But contrary to Remington’s view, the court 
held that the design of the cutting surface of the Philips shaver was not necessary for technical 
reasons so as to deny competitive individuality. This was because the individual design of the 
cutting surface selected by Philips was not the only technical solution to achieve the same 
shaving effect. The fact that an alternative design was not profitable for cost reasons did not 
alter the fact that other shapes could give the same result, as consideration was to be given the 
technical possibilities before the cost aspects. The court further held that Philips triple-headed 
shavers were sufficiently known in the public, and as sales figures and poll results had shown, 
the Philips shavers enjoyed an “excellent public awareness”. 
 
3.10.4.5 Likelihood of Confusion 
The court found that the risk for confusion of the business origin required for an avoidable 
deception was satisfied. The conflicting products were so similar in terms of the decisive 
overall impression that there was a risk of confusion for the consumers, who according to the 
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court would see the products in isolation from each other181.  The court described several 
similarities of the shavers, and concluded that in the light of those obvious identical features, 
the differences referred by Remington were marginal and not sufficient to exclude a 
likelihood of confusion. The court also established that the name “Remington” applied visibly 
on the shavers did not exclude at least an indirect likelihood of confusion, since the public 
might believe that Remington was commercially or organizationally linked to Philips.  
 
Furthermore, the court held that Remington was guilty of unfair conduct since it had acted in 
knowledge of Philips’ products and nevertheless had failed to take the suitable measures that 
were reasonable in order to exclude any misleading confusion of origin. Putting the name 
“Remington” on the shavers did not eliminate the indirect risk that the public would think that 
the Remington shavers were a new product line by Philips or otherwise were connected with 
Philips. Remington could easily and reasonably have made changes to the design, but had 
chosen not to do so. The court concluded that on those grounds, Remington had attempted to 
dishonestly attach itself to the good reputation of Philips’ products. Hence, the court decided 
that the interlocutory injunction already issued was to be upheld, as the injunction was 
justified in the light of the parties’ further submissions.182
 
 
 
3.11 GERMANY (3): Superior District Court of Cologne 
Date of judgment183: May 9, 2003  
3.11.1  Dispute Background 
Remington appealed the decision by Cologne District Court, and the matter was referred to 
the Superior District Court on appeal. The dispute background has already been described in 
the previous chapter. These two German court judgments are interesting from the point of 
view that the first instance court found trademark law inapplicable but applied competition 
law. The appeal court did the opposite, as you will soon find out. For a first instance court and 
an appeal court to arrive at completely different conclusions regarding the applicability of 
certain areas of law is quite unusual. As I said in the previous chapter, these judgments also 
stand out because the courts decided for the favor of Philips, which had only happened twice 
in Europe before, in the Swedish first instance court (which changed on appeal) and the 
German PTO’s decisions not to cancel Philips’ picture trademark 1034262. As you will soon 
find out, the court also came to an interesting conclusion regarding the separation of powers 
in German trademark law between the infringement courts and the registration authorities.  
 
3.11.2  Trademark Law 
The appeal court decided that the first instance court had rightly confirmed the interlocutory 
injunction and that the appeal was to be dismissed on the merits of the case. However, the 
appeal court’s reasons for upholding the injunction differed from the first instance decision.  
                                                 
181 The court did not further explain why it assumed that the products would be seen in isolation from each other. 
I think it is more reasonable to believe that any retailer selling electrical equipment such as technically advanced 
electric shavers would prefer to offer more than one brand, and display the shavers next to each other to enable 
the customers to compare them. This was also the view of the Australian court. 
182 My comments to this judgment is put in the end of the appeal judgment described in the following chapter. 
183 Case No. 6 U 192/02. 
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 3.11.2.1 The Assumption of Urgency 
Agreeing with the first instance decision, the court found that Philips’ application for an 
interlocutory injunction had been filed without waiting so long as to impair the assumption of 
urgency. The court held that the numerous proceedings between the parties would give Philips 
reason to expect an infringement in Germany as well. Philips’ management had, however, not 
acquired positive knowledge of the Remington launch until two weeks after it began, and the 
indications on the Internet, in newspapers and the launch in the neighboring countries had not 
been specific enough for Philips to assume that a German launch was to come.184 The court 
agreed with the first instance court that regard should also be taken to Philips’ corporate 
structure and the complexity of the material. 
 
3.11.2.2 Trademark Use and Likelihood of Confusion  
The court found Philips’ petition for an injunction to be justified under two provisions185 of 
the German Trademark Act, which within their scope of application took priority as special 
legislation over competition law claims. Therefore, no competition law was discussed in the 
appeal judgment, in contrast to the decision of the first instance court. 
 
The court established that Remington used the triple-headed shavers as a trademark, and 
decided that Remington’s shavers established a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of 
Section 14186 of the Trademark Act. The court had taken into account all the circumstances of 
the individual case, specifically the distinctive character of the overall impression of the signs 
and the proximity of the goods at issue for which the signs were used. In the light of those 
criteria and given the identicality of the products in conflict, the court thus held that there was 
a likelihood of confusion in the legal sense; the design of Remington’s shaver faceplate had a 
very high degree of similarity with Philips’ trademarks.  
 
3.11.2.3 Features Determined by Technical Considerations 
Philips had submitted that its shaver head as a whole and the individual shape elements that 
characterized it was purely non-functional aesthetic design elements. Philips had also argued 
that there were other distinguishable shapes that could give the same result, without 
consequences for the thoroughness and speed of the shave, the user comfort or the production 
costs.187 Remington, on the other hand, had submitted that the characterizing elements of the 
shape were determined exclusively by technical considerations.  
 
The court held that in the assessment of trademark similarity, the relevant shape elements to 
be compared are those that have significance as an indication of origin for the public. But on 
the other hand, no account at all should be taken to shape features that are not capable of 
                                                 
184 As I also commented in the previous chapter, I find it hard to believe that a company like Philips, obviously 
having a very alert intellectual property and market division, would be ignorant of a competitor’s launch of a 
triple-headed shaver which had already been marketed in the neighboring countries.   
185 Section 14 of the German Trademarks Act. 
186 Section 14 Para. 2 No. 2 of the German Trademarks Act. 
187 As I also mentioned under the first instance decision, it is a bit surprising that Philips decided to use the 
argument of alternative shapes, since the ECJ had clearly stated in its judgment from 2002 that the relevant 
provision could not be overcome by establishing that the same technical result could be obtained by other 
shapes. 
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enjoying trademark protection, either because of an absolute obstacle to protection or because 
the features only determine a shape that results from the nature of goods themselves, are 
necessary to obtain a technical result or give the product substantial value188. Thus, the court 
established that features of three-dimensional marks that are determined by purely technical 
reasons are not part of the trademark protection, and can as a matter of principle not establish 
a likelihood of confusion. This conclusion would however not matter, as you will soon see. 
 
The court referred to the ECJ judgment, which had provided that trademark registration was 
excluded “if the essential functional features of the shape were attributable only to the 
technical result […] even if there were other shapes which allowed the same technical result 
to be obtained”. The court observed that the ECJ decision indeed had a binding effect on 
German courts regarding the interpretation of the relevant articles of the Directive. However, 
the actual decision whether the shape of the Philips trademark was exclusively determined by 
technical considerations had already been taken by the British court and was not decided by 
the ECJ. Therefore, the court was responsible for examining under its own competence 
whether the present case involved a shape of the trademark that was determined by purely 
technical considerations within the meaning of Sec. 3 Para. 2 No. 2 of the German Trademark 
Act189. The court did not, however, decide upon that matter, because of the separation of 
powers in German trademark law. 
 
3.11.2.4 The Separation of Powers in German Trademark Law 
Hence, the court concluded that there was no need for it to decide whether the shape elements 
of Philips’ trademarks enjoyed protection or whether they were technical shapes that did not 
fall within the scope of the trademark protection. This was because of the separation of 
powers in German trademark law between the registration instance on the one hand and the 
infringement courts on the other hand, and the binding effect that results from registration.190  
The patent authorities alone are responsible for deciding on the registration or cancellation of 
a trademark, and hence also for the decision whether a shape can be registered as a trademark 
or whether a registered shape trademark is to be cancelled. As long as a trademark is entered 
on the Register, the ordinary courts in an infringement dispute are bound by the registration 
and have no review powers of their own.  
 
The court further established that if a trademark has been registered in breach of Section 3 
Para. 2 No. 2 of the Trademark Act although its shape –as possible in the case at issue- was 
determined by purely technical considerations, the infringement court must assume trademark 
capacity until cancellation. Hence, the examination of the likelihood of confusion has to be 
based on the trademark as it was registered, even if that assessment must include features that 
are exclusively determined by technical considerations.  
 
Remington had argued that an exception should be made from the principle of binding effect 
since the ECJ decision had already determined that Philips’ trademarks were ready for 
                                                 
188 As set out in Article 3(1)(e) of the Directive. 
189 Corresponding to Article 3(1)(e), second indent of the Directive. 
190 The court explained that in the assessment of the likelihood of confusion, the trial court was obliged to 
exclude individual elements of a trademark that were exclusively determined by technical considerations for lack 
of capacity for protection. On the other hand, the first instance court was bound by the registration of a 
trademark such that it was unable to deny the trademark any protection. If Remington’s allegation was correct 
that Philips’ trademarks in all their elements were determined by a purely technical shape, there were no other 
elements for an assessment of the likelihood of confusion. The trademark would then be denied any protective 
effect, which was a result that was incompatible with the separation of powers in German trademark law. 
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cancellation. The court disagreed, and held that the question whether Philips’ trademarks had 
shapes purely determined by technical considerations had not been answered by the ECJ but 
was assumed as being the case on the basis of the materials submitted to it. 
 
3.11.3  The Judgment    
Thus, the court established that there was a likelihood of confusion in the legal sense between 
Philips’ trademarks and Remington’s shaver, as there was a high degree of similarity between 
them. As a consequence of the separation of powers, the examination of the likelihood of 
confusion was based on the trademark as it was registered, even if the registration perhaps 
included solely technical features, which were not capable of trademark protection. 
Accordingly, the court dismissed Remington’s appeal and confirmed the interlocutory 
injunction decided on August 28, 2002 that had been upheld by the District Court and which 
forbade Remington to market its triple-headed shavers in Germany. Remington appealed the 
judgment, but the case has not yet been decided at the time of writing this. 
 
Regarding the trademarks, they were obviously still valid, and could not in any event have 
been cancelled by the court since cancellation of trademarks in Germany can only be decided 
by the patent authorities and not by an ordinary court. 
 
3.11.4  Comments 
As I have previously mentioned, it is quite interesting that the appeal court applied a different 
area of law than the first instance court; trademark law took priority over competition law. 
There were, however, some noticeable similarities between the two courts’ decisions, for 
instance that both courts found that there was a likelihood of confusion. The first instance 
court, which applied competition law, found that the two shavers were confusingly similar, 
even though the name “Remington” was visibly written on Remington’s shavers. The appeal 
court applied trademark law and established that for an average consumer there was a 
likelihood of confusion of business origin between Philips’ trademarks and Remington’s 
shavers. Obviously, assessments of trademark law and competition law can be quite similar, 
and in cases like this it also becomes very clear that competition law and the exclusions in 
trademark law has the same purpose; to enable fair competition. 
 
A remarkable conclusion of the court was the inability for it to decide on some matters due to 
the separation of powers between the registration authorities and the infringement courts, and 
the binding effect of a registration. As a consequence, it was the trademark as it had been 
registered that should be taken into account, even if it might have been wrongfully registered. 
If it had not been because of this, the judgment would probably have been different, as only 
features that were capable of trademark protection would have been included in the 
assessment. The court held that it would have been impossible to establish a likelihood of 
confusion if all the characteristic features of the mark were determined by purely technical 
considerations and thus was not protected. Hence, the court did not have to decide upon the 
technical functions, but established that the ECJ had only decided that trademarks with 
essential features which were technically determined were excluded from registration, not that 
that was the case with Philips’ trademark. Therefore, the court found that an exception could 
not be made from the principle of binding effect of a registration, which Remington had 
requested. A spontaneous opinion is that the principle of binding effect can have unfortunate 
consequences, in this case for Remington, since the outcome of the dispute probably would 
have looked different if an exception from it had been made. However, below you will read 
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about the appeals from the Federal Patent Court, which has the authority to review and cancel 
registered trademarks. 
 
 
 
3.12 GERMANY (4): Federal Patent Court, Trademark 
Appeal Division 
Date of judgment191: April 14, 2004 
3.12.1  Dispute Background and Parties’ Requests 
In its ruling on October 18, 2001 described in Chapter 3.9 above192, the German PTO decided 
not to cancel the contested Philips trademark, which was a picture mark representing the 
shaver head in detail (see Appendix A for illustration of German registration 1034262)193. 
Remington appealed the judgment, and a few years later the Federal Patent Court announced 
the following ruling. The same day it also decided the destiny of another appealed Philips 
trademark, which is described in the next chapter. Since the first PTO judgment, there had 
been two court decisions, from the District Court and the Appeal Court of Cologne, 
confirming the interlocutory injunction forbidding Remington to market its triple-headed 
shavers in Germany. Since the PTO’s decision, the matter had also been decided by the ECJ.  
 
Remington requested that the PTO’s decision should be set aside and that Philips’ trademark 
should be cancelled, since the trademark depicted essential parts of the shaver which were all 
technically determined. Philips requested the appeal to be dismissed and adopted the PTO’s 
arguments for non-cancellation. 
 
3.12.2  The Court’s Findings 
The court found Remington’s appeal to be unjustified, since the preconditions for withdrawal 
of protection of Philips’ trademark was not satisfied. The indications were insufficient that, at 
the time of the registration of the trademark (in 1982) and at the time of the PTO’s decision, 
the contested trademark was in conflict with an obstacle to protection pursuant to the old or 
the new German Trademark Acts. The court held that the longer time since the registration, 
the more careful must the examination be, since a retroactive assessment of market opinion or 
market need was difficult or even impossible. That was the reason why the German legislature 
excluded cancellation of trademarks upon application pursuant to Sec. 50 of the German 
Trademark Act if more than 10 years had passed since the registration. Furthermore, Sec. 162 
Para. 2 of the German Trademark Act provided that the cancellation of old trademarks 
required incapacity for protection under both the old and the new law, and the preconditions 
for trademark capacity in the old Trademark Act, under which the trademark was registered, 
differed from those of the new Trademark Act. One difference was that the ground for 
exclusion in the new Trademark Act had no direct equivalent in the old Act, and instead of 
trademark capacity, distinctive character was required or could be overcome by secondary 
                                                 
191 Unfortunately the Case No. is unknown. 
192 The reason why I did not put this appeal decision right after the first instance PTO decision, is because the 
two Cologne judgments came “in between” and preferably should be read before this appeal decision, in order to 
understand it better.  
193 The German trademark registration 1034262 is similar to the International Registration 430.837, also 
illustrated in Appendix A.  
 72
meaning at the time of registration, which had been the case. The court further established that 
no objections against trademark capacity at the time of registration had been asserted or were 
apparent, so it could not be assumed that the registration was wrongly admitted pursuant to 
provisions of the old Trademark Act. Thus, the application of the old Act did not result in any 
incapacity of registration, so no cancellation could be made even if the new Act did. Also, the 
10-year exclusion period of the new Act applied and excluded the cancellation of the 
trademark since more than 10 years had passed since its registration. The court concluded 
that: 
 
[t]his result is possibly unsatisfactory from the point of view of [Remington] and in the light of the 
decision of the European Court of Justice in the Philips-Remington case, but can only be countered by 
an appropriate determination of scope of protection of the contested trademark as adjusted to the 
applicable interpretation of the law, such scope of protection not being static but rather requiring 
adjustment to changed circumstances in both a legal and factual respect and above all that of market 
interpretation. […] It is also [in the ordinary courts] that the question must be answered whether the 
present representation is, from the point of view of the public circles concerned, even if they have the 
protected products in view, at all regarded as a reproduction of a technically predetermined shape and 
can be used vis-à-vis a technical object with the effect of establishing prohibition. 
 
Hence, Remington’s appeal was unsuccessful and dismissed. However, the court found an 
appeal on the law to be admissible since the decision concerned legal issues of fundamental 
importance with respect to several provisions of the German Trademark Act and their 
application to old trademarks. Thus, the Federal Patent Court required a decision of the 
Supreme Court for the development of the law or to ensure uniform court decisions. 
 
 
 
3.13 GERMANY (5): Federal Patent Court, Trademark 
Appeal Division  
Date of judgment194: April 14, 2004 
3.13.1  Dispute Background  
This judgment was pronounced the same day as the one described in the previous chapter. 
Remington had appealed the PTO’s decision195 not to cancel the very simplest of Philips’ 
trademarks. It was a picture trademark representing a triangle with three identical circles in it, 
with no details (trademark registration IR 430.836 is illustrated in Appendix A). As ground 
for the appeal, Remington argued that the trademark was a mere reproduction of the head of 
the shaver and thus lacked trademark capacity. Philips contested Remington’s petition and 
argued that Remington’s referred ground did not apply to picture marks, only to trademarks 
depicting a product’s shape. Philips also relied on telle-quelle protection, which is provided 
for in Art. 6 quinquies B of the Paris Convention. The telle-quelle principle is mainly that a 
trademark already registered in one country should be able to enjoy registration in its original 
shape or design in another country.196 The PTO had upheld the trademark protection by 
establishing that the most-favored clause197 of the German Trademark Act could not by virtue 
of the telle-quelle privilege have been denied protection simply because of lack of trademark 
                                                 
194 Case No. 28 W (pat) 131/01. 
195 Unfortunately, I do not have the PTO’s judgment, but it was handled by the PTO at the same time as the 
decision described in Chapter 3.9. 
196 Koktvedgaard, Mogens and Levin, Marianne: Lärobok i Immaterialrätt, page 318. 
197 Sec. 162 Para. 2 of the German Trademark Act. 
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capacity resulting from the technical necessity of the shape. This was because the relevant 
provision198 of the Trademark Act did not have a corresponding feature in Art. 6 quinquies B 
of the Paris Convention. The PTO had therefore dismissed the application for cancellation but 
had refrained from imposing costs on the petitioner Remington. 
 
3.13.2  The Parties’ Submissions and the Court’s Findings 
Hence, Remington appealed against the PTO’s ruling and argued that reliance on telle-quelle 
protection was not possible. Remington further argued that the trademark lacked the necessary 
distinctive character and that there was no infringement of ordre publique pursuant to Art. 6 
quinquies B Para. 2 No. 3 of the Paris Convention, since the present design was incompatible 
with the function as an indication of origin. Remington thus requested that the PTO ruling 
should be set aside and the trademark should be cancelled. Philips, on the other hand, adopted 
the arguments of the PTO’s decision and argued that telle-quelle protection indeed applied. 
Philips further held that the absolute grounds for refusal could no longer be asserted given the 
10-year exclusion period.  
 
The court found Remington’s appeal to be unjustified, as the preconditions for the withdrawal 
of protection of the contested trademark were not satisfied. There were no sufficient 
indications that, at the time of registration and at the time for the PTO decision, the contested 
trademark was in conflict with an obstacle to protection pursuant to the old or the new 
Trademark Acts. The court further held that there was no need to determine whether telle-
quelle protection took effect to the benefit of Philips’ trademark regarding the pictorial 
reproduction of a product shape that is merely technically determined. Hence, a withdrawal of 
protection would nonetheless fail, as the factual preconditions of the new Trademark Act were 
not satisfied. The ECJ had in its judgment declared that also two-dimensional trademarks 
could fall under the legitimate interest of free use of certain product shapes, but then the 
trademark’s reproduction of the shape need to be realistically representing the technical 
features of the product. That was not the case as the contested trademark were simply a 
triangle with three circles inside of it, which did not suggest that the shape of it were 
determined by technical considerations.  
 
As a period of more than 10 years had expired since the date of registration of the trademark, 
Remington’s other objections against the capacity for protection failed. Thus, the court 
concluded that also case law established that it was not possible to rely on a lack of 
distinctiveness or the existence of legitimate interest in free use of old trademarks. 
Concerning the alleged infringement of ordre publique pursuant to Art.6 quinquies B of the 
Paris Convention, the court found that there had been no substantiated submissions on the 
matter. 
 
Hence, the court found Remington’s appeal to be unsuccessful and, accordingly, the appeal 
was dismissed. Contrary to the court’s findings in the parallel case described above, the court 
concluded that there was no occasion for the admission of an appeal on the law, since the 
decision was not based on a legal issue of fundamental importance. 
 
 
 
                                                 
198 Sec. 3 Para. 2 No. 2 of the German Trademark Act. 
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3.14 GERMANY (6 and 7): Federal Patent Court, Trademark 
Appeal Division 
Date of judgments199: May 4, 2004 
3.14.1  Dispute Background 
At the same day (May 4, 2004), and probably at the same time, the Federal Patent Court 
decided the destiny of two identical international trademark registrations; one was a picture 
mark and the other a three-dimensional mark. Since the wording of the two judgments is 
completely identical, with only a few exceptions, which I will comment upon below, I have 
described the judgments together.  
 
In August 1995 the German Patent and Trademark Office had granted Philips protection in 
Germany for the three-dimensional mark under international registration number IR 587.254 
(illustrated in Appendix A). In January 1996 the PTO had granted Philips protection for an 
identical picture trademark representing the top part of a triple-headed shaver (see Appendix 
A for the identical registration 638.663). The two international trademarks were completely 
identical, but as mentioned above, one was a two-dimensional picture trademark and the other 
a three-dimensional ‘shape’ trademark.  
 
On December 6, 2000, Remington applied for cancellation of both trademarks on the grounds 
that they were mere reproductions of the head of an electric shaver and thus lacked eligibility 
for trademark protection. In addition, Remington argued that the marks had been wrongly 
registered as they lacked distinctive character and that there was a legitimate interest in free 
use. Philips contested Remington’s petitions by relying on telle-quelle protection and arguing 
that eligibility for trademark protection must be assumed. In its decisions200 on May 6, 2002 
the PTO dismissed Remington’s petitions on the grounds that the telle-quelle privilege meant 
that the contested trademarks could not be examined for eligibility for trademark protection 
neither at the time when protection was extended nor according to Art. 6 quinquies B of the 
Paris Convention and some other provisions201. Furthermore, the PTO held that the marks 
could not be denied protection on the grounds of a lack of eligibility for trademark protection 
based on the technical necessity of the shape. The grounds for withdrawal of protection of a 
lack of distinctive character and the existence of a legitimate interest in free use were only 
asserted in the course of the proceedings and, as an inadmissible extension of the proceedings, 
could according to the PTO no longer be taken into account. Accordingly, the PTO dismissed 
both cancellation petitions and thus upheld the protection for Philips’ trademarks IR 587 254 
and IR 638 663. Remington appealed both judgments.   
 
3.14.2  The Parties’ Submissions  
Remington argued in both appeals that the telle-quelle clause could only apply to a matter that 
by its nature could not constitute a trademark according to national law. This was, according 
to Remington, not an issue in the case of picture trademarks representing features that were 
exclusively determined by technical considerations, since on that point the grounds for the 
refusal of protection specified in Art. 6 quinquies B of the Paris Convention were not 
                                                 
199 Case No. 28 W (pat) 147/02 concerning the IR 587.254 registration and Case No. 28 W (pat) 149/02 
concerning the IR 638.663 registration. 
200 Unfortunately, I do not have the PTO judgments from May 6, 2002 but the essential parts of them are 
described in the appeal rulings. 
201 Sec. 113 of the German Trademark Act in conjunction with Art. 5 of the Madrid Agreement. 
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exhaustive. In addition, Remington argued that it followed from the ECJ decision that a 
product shape was not accessible to trademark protection if its essential functional features 
were merely ascribable to a technical effect. This was the case with both of Philips’ contested 
trademarks, since they were simply realistic pictorial or three-dimensional reproductions of 
the cutter head of the product protected by the trademarks and thus were necessary to achieve 
the technical effect. Remington further argued that as a consequence of the ECJ decision, 
cancellation of the mark had already been made in the UK, France and Sweden. Furthermore, 
Remington claimed that the trademark lacked distinctiveness and constituted an infringement 
of public order pursuant to Art. 6 quinquies B Para. 2 No. 3 of the Paris Convention, since the 
design was not compatible with the function as an indication of origin. 
 
Philips petitioned that the appeal should be dismissed, and adopted the arguments contained 
in the contested ruling on the telle-quelle privilege. Furthermore, Philips argued that the 
design of the contested trademarks was not exclusively determined by technical 
considerations, but also included design elements. Philips also petitioned that the ECJ had not 
ultimately taken any decision on the facts of the case presented before it, it had only answered 
the referred questions on the interpretation of the Directive.   
 
3.14.3  The Court’s Findings 
The court found Remington’s appeal to be admissible and well founded, and decided that both 
of the PTO’s rulings from May 6, 2002 were to be set aside. Thus, the conditions for 
withdrawal of protection from the contested trademarks were satisfied, since the contested 
trademarks were still in conflict with the obstacle to protection of a shape that is merely 
determined by technical considerations both at the time of the extension of protection202 and 
at the time of the decision on the petition for withdrawal of protection. In the judgment 
concerning the picture trademark, the court clarified that the relevant wording of the German 
Trademark Act also covered two-dimensional picture trademarks if the pictorial design was 
limited to the largely realistic reproduction of exclusively technical shape elements. 
 
The court found that the PTO had failed to appreciate several matters of law when it 
dismissed the petition for cancellation. Thus, originally telle-quelle protection was intended to 
prevent a basic trademark, when IR protection was being extended in a member state, from 
being barred by obstacles to protection other than the grounds for refusal listed in Art. 6 
quinquies Section B Nos. 1-3 of the Paris Convention. The court explained that telle-quelle 
protection had been of importance in connection with the old German Trademark Act, but that 
after the new Trademark Act’s entry into effect, under which both the contested trademarks 
had been extended, there was no longer any requirement to take into account such Paris 
Convention examination standards. The reason was that the new German Trademark Act 
constituted the implementation of the Directive which in its 12th Recital expressly cited the 
complete agreement of its provisions with the Paris Convention, which meant that a 
construction in accordance with the Directive permitted the conclusion that the obstacles to 
registration in the German Trademark Act correspond entirely with those of the Paris 
Convention.  
 
                                                 
202 “Extension of protection” refers to the extension of protection of an international registration under the 
Madrid system to also cover Germany. 
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Furthermore, the court established that the question of technical nature pursuant to Sec. 3 
Para. 2 No. 2 of the German Trademark Act203 was as a matter of principle subject to 
unrestricted examination in both the extension and cancellation proceedings for an IR 
trademark extended to Germany. The court found both of the contested trademarks to be 
subject to that obstacle to protection, since they consisted exclusively of a shape, or in the 
picture mark case a reproduction of a shape, which was necessary to achieve a technical 
effect. The court referred to the criteria set out by the ECJ decision, which excluded from 
registration shapes which essential functional features were technically determined and 
ascribed the existence of alternative shapes which could obtain the same technical effect no 
relevance. In the light of that criteria, the contested trademarks were found to be mere 
reproductions of the arrangement of the elements of the product necessary to achieve the 
technical effect, without any apparent other features going beyond the technical design. Thus, 
both trademarks were exact graphic reproductions of the head of a shaver. The court described 
in detail all the features of the contested trademarks, and concluded that the shape had no 
shape elements that could be classified as non-technical or as design elements; all the features 
were necessary for the technical result. The evidence was sufficient for the court to be able to 
determine the technical nature of the contested trademarks, and a strong indication was also 
the existence of product industrial property rights of that same shape. Hence, it was 
undisputed that Philips had had the arrangement protected by patents, even though those had 
expired following the end of the protected period. In addition, various national courts had 
obtained independent experts that unanimously came to the conclusion that the trademark 
consisted exclusively of a shape necessary to obtain the technical result. It followed, for 
instance, from the Swedish appeal decision from January 2004 (see Chapter 3.4), the French 
decision from June 2003 (see Chapter 3.18) and the expertise by the expert P. Turner from 
October 1997 prepared for the first British decision. The court continued: 
 
These all emphasized that the essential elements of the trademark comprised cutter heads arranged in 
an equilateral triangle and the triangular casing surrounding such, and that the arrangement of the 
cutter heads arranged in an equilateral triangle had been selected in order to create a compact shaver 
unit and at the same time to create the conditions for obtaining the best shaving effect. Since the 
design left no scope for arbitrariness, the shape element was due exclusively to its technical effect. 
These findings correspond with this Court’s assessment of the technical factual elements to be 
assessed in the present case, and this Court sees no occasion for effecting further investigations on the 
question of the technical nature of the shape of the goods claimed in the present case. In the light of 
the aforesaid, protection is to be withdrawn from the contested trademark, since it merely consists of a 
shape that is necessary to achieve a technical effect.204
 
The Federal Patent Court thus concluded that Remington’s appeals were successful, and that 
the assessment of any other obstacles to registration needed not to be decided in the light of 
the factual and legal situation of cancellation of the two trademarks. Thus, the PTO ruling 
from May 6, 2002 was set aside and the protection in Germany was withdrawn from 
international trademarks IR 587.254 and IR 638.663.  
 
Appeal on the law was however admissible, as the decision concerned the harmonized 
construction of several provisions of the German Trademark Act and the relationship between 
the Directive and the Paris Convention within the framework of telle-quelle protection. 
Hence, as the decision concerned legal questions of fundamental importance it required a 
decision by the Supreme Court for the development of the law or to ensure uniform decision-
making practice. Philips appealed both decisions. 
                                                 
203 Corresponding to Article 3(1)(e) second indent of the Directive. 
204 Page 10 of both judgments. 
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3.15 GERMANY (8): German Patent and Trademark Office, 
Trademark Division 
Date of judgment205: November 12, 2004 
3.15.1  Dispute Background and the Parties’ Submissions 
On August 19, 2003, Remington filed an application for cancellation of Philips’ registered 
three-dimensional German (not international) trademark 394 08 350 representing the head of 
a triple-headed shaver (for illustration see the identical IR trademark 587.254 in Appendix A). 
 
Remington submitted that Philips’ three-dimensional trademark consisted entirely of the 
reproduction of a part of the product, namely the shaver head unit with three rotary cutting 
heads. Remington claimed that the arrangement of that particular part of the shaver was 
necessary to achieve the technical result. Even if there were other possible designs, the 
configuration with three cutting heads arranged in an equilateral triangle was the optimum 
solution to the technical problem. A mere reproduction of a technical function was thus not 
capable of trademark protection, and it made no difference if alternative shapes were available 
to achieve the same technical result. Remington also held that the mark lacked distinctiveness. 
Thus, Remington requested Philips’ three-dimensional mark to be cancelled and deleted from 
the Register. 
 
Philips, on the other hand, requested that the petition for cancellation be dismissed, as even 
according to the legal principles drawn up by the ECJ decision, findings of fact must be 
adopted on whether the contested three-dimensional mark was solely determined by technical 
considerations. Philips further argued that it was easily possible to depart from the findings of 
fact of the UK courts, particular if the evidence submitted was appreciated differently. In 
addition, Philips contended that the two most recent decisions206 by the Federal Patent Court 
from May earlier the same year (2004), in which two Philips trademarks had been cancelled, 
contained obvious insufficiencies in terms of both facts and law. Therefore, those two 
judgments could neither be binding nor indicative for the cancellation proceedings.  
 
3.15.2  The PTO’s Findings 
The PTO found Remington’s petition for cancellation admissible and well founded, as the 
conditions for cancellation of the contested trademark were satisfied; both at the time of 
registration and at the time of the decision on cancellation, the contested three-dimensional 
trademark had been in conflict with the obstacle to protection of a shape determined solely by 
technical considerations. Hence, the PTO found that the mark consisted exclusively of the 
representation of a shape that was necessary to achieve a technical effect.207 The PTO thus 
followed the criteria that the ECJ had provided in its decision: that the shape of a product is 
not capable of trademark protection if it is shown that the essential functional features of this 
shape are only ascribable to their technical result.  
                                                 
205 Case No. S 198/03 Lösch, Register No. 394 08 350.4/08. 
206 See Chapter 3.14 above. 
207 In accordance with Sec. 3 Para. 2 No. 2 of the German Trademark Act, corresponding to Article 3(1)(e) 
second indent of the Trademark Directive. 
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The PTO observed that the contested three-dimensional German trademark corresponded 
exactly with the international three-dimensional trademark (IR 587.254) which the Federal 
Patent Court earlier in 2004 had cancelled on the ground that its features were necessary for 
obtaining the technical result208. After a careful and detailed assessment of the features of the 
trademark, the PTO established that all the essential features of the shape were necessary for 
the technical function of the shaver. Regarding the ‘main’ feature, the arrangement of three 
cutting heads in the form of an equilateral triangle, that configuration ensured that during the 
shave all the areas of the skin were passed over by the cutter heads, with the result that no 
unshaven areas could remain on the skin after the shave, irrespective of how the shaver was 
guided over the skin. 
 
Philips had argued that the essential functional features of the shape were mainly based on 
aesthetic considerations and that those features were at least not only ascribable to the 
technical result. Philips had thus relied on the wording in the ECJ’s answer to the fourth 
question that the term “only” were to be interpreted as “exclusively”, i.e. that features which 
also have functions other than purely technical functions are not covered by Article 3(1)(e) of 
the Directive. The PTO disagreed with the strict interpretation of the word “only”, and 
established that  
 
[t]he wording “only [ascribable to] the technical result” in this context can, however, not 
mean that capacity for registration is established if an aesthetic result is also present. Such a 
view would be in conflict with the purpose of the provision in question, rendering it 
practically meaningless, since every technically determined shape has probably also an 
aesthetic effect of whatever kind.209
 
Hence, the reason for the obstacle to protection was to prevent the protection of a trademark 
right giving its holder a monopoly in technical solutions or utility characteristics of a product 
that the user could also expect in the goods of competitors. The PTO asserted that the fact that 
all the essential features of the shape were determined by technical considerations could not 
be altered by the fact that the shape or its essential features also produced an attractive design.  
Thus, a shape whose essential features were only determined by technical considerations must 
accordingly be excluded from trademark protection even if the shape was also selected on the 
basis of aesthetic considerations. 
 
For the reasons set out above, the PTO accordingly decided the registration of the three-
dimensional trademark to be cancelled. Accordingly, there was no reason for the PTO to 
assess whether any of the other obstacles to registration, asserted by Remington, were 
satisfied.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
208 See the previous chapter (3.14). 
209 Page 4 of the judgment. 
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3.16 OPINION of Advocate-General of the ECJ 
Date of opinion210: January 23, 2001211
3.16.1  Dispute Background 
When a preliminary ruling is requested, one of the eight212 Advocates-General213 of the 
European Court of Justice presents the case before the court and suggests a verdict. The 
suggestion is given after the proceedings have been held, but before the court has reached its 
verdict.214 As mentioned in Chapter 3.7 the UK Court of Appeal chose to refer some questions 
to be decided by the ECJ. Hence, the dispute background is the same as in the two UK 
proceedings described in Chapters 3.6 and 3.7, essentially that Philips had sued Remington 
for trademark infringement on the UK market.  
 
Obviously, the opinion of an Advocate-General is not a judgment, and one might ask why this 
opinion is brought up in the context of this work. I have chosen to bring it up because I 
believe it adds some interesting aspects to the matter. This was the first time the technical 
aspects of a trademark was taken up to be decided on such high level of EC judicature, and 
the ECJ ruling would be an important precedent for the courts of all member states. For the 
ECJ, the opinion of the Advocate-General is important, as it provides a suggestion on how to 
rule; a suggestion that the ECJ usually follows. Since the ECJ decision came to be very 
important for the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Directive, also the Advocate-
General’s opinion is of interest.  
 
3.16.2  The Questions Referred for a Preliminary Ruling 
The UK Court of Appeal decided to refer seven questions on the interpretation of the 
Directive to the ECJ. I intentionally exclude the referred questions 5, 6, and 7 since they 
concerned matters that were considered irrelevant both by the Advocate-General and the ECJ 
due to the answer of question 4:215  
 
1. Is there a category of marks which is not excluded from registration by Article 3(1)(b) to (d) and Article 
3(3) of the Council Directive 89/104/EEC (the “Directive”), which is nonetheless excluded from 
registration by Article 3(1)(a) of the Directive (as being incapable of distinguishing the goods of the 
proprietor from those of other undertakings)? 
 
2. Is the shape (or part of the shape) of an article (being the article in respect of which the sign is 
registered) only capable of distinguishing for the purposes of Article 2 if it contains some capricious 
addition (being an embellishment which has no functional purpose) to the shape of the article? 
 
3. Where a trader has been the only supplier of particular goods to the market, is extensive use of a sign, 
which consists of the shape (or part of the shape) of those goods and which does not include any 
capricious addition, sufficient to give the sign a distinctive character for the purposes of Article 3(3) in 
circumstances where as a result of that use a substantial proportion of the relevant trade and public 
 
                                                 
210 The case which the opinion concerned was Case C-299/99, discussed in the next chapter. 
211 Please note that this opinion was announced before the German PTO and FPC decisions described in the 
previous chapters, except the very first PTO decision. For reasons of clarity, I chose to put this chapter in 
connection to the ECJ decision. 
212 Article 222 of the EC Treaty provides that there shall be eight Advocates-General, but the number may be 
increased, as stated in the same Article. 
213 I will use the wording expressed in the English version of the Treaty on the EU, Advocate-General. 
214 Bernitz, Ulf and Kjellgren, Anders: Europarättens grunder, page 69. 
215 The questions are literally quoted from the Opinion of the Advocate-General, page 2. 
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(i) associate the shape with that trader and no other undertaking; 
(ii) believe that goods of that shape come from that trader, absent a statement to the contrary? 
 
4. (i) Can the restriction imposed by the words “if it consists exclusively of the shape of goods which is 
necessary to achieve a technical result” appearing in Article 3(1)(e)(ii) be overcome by establishing that 
there are other shapes which can obtain the same technical result or  
 
(ii) is the shape unregistrable by virtue thereof if it is shown that the essential features of the shape are 
attributable only to the technical result or 
 
(iii) is some other and, if so, what test appropriate for determining whether the restriction applies? 
 
3.16.3  Analysis of the Questions 
I will only mention the most interesting parts of Advocate-General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer’s 
opinion, since the final answers to the referred questions will be discussed in the next chapter, 
under the ECJ preliminary ruling. 
 
The Advocate-General declared that for the purpose of solving the case, only the second 
indent of subparagraph 3(1)(e) of the Directive, which excludes from registration “signs 
which consist exclusively of the shape of goods which is necessary to obtain a technical 
result”, was relevant. He argued that a trademark having the characteristics of that at issue, 
namely a mark depicting a shaver with three rotary cutting heads placed in each corner of a 
triangle, seemed to be “the perfect example of a merely functional shape”. He further held that 
at least in appearance, the trademark’s essential features216 fulfill a function and are there only 
in so far they perform the function. Use of the phrase “essential features” meant, according to 
the Advocate-General, that a shape containing an arbitrary element, which from a functional 
point of view was minor, did not escape the prohibition. 
 
The Advocate-General established that subparagraph (e) was not of the same legal nature as 
subparagraphs (b)(c) and (d) of Article 3(1). The exclusion in (e) was not based on the lack of 
distinctiveness of certain natural, functional or ornamental shapes, but reflected the legitimate 
concern to prevent individuals from resorting to trademark protection when wanting to extend 
exclusive rights over technical developments. As opposed to the previous subparagraphs, (e) 
could not be ‘overcome’ by acquiring distinctiveness217 since natural, functional or 
ornamental shapes were incapable, by express intention of the legislature, of acquiring a 
distinctive character. Hence, the Advocate-General made clear that it was unnecessary as well 
as contrary to the scheme of the Directive to consider whether or not such shapes had 
acquired distinctiveness.  
 
He further concluded that there was nothing in the wording of Article 3(1)(e) which made it 
possible to assume that a merely functional shape could be registered as long as there was an 
alternative shape which was capable of achieving a comparable technical result. He held that 
if the existence of alternative shapes would matter, nothing would stop an undertaking from 
registering as trademarks all imaginable shapes which achieved such result, thus obtaining a 
permanent monopoly over a particular technical solution. It would also be an unreasonable 
task for trademark courts to carry out comprehensive assessments concerning advanced 
technical matters. 
                                                 
216 The Advocate-General hereby adopted the phrase “essential features” expressed in the fourth question 
referred to the ECJ. 
217 According to Article 3(3) of the Directive. 
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The Advocate-General also emphasized the immediate purpose of barring registration of 
merely functional shapes or shapes which give a substantial value to the goods, which was to:  
 
[P]revent the exclusive and permanent right which a trade mark confers from serving to extend the 
life of other rights which the legislature has sought to make subject to limited periods. I refer, 
specifically, to the legislation on industrial patents and designs. Were it not for the existence of 
subparagraph (e) of Article 3(1), it would be easy to overturn the balance of public interest which 
must exist between rewarding innovation fairly, by granting exclusive protection, and encouraging 
industrial development, which entails placing time-limits on such protection, with the purpose of 
making the goods or the design freely available once the time-limit expires.218
 
He finally concluded that Article 3(1)(e) must be interpreted as meaning that any shape 
having essential features that serve the achievement of a technical result must be regarded as a 
sign which consists exclusively of the shape of goods which is necessary to obtain such a 
result, irrespective of whether it was possible to achieve that result using other shapes. If a 
sign meets those conditions, there was no need to consider whether it had any distinctive 
character. 
 
 
 
3.17 PRELIMINARY RULING (European Court of Justice of 
the European Communities) 
Date of judgment219: June 18, 2002 
3.17.1  Background  
As described in Chapter 3.7, the United Kingdom Court of Appeal decided to refer several 
questions regarding the interpretation of the Directive to the ECJ. The preliminary ruling 
came to be a very important precedent in Community law, as it provides guidance on how to 
interpret the somewhat unclear provisions of the Directive. Obviously, this judgment strongly 
influenced all the following judgments220 of the national courts of the EU member states, as 
they are obliged to follow the decisions of the ECJ. Unfortunately, there are some obscurities 
in the judgment, which I will get back to in the end of the chapter. 
 
Since the relevant referred questions are already quoted in the previous chapter, they will not 
be repeated here. All articles in the following text are pursuant to the Directive. 
 
3.17.2  The ECJ’s Answers to Questions 1, 2, and 3 
Regarding the first question, the court held that there was no such category of marks which 
was not excluded from registration by Article 3(1)(b), (c) and (d) and Article 3(3) which was 
nonetheless excluded from registration by Article 3(1)(a) as being incapable of distinguishing 
the goods of the proprietor of the mark from those of other undertakings.  
 
                                                 
218 Page 6-7 of the Opinion of the Advocate-General. 
219 Case C-299/99 (Philips Electronics N.V. v. Remington Consumer Products Limited). 
220 It came to be important for many other reasons as well; for example did the OHIM decide to expunge 
LEGO’s Community Trademark Registration after the announcement of this case, on grounds of functionality. 
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Concerning the second question, the ECJ declared that in order to be capable of distinguishing 
a product for the purposes of Article 2 of the Directive, the shape of the product in respect of 
which the sign is registered does not require any capricious addition, such as an 
embellishment with no functional purpose. Hence, Article 2 made no distinction between 
different categories of trademarks, and the criteria for assessing the distinctive character of 
three-dimensional trademarks such as the Philips mark were not different from the criteria to 
be applied to other categories of trademarks. Under Article 2 the shape in question must 
simply be capable of distinguishing the product from the products of others and thus fulfill its 
essential purpose of guaranteeing the origin of the product. Accordingly, the ECJ established 
that the Directive in no way required that the shape of a product should contain arbitrary 
elements to enjoy registration.  
 
The third question regarded the possible acquired distinctiveness a mark that is excluded from 
registration according to Article 3(1)(b), (c) and (d) can get through the use made of it. The 
court clarified that if a shape was refused registration pursuant to Article 3(1)(e) (which is the 
subject of the fourth question), it could in no circumstance be registered by virtue of Article 
3(3), by proving to have acquired a distinctive character. 
 
For some reason, the ECJ nonetheless found it necessary to get into what was required for a 
mark to acquire distinctiveness. The court concluded that where a trader has been the only 
supplier of particular goods to the market, extensive use of a sign which consists of the shape 
of those goods may be sufficient to give the sign a distinctive character for the purposes of 
Article 3(3). This applies in circumstances where, as a result of that use, a substantial part of 
the relevant class of persons relates that shape with the trader and no other undertaking, or 
believes that goods of that shape come from the trader. The court stated, however, that it was 
up to the national court to verify that the required circumstances existed, on the basis of 
specific and reliable data. It must be proved that the presumed expectations of an average 
consumer of the category of goods or services in question, who is reasonably well informed 
and reasonably observant and circumspect221, are taken into account. It is also required that 
the identification, by the relevant class of persons, of the product as originating from a given 
undertaking is a result of the use of the mark as a trademark. However, personally I agree 
with the Advocate-General that the answer of this question is irrelevant for the purposes of the 
case since the ECJ’s answer to Question 4 nonetheless will preclude the application of Article 
3(3). 
 
3.17.3  The ECJ’s Answer to Question 4 
The fourth and last question the court answered was also the most interesting in the context of 
this work. The court concluded that the second indent of Article 3(1)(e) of the Directive must 
be interpreted to mean that a sign consisting exclusively of the shape of a product is 
unregistrable by virtue thereof if it is established that the essential functional features of that 
shape are attributable only to the technical result. The court also established that the ground 
for refusal or invalidity of a registration imposed by that provision could not be overcome by 
establishing that the same technical result could be achieved by other shapes.  
 
                                                 
221 These criteria had been introduced in the ECJ case of Springenheide and Tusky (1998) Case C-210/96, ECR 
I-4657, paragraph 31. 
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The court further held that the various grounds for refusal of registration listed in Article 3 
must be interpreted in the light of the public interest underlying each of them222. The rational 
of the grounds for refusal of registration pursuant to Article 3(1)(e) is, according to the ECJ, 
to prevent trademark protection from granting its proprietor a monopoly on technical 
solutions or functional characteristics of a product. Such protection would form an obstacle 
preventing competitors from freely offering products incorporating the particular technical 
solutions or functional characteristics in competition with the proprietor of the trademark. The 
ECJ held that such exclusive rights to technical functions given by trademark protection 
would clearly limit the competitors’ freedom of choice in regard to which technical solution 
they wish to adopt to perform the desired function. Accordingly, the court concluded that for 
the application of Article 3(1)(e) it was irrelevant if there were alternative shapes that could 
fulfill the technical function; the competitors’ freedom of choice would still be limited since 
the registered technical solution could not be used. 
 
Finally, the court established that there was no need to reply to the infringement matters of 
question 5, 6 and 7, since the answer of the fourth question precluded any possible 
infringement. 
 
3.17.4  Comments  
There are a few comments I would like to make regarding the court’s findings in this case. 
My personal view is that the ECJ’s preliminary ruling did not provide the clear guidance on 
the interpretation of the Directive as it could have given. This was the first time the ECJ had 
to decide on the second indent of Article 3(1)(e), and a lucid answer on the interpretation of 
the provision would have been welcomed. The ECJ is entitled to interpret and reformulate the 
referred questions as it finds it appropriate223, a possibility that it took advantage of in this 
preliminary ruling. Unfortunately, the ECJ chose not to answer the referring court’s question 
4(c), namely if there was a test that was appropriate for determining whether the restriction in 
Article 3(1)(e) applied. The court had in its answer rejected one of the suggested theories to 
assess if a shape is “necessary” to obtain a technical result, namely the doctrine on alternative 
shapes which had been asserted by Philips. By not answering question 4(c), the ECJ failed to 
show how the term “necessary” then should be interpreted and applied. Thus, question 4(c) 
clearly asks how to apply the restriction in case the existence of alternative shapes (see 
question 4(a)), was irrelevant. The reason why the court decided not to answer this referred 
question remains unknown, but perhaps it did not want to limit itself by providing a certain 
method on how to decide the necessity criterion. Some guidance was however given as the 
ECJ held that it is only the essential features of the shape that necessarily has to be 
attributable to the technical result for the provision to apply. In any way, the ECJ’s omission 
to give a clear answer to the question was a bit unfortunate, since a positive definition on the 
necessity criterion was clearly called for. Moreover, I am of the opinion that the court should 
have given some guidance regarding how to define the actual “technical result”, which I 
believe is an important consideration for the application of Article 3(1)(e). A narrow and 
detailed definition of the relevant technical result might result in a different outcome than a 
wide definition.  
 
                                                 
222 The court referred to what had been established in paragraphs 25 to 27 of the Windsurfing Chiemsee decision 
from 1999 (Joined Cases C-108/97 and C-109/97, ECR I-2779). 
223 Bernitz, Ulf: Europarättens grunder, s.143. Furthermore, in Costa v. ENEL (Case 6/64), the ECJ held that it 
was authorized to elucidate and use in its judgment any circumstances of the present case that it found relevant, 
despite the wording of the referred questions, which the ECJ had found incomplete. 
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Furthermore, the court adopted the phrase “essential functional features” from the referred 
questions, but it remains uncertain how an assessment of which features are essential should 
be made. No guidance regarding this was provided by the court224, nor did it establish what 
features might be considered as non-essential. Considerations like these are inevitably highly 
subjective, and subjective assessments when applying a legal provision are likely to cause 
problems and even violate law and order if there is no guidance on the interpretation. Another 
question that remained unanswered and requires a subjective assessment is what is needed for 
a feature to be considered functional.225  
 
Yet one more obscurity in the judgment is the wording of paragraph 80, that the essential 
characteristics perform a technical function and were chosen to fulfill that function. It is 
unclear if the court meant that the application of the prohibition could depend on the 
subjective intentions of the designer of the shape of the product. I believe, however, that if the 
intention of the designer was to be given a decisive importance in the assessment, the ECJ 
would reasonably have emphasized that in its judgment. In any way, it is unfortunate that the 
ECJ did not manage to express itself clearly enough, but left room for speculations.   
 
Moreover, the terminology used is somewhat confusing due to its lack of uniformity. In some 
of the paragraphs the court refers to “essential characteristics”  that “perform a technical 
function” 226 and in other paragraphs of the judgment it refers to “essential functional 
characteristics/features” that are ”attributable solely/only to the technical result”227. It might 
be motivated to ask why the ECJ started to include the word “functional” in the latter 
paragraphs, and why the court suddenly, in paragraph 84, started to use the term “features” 
instead of “characteristics”. 
  
The reason why I have so many comments to this judgment is because I have read numerous 
judgments referring to this judgment, and the ECJ’s answers has been interpreted in different 
ways by different courts. It is important that the ECJ in its judgments give clear answers and 
leaves no room for any speculations of its intentions; a preliminary ruling by the ECJ is 
supposed to provide guidance, not to cause confusion. 
 
The ECJ judgment was widely interpreted as a defeat for Philips, even if the ECJ had not 
given any judgment on the specific circumstances of the case and the final application of its 
findings was left for the UK court to decide. Philips, however, interpreted the preliminary 
ruling differently. In a journal article from April 2003 Philips’ Trademark, Design & Domain 
Name Manager Mr. Jef Vandekerckhove, said that Philips remained unmoved by the outcome 
of the ECJ judgment. Mr. Vandekerckhove held that “Remington has claimed that they've 
won the war but the only thing that the ECJ has said is that the criterion as we suggested, the 
multiplicity of shapes, is not a sufficient criterion to overcome the functionality exclusion.”  
He added: “We had an objective criterion - if you have multiple shapes then the shape should 
be registrable. But when you look at the decision now, you are confronted with a few 
difficulties. The criterion 'attributable only to the technical result' is very subjective. The 
'essential elements of the shape' is also not clearly defined.” Mr. Vandekerckhove believed 
                                                 
224 The Advocate-General had, however, in paragraph 28 of his opinion explained the use of the phrase “essential 
features” to mean that “a shape containing an arbitrary element which, from a functional point of view, is minor, 
such as its color, does not escape the prohibition”. 
225 In the third UK judgment, described in Chapter 3.24, the UK court held that the inclusion of the word 
‘functional’ was a mistake by the ECJ and thus should be disregarded. 
226 See paragraphs 79 and 80 of the ECJ judgment. 
227 See paragraphs 83, 84 and 86.4 of the ECJ judgment. 
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that the decision of the ECJ was not clear at all and that important questions remained to be 
resolved. ”We have all confidence that in the end our trade mark will become registered, even 
with the new criterion,” he concluded.228  
 
Mr. Vandekerckhove was indeed right in his criticism of the obscurities of the ECJ judgment, 
but whether his other predictions were right or wrong will be determined in the following 
judgments of the national European courts. It is however a fact that practically all of the 
courts in the EU member states came to interpret the ruling to imply that Philips’ shaver head 
cannot enjoy protection on the grounds of technical function. This interpretation is also 
supported by the fact that the court did not even consider the three last questions regarding 
infringement, as it was deemed unnecessary because of the answers to the other questions.  
 
 
 
3.18 FRANCE (1): Paris First Instance Court 
Date of judgment229: June 13, 2003  
3.18.1  Background and Claims 
In the judgment there is no background to the dispute described. However, according to the 
German District Court judgment from November 5, 2002, Remington had been marketing its 
triple-headed shavers in France since September 2000. As subject for this judgment, 
Remington230 sought the annulment of seven Philips231 trademark registrations regarding 
triple-headed shavers. As a response, Philips filed an infringement claim against Remington 
based on its rights relating to the French semi-figurative trademark described below. This 
judgment is particularly interesting, as France was the second country in the EC (after 
Germany) to decide upon the matter after the precedent preliminary ruling by the ECJ had 
been pronounced. As you will see, the court also adopted the guidance provided by the ECJ of 
the interpretation of the Directive. Though, the real interesting matter to determine is how the 
court interpreted the ECJ decision.   
 
The seven Philips trademarks that Remington sought to annul are all illustrated in Appendix 
A. Six of them were international IR registrations (IR 430.836, IR 430.837, IR 430.839, IR 
587.254, IR 638.663 and IR 439.559) and one was a French semi-figurative trademark 
registration (95/563.306) also including the denomination PHILISHAVE. The trademarks had 
been filed to designate in particular trimmers and shaving apparatus, electric shavers and 
components thereof, and hand tools and knifes. 
 
Remington sought annulment of the Philips trademarks under several different sources of law; 
Articles 6 quinquies B – 2) and 3) of the Paris Convention, Articles 1 and 3 of the Statute of 
                                                 
228 Managing Intellectual Property 04/2003: “Brand building the Dutch way” (cover story). Published in April 
2003, available at 
http://www.multilaw.com/Template.cfm?Section=Legal_Specialties&template=/ContentManagement/ContentDi
splay.cfm&ContentID=2070 (2005-06-14) 
229 Case No. 01/13079. 
230 Remington Consumer Products Limited. 
231 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. 
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December 31, 1964232, Articles 3 and 5 of the Directive, L.711-1, 711-2 and 711-3 b of the 
French Intellectual Property Code (IPC) and, finally, article 15-1 of the TRIPS Agreement of 
April 14, 1993. 
 
3.18.2  The Court’s Reasoning  
3.18.2.1 The Legal Framework 
The court established that Remington’s main claim consisted of two arguments, one 
concerned the descriptive nature of the trademarks, and the other regarded their functional 
nature. The court declared that the first thing necessary to assess whether the configuration 
that Philips intended to protect by its trademark registrations was functional in nature or not.  
 
The court found that the Paris Convention did not contain any specific provisions regarding 
the functional nature of a shape registered as a trademark. The court further concluded that 
there had been many case law decisions denying trademark protection for shapes that were 
either necessary for the technical purpose, determined only by technical considerations or 
necessary in terms of the expected necessary result. The case law had stated two principles; 
that the existence of multiple functional shapes with respect to the desired technical result did 
not make it possible to monopolize one of those shapes by obtaining trademark protection, 
and that a necessary shape could not become distinctive through use. The court further 
established that the Directive denied registration of signs which consisted exclusively of the 
shape of goods which was necessary to obtain a technical result, and also ruled out the 
possibility for such signs to become distinctive through use233. The parties agreed that the 
assessment of the functional nature of all the trademarks, even those that had been filed prior 
to the entry into force of new legal provisions on the matter, must be based on the principles 
set out in the Directive, the provisions of Article L.711-2 of the French Intellectual Property 
Code and on the criteria defined in the ECJ decision from June 18, 2002. It is worth 
mentioning again that France was the second European country (after Germany) to make a 
decision on the validity of Philips’ trademarks after the ECJ preliminary ruling had been 
pronounced only a year earlier. 
 
3.18.2.2  The Assessment Criteria Defined in the ECJ Decision 
The court declared that the parties had already litigated in the UK regarding one of the seven 
trademarks in issue (IR 430.837), which resulted in the annulment of the Philips trademark on 
the ground that it was exclusively formed of a shape that was necessary to obtain a technical 
result. Moreover, the preliminary ruling of the ECJ was given a lot of importance in the 
French court’s assessment. 
 
Philips argued that the ECJ had adopted an approach that was in between the one that made it 
possible to cover purely functional shapes thanks to the criterion of multiple shapes, and the 
very restrictive approach that excluded all functional shapes. Thus, according to Philips, the 
ECJ therefore excluded only the essential characteristics of the shape that were attributed only 
to a technical result. Philips inferred from this that the ECJ acknowledged that a shape did not 
fall within the exclusion either when the essential characteristics of the shape were not 
                                                 
232 Prior to the transposition of the EC Directive, the Statute of December 31, 1964, applied, which stated that 
trademarks formed exclusively of words indicating the essential quality of the goods or its composition were 
barred from registration. 
233 Article 3(1)(e) and Article 3(3) of the Directive. 
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functional, or when they were functional but not solely attributable to the technical result. 
Remington inferred from the ECJ decision that a trademark was not valid when the 
characteristic shape elements forming the sign were functional, even when the trademark 
possessed other features that were not functional. Remington further submitted that the 
OHIM’s234 case law as well as French case law established that the mere addition of arbitrary 
elements was not sufficient to make a sign distinctive, when the sign without those additions 
would appear as essentially functional.  
 
The court held that in order to benefit from the exclusive protection granted by trademark law, 
a sign could not possess essential characteristics that were solely attributable to performing 
the technical result that was the main purpose of the product. The court also elucidated the 
definition made by the Advocate-General before the ECJ that the phrase “essential features” 
meant that a shape containing an arbitrary element which, from a functional point of view, 
was minor, did not escape the prohibition. Furthermore, the court held that, contrary to what 
Philips had claimed, it could not be inferred that a shape whose essential characteristics were 
functional, but not only attributable to the technical result would fall outside the exception.  
 
The court concluded that a sign formed of shapes whose characteristics were functional and 
attributable to the technical result could only avoid the exclusion from registration if it was 
also formed of other shapes that were non-functional, independent from the technical result 
and sufficiently distinctive to enable the public to distinguish the product with the sign from 
competing products. By reference to case law, that presupposed that such non-functional 
shapes, which formed part of the sign were not secondary, as they must be capable, even 
when taken alone, of distinguishing the sign in the eyes of the public. Consequently, the court 
found it necessary to examine whether or not the shapes forming Philips’ trademarks 
contained such non-functional elements that were capable of distinguishing them. 
 
3.18.2.3  Non-Functional Features 
Philips claimed three shape elements of its shaver to be non-functional: the arrangement in an 
equilateral triangle of the three grids (i.e. the round rotary cutting heads), the shape of the 
external outline (i.e. the cutting base) and the shape of the edge of the faceplate. Regarding 
the choice of the arrangement of the three heads in an equilateral triangle, Philips claimed that 
it was an attractive result of extended design work and not a result of a functional solution. 
Philips also held that there was no proof that the arrangement of the cutting heads in a circle 
or rectangle would not fulfill their function just as well. In addition, Philips argued that the 
choice of a visually balanced equilateral triangle with rounded angles was made to “soften” 
the shaver’s appearance, thus was the result of marketing and industrial aesthetics concerns.  
 
The court established that a single shaving head would be an insufficient solution, and held 
that efficiency of the shave was presupposed by use of several cutting heads arranged in a 
close formation. The arrangement in a triangle easily allowed the user to angle the shaver in 
different ways in order to use only one, only two, or all three of the heads dependant on the 
width of the part of the face to be shaved. The court further stated that the rounded nature of 
the angles was of functional matter, since angles on facial shaver preferably are rounded to 
prevent having sharp angles that might bother or even harm the user. Accordingly, the court 
concluded that even though aesthetic preoccupations might have led to emphasizing the 
rounded shape of the angles and the triangular shape, those considerations appeared only 
                                                 
234 Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trademarks and Designs). 
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secondary with respect to the technical results to which the shapes at issue were mainly 
dedicated. 
 
Concerning the shape of the linear external outline of the faceplate, which could be seen in 
three of the seven contested trademarks (IR 430.836, IR 430.837 and IR 439.559), Philips 
argued that its purpose was to hold the cutting heads in place and to avoid having open spaces 
between them that could allow direct access to the blades. The court found that the shape of 
the rim necessarily followed the configuration of the base of the heads, and established that 
Philips had not shown in what way that shape could have been motivated by any other 
considerations than technical ones.  
 
The third supposedly non-functional feature Philips claimed was the shape of the rim 
surrounding the cutting heads on the faceplate, also called the ‘clover-leaf’ design (as seen on 
trademarks IR 587.254 and IR 638.663). Philips argued that the rim enhanced the visual 
impression of a cloverleaf on the head of the shaver. Moreover, Philips contended that the 
only technical requirement of the faceplate was to cover the area around and between the 
cutting heads, but the cloverleaf shaped outline on it was the result of a mere aesthetical 
choice, with the only purpose to “provide visual support to an appearance of comfort”. 
Remington, on the other hand, argued that the technical purpose of the cloverleaf shaped 
outline was to stretch the skin and straighten the hairs.  
 
The court concluded that the possibly arbitrary element formed of the shape of the faceplate 
was relatively unimportant for the formation of the trademarks whose general lines were 
subject to the technical result the users expected. Hence, the court had not found any non-
functional features of the Philips trademarks that were capable of distinguishing them.  
 
3.18.3  The Judgment 
Accordingly, the court decided that the French extensions of the six international Philips 
trademark registrations235 were to be cancelled. The annulment pertained to “electric shavers 
and spare parts or accessories thereof, including shaving units formed of a base equipped with 
a shaving head, shaving apparatus and trimmers”. Furthermore, the court sentenced Philips to 
pay Remington € 20,000 and to bear all court fees.  
 
Regarding the French semi-figurative trademark that also had the denomination 
PHILISHAVE displayed on it, the court dismissed the annulment claim. The reason was that 
the court found it to have distinctiveness because of the denomination in large type, and that a 
genuine use of the trademark to designate shavers had been shown.  
 
3.18.3.1  The Infringement of the French Trademark 
After Remington had filed its annulment claims, Philips had in response filed an infringement 
claim against Remington, arguing that Remington had infringed Philips’ rights relating to its 
French semi-figurative trademark, which comprised a picture of a shaver head with the 
denomination PHILISHAVE beneath it. The court concluded that since it had not been 
claimed that the Remington shavers reproduced or imitated the PHILISHAVE denomination, 
the infringement claim could only be dismissed.  
 
                                                 
235 International trademarks IR 430.836, IR 430.837, IR 430.839, IR 587.254, IR 638.663 and IR 439.559. 
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The decision was appealed by Philips and brought up to justice before Paris Court of Appeals, 
which announced its judgment on February 16, 2005. The appeal judgment is described in the 
following chapter.  
 
 
 
3.19 FRANCE (2): Paris Court of Appeals 
Date of judgment236: February 16, 2005 
3.19.1  Background and Claims 
Since the first instance decision in June 2003, Remington Consumer Products Ltd. had been 
bought by a British company called Rayovac Europe Ltd., which thus is the successor-in-
interest to Remington, who had been the plaintiff in the first instance proceedings. Please 
observe that I here temporarily abandon the chronological order so that the appeal judgment 
can be placed in connection to the first instance decision. As a matter of fact, this is the very 
last judgment between the parties that has been pronounced before the completion of this 
thesis. Thus, the claims and submissions in relation to this court proceeding are the “last calls” 
from the parties, which is interesting as it shows the parties’ current, or very recent, opinions 
on the matter. That is also the reason why I describe the parties’ claims in such detail.  
 
Philips sought the annulment of the first instance judgment and also requested the Court of 
Appeals to find that Philips had abandoned the French trademark (95/563 306, see Appendix 
A), which had been declared still valid by the first instance court, and that the decision 
rendered concerning that trademark was groundless because of the abandonment. Philips 
further requested the court to state that the six international trademarks237 (see Appendix A) 
invalidated in the first instance decision were indeed valid and therefore infringed by 
Rayovac. Furthermore, Philips requested the court to sentence Rayovac to discontinue any 
and all reproduction, imitation, use or other affixing of the six trademarks, particularly the 
three trademarks comprising the ‘cloverleaf’ design (IR 430.837, IR 587.254 and IR 638.663), 
on any media whatsoever. In addition, Philips wanted the court to restrain Rayovac from 
offering for sale shavers that reproduce or imitate Philips trademarks, particularly the two 
“main” registrations IR 430.837 and IR 638.663, subject to a fine of €500 per shaver found in 
any sales outlet in France. Yet another request was that the court should order the destruction, 
at Philips’ initiative and at Rayovac’s expense, of all products, packaging, leaflets and 
promotional literature bearing the infringed trademarks. Furthermore, Philips wanted the court 
to sentence Rayovac to pay Philips a provisionally evaluated amount of €950,000 as 
compensation for the loss sustained due to the infringement of the trademarks. Additionally, 
Philips requested the court to state and rule that the decision to be rendered should be 
published in 10 newspapers or periodicals chosen by Philips within an overall publication 
budget of €70,000 expensed by Rayovac. Philips’ final request was that the court sentenced 
Rayovac to pay Philips €206,994.78 as per article 700 of the French New Civil Procedure 
Code and to pay the court fees.238
                                                 
236 Case No. 03/14961. 
237 International trademarks IR 430.836, IR 430.837, IR 430.839, IR 587.254, IR 638.663 and IR 439.559. 
238 The reason why I chose to describe all of Philips’ claims in detail is that I find it interesting that Philips after 
defeats in numerous other European Union countries (except only partially in Germany) still submits such 
“aggressive” claims. Keeping the numerous defeats from all over the world in mind and the first instance court’s 
firm decision to invalidate the trademarks, the likelihood of winning this appeal case must have been deemed to 
be quite small. 
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Rayovac requested the Court of Appeals to confirm the decision rendered by the first instance 
court and to add thereto some further claims. Rayovac requested the court to state and rule 
that pursuant to Articles 6 quinquies B 2 and 3 of the Paris Convention, Articles 1 and 3 of the 
Statute of December 31, 1964, Articles 3 and 5 of the EC Trademark Directive, Articles 
L.711-1, 711-2 and 711-3 b) of the French Intellectual Property Code and Article 15.1 of the 
TRIPS Agreement, the seven trademark registrations held by Philips have been null and void 
from the outset and with respect to all third parties (erga omnes239). Rayovac further requested 
the court to state and rule that the decision to be rendered should be entered in the National 
Trademark Registry and in the International Trademark Registry, and that unless that was 
done within one month following the pronouncement of the decision, Remington should be 
entitled to have it done itself upon simple production of a copy of such decision, at Philips’ 
expense. Alternatively, Rayovac wanted the court to declare that Philips’ rights in said 
trademark registrations have lapsed as per Article L.714-5 of the French Intellectual Property 
Code and state and rule that such lapse of rights should be effective erga omnes as of the 5th 
anniversary of those trademarks’ non-use. Furthermore, Rayovac requested the court to 
declare that Remington had not committed any acts of infringement of Philips’ trademarks, 
and to admit Remington’s counterclaims requesting the court to sentence Philips to pay 
Remington an indemnity of €2,000,000 in damages for abusive, thoughtless and vexatious 
actions and €200,000 in legal fees, as per Article 700 of the French New Code of Civil 
Procedure, as well as ordering the decision to be published in ten newspapers on Philips’ 
expense, within a budget of €100,000.  
 
3.19.2  The Parties’ Submissions 
The court clarified that Rayovac sought the cancellation of seven Philips trademarks, six 
international registrations and one French, while Philips considered the six international 
trademarks to be valid, and accordingly accused Rayovac of infringing them. The court 
declared that the French trademark (95/563 306) had been cancelled at Philips’ request in 
January 1997, thus more than five years before the first instance had found it still valid (!).240 
Because of the non-existence of the trademark registration, there was (obviously) no reason 
for Rayovac to seek the cancellation of the mark, and Philips waived its rights to use the mark 
as support of its infringement claims.  
 
In support of its plea that the six international trademarks were null and void, Rayovac argued 
that each of the elements forming Philips’ trademarks was functional in nature.  On the basis 
of the assessment criteria defined in the decision rendered by the ECJ on June 18, 2002, 
Rayovac asserted that trademarks consisting exclusively of a shape whose essential 
characteristics achieve a technical result are invalid. Rayovac inferred from this that even 
though, in addition to the technical function and result, the shape also provided other aesthetic 
or appealing advantages to attract customers, such a role was not separable from the technical 
function. In addition, Rayovac argued that the assembly or the combination of several 
functional elements, even though it may be arbitrary, could not allow a single company to 
appropriate each of those functional elements to the detriment of its competitors. 
 
                                                 
239 Erga omnes (in this context) means a declaration of cancellation with universal effect. 
240 I find it highly remarkable that a trademark which was cancelled in 1997 five years later could be the subject 
of court proceedings before Paris First Instance Court without anyone, neither Philips nor the court, discovering 
that the trademark registration did not even exist anymore. Hence, it was not until the appeal proceedings took 
place that Philips had realized it.  
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Philips replied that the exception defined by the Directive was to be construed narrowly and 
that a complex shape may be considered as non-necessary to the technical result, even though 
its features, when considered separately, have a functional role and even though its non-
functional elements do not in themselves constitute its essential characteristics. Philips added 
that the chosen shapes of its trademarks, such as the upside-down equilateral triangle shape, 
were the result of a combination of functional and non-functional features that were not 
exclusively related to the technical result. Philips further held that consumer surveys 
demonstrated that the trademarks performed their essential function, which was to allow the 
identification of the origin of the products they designated. 
 
The parties agreed that the functionality of the trademarks must be assessed in the light of the 
principles set forth in the Directive, the provisions of Article L.711-2241 of the French 
Intellectual Property Code and of the criteria set out in the ECJ judgment. 
 
3.19.3  The Court’s Findings 
3.19.3.1  The ECJ Preliminary Ruling  
The court cited large parts of the ECJ preliminary ruling, for instance parts of the answer to 
question two, where the ECJ rejected the proposed requirement of a capricious addition for 
the sign to be registered, and held that the shape must simply be capable of distinguishing the 
product of the trademark proprietor from those of others, and thus fulfill its essential purpose 
of indicating origin. The court also elucidated the ECJ’s holding in its answer to the fourth 
question that: 
 
As regards, in particular, signs consisting exclusively of the shape of the product necessary to obtain a 
technical result, listed in Article 3(1)(e), second indent, of the Directive, that provision is intended to 
preclude the registration of shapes whose essential characteristics perform a technical function, with 
the result that the exclusivity inherent in the trade mark right would limit the possibility of 
competitors supplying a product incorporating such a function or at least limit their freedom of choice 
in regard to the technical solution they wish to adopt in order to incorporate such a function in their 
product.242
 
The court further emphasized that the ECJ had established that the aim of the Article was in 
the public interest, namely that shapes whose essential characteristics performed a technical 
function should be freely used by all and not reserved to one undertaking alone that had 
registered the shape as a trademark. The court established the ECJ’s view that where the 
essential functional characteristics of the shape of a product were attributable solely to the 
technical result, Article 3(1)(e), second indent, precluded registration of a sign consisting of 
that shape, even if that technical result could be achieved by other shapes. 
 
Hence, the court inferred from the ECJ teachings that a trademark registration consisting 
exclusively of the functional shape of a product must not prevent competitors from offering 
products that include said function. The court further deduced that a sign which exclusively 
consists of a shape whose essential characteristics fulfill a technical function is therefore not 
liable to constitute a trademark. Moreover, it was inferred from the ECJ ruling that a complex 
trademark consisting of a shape imposed by the function of the product as well as by arbitrary 
                                                 
241 The French provision corresponding to Article 3(1)(e) is Article L.711-2 c) of the French Intellectual Property 
Code, which states: The following are devoid of distinctiveness […] signs consisting exclusively of the shape 
imposed by the nature or the purpose of the good, or whose shape gives the goods its substantial value. 
242 Paragraph 79 of the ECJ preliminary ruling (C-299/99). 
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elements could not avoid the exclusion provided in the Directive, unless those arbitrary 
elements were so distinctive that they allowed the identification of the product origin. The 
court found that it could not be sufficient, as claimed by Philips, that if the functional 
elements were aesthetic as well, that would give the sign the distinctiveness that it lacked in 
cases where the sign consisted exclusively of a shape necessary for the technical result. 
Hence, protection of such trademarks would result in depriving competitors of the possibility 
of using the shape freely. Just like the first instance court, the appeal court thus found it 
necessary to determine whether the shapes forming the trademarks at issue included non-
functional elements that were capable of distinguishing them.  
 
Philips admitted that the trademarks did include functional elements, such as a set of rotating 
blades, a mechanical connection between the sets of blades and an electric motor causing all 
the blades to rotate together and a grid with the purpose of separating the skin from the cutting 
edges of the moving blades, catching the whiskers through the openings in the grid, and 
working with the blades to cut such whiskers. However, Philips considered the following 
features to be non-functional: the equilateral triangle with “very” rounded angles and three 
shaving heads, the shape of the equilateral triangle arranged upside down, the shape of the 
outer rim or holder for the cutting blades and the shape of the front plate edge (or raised line). 
The court found reason to assess one by one the functionality of all the different shape 
features of the trademarks. 
 
3.19.3.2  Assessment of the Shape Elements  
In regards to the arrangement of an equilateral triangle with “very” rounded angles and three 
shaving heads, Philips claimed that combination of shapes to be a successful result of a 
compromise between functional and non-functional elements and was not dictated by any 
technical requirement. To the contrary, the court found that the choice of three circular heads 
produced a technical result. This was established by evidence of Philips’ promotional leaflets 
in which the triple-headed shaver was presented as the “most obvious innovation” and that it 
provided a closer shave approximately 30% faster than a double-headed shaver. The leaflets 
also mentioned trials carried out with four, six or eight shaving heads with results that was not 
better than with the triple-headed shaver. The triangular configuration with rounded angles 
was also found to be the result of a search for the optimum technical result, namely to ensure 
a compact shaver. This had been noted and established by several persons skilled in the art, 
which had been heard before courts in earlier proceedings between the parties.243 Hence, the 
number of three cutting heads provides a maximum shaving effect per surface unit, and only 
the symmetry of an equilateral triangle made it possible to “drive the three cutting heads in 
the same direction and at the same speed by means of a single gear centered on the axle of the 
shaver motor”. Thus, the shape served the result that was sought in terms of ease of use, 
efficiency and cutting accuracy of the shaver. The court further noted that Philips had claimed 
the equilateral triangle arrangement in both a British patent244 and in an American patent245. 
The rounded shape of the angles, in addition to the fact that it was claimed in the two patents, 
was found to be dictated by the concern to avoid sharp edges that could injure the user or 
make the shave uncomfortable. The court held that it was indifferent that the rounded shape 
gave the shaver a more aesthetic aspect since it contributed to the intended technical result. 
                                                 
243 Mr. Wallace D. Herrick, heard as witness by the Australian Federal Court, Mr. Peter John Turner heard 
before the British court, Philips own expert in the Australian court and Marc Santarelli, a Patent Attorney 
appointed by Remington. 
244 British patent No. 1 348 023.  
245 American patent No. 4 310 968. 
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Concerning the shape of the outer rim of the faceplate on which the cutters were mounted, the 
court found that it was contingent upon and followed the triangular shape and was not the 
result of any decorative choice. Philips had claimed that the raised outer rim appearing on two 
of the trademarks (IR 430.837 and IR 430.836) was only decorative. In Philips’ English 
patent, the raised rim was described as “serving to stretch the skin” and was mentioned as “a 
dry shaver comprising a shaving head or heads surrounded by a non-rotary skin-tightening rim 
formed on an annular […]”. The court concluded that the rim, which followed the shape of 
the base by overhanging it so that it stretched the skin in order to lift up the hairs, was 
imposed by the function it performed and was therefore devoid of any arbitrary and 
decorative character. 
 
Regarding the cloverleaf shaped rim on the two identical trademarks (IR 638.663 and IR 
587.254), the court observed that it was visible on one of the figures of the British patent but 
was not subject of any patent claim. However, the descriptive part of the patent provided that 
the raised part located between the two cutting units served to stretch or flatten the skin 
between the cutting units. Since the shape of the rim was thus precisely claimed, the court 
concluded that Philips had wrongly claimed that the shape of the rim was not dictated by any 
technical requirement. The functional nature of the rim was also supported by the fact that it 
was described in a European patent246 as skin-stretching and making sure that the pressure 
exerted on the shaving part was not to high, thus avoiding the skin getting cut. Accordingly, 
the court found the functional nature of the rim to be confirmed by the patent evidence, as the 
shape was exclusively determined by the intended technical result, being to stretch the skin 
and prevent skin cuts. 
 
In addition, the court clarified that there was no reason to determine whether the marks had 
acquired distinctiveness by use247, for instance by means of opinion surveys proving that 
consumers identified the corporate origin, as no distinctiveness could alter the exclusion of 
technically necessary shapes from protection.  
 
3.19.4  The Court’s Conclusion  
Paris Court of Appeals thus concluded that all of the six contested trademarks consisted 
exclusively of shape characteristics imposed by the function of the products. Accordingly, the 
first instance judgment that had cancelled the French extensions of the six international 
trademarks IR 430.836, IR 430.837, IR 430.839, IR 439.559, IR 587.254 and IR 638.663 was 
confirmed. Furthermore, the court dismissed the cancellation request with respect to the 
French semi-figurative trademark (95/563 306), which had already been withdrawn. 
Consequently, Philips’ action for trademark infringement was dismissed.  
 
Rayovac had as grounds for its claim for damages maintained that Philips by initiating the 
proceedings prevented Rayovac from having normal access to the European rotary shaver 
market and caused it to lose considerable profits on sales of triple-header shavers, a market on 
which Philips occupied a dominant position. The court found that Philips’ actions could not 
constitute an abuse of process since it was initiated in response to a cancellation action filed 
by Remington. Moreover, Rayovac had not evidenced that the proceedings were the cause of 
its stagnating sales of triple-headed shavers, as Philips had been selling the product – that was 
                                                 
246 European patent No. 0 719 203. 
247 Pursuant to Article L.711-2, § 3 of the French Intellectual Property Code and Article 3(3) of the Directive. 
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the subject of many patents – since 1967. Rayovac’s claim for damages was therefore 
dismissed.   
 
The court declared that the publication measure requested by Rayovac appeared justified and 
thus authorized Rayovac to publish the appeal court decision, whether in whole or in part, in 
five newspapers or periodicals of its own choice, at Philips’ expense and within a total budget 
of €60,000 (VAT excluded). Furthermore, the court sentenced Philips to pay Rayovac 
€200,000 under Article 700 of the French New Civil Procedure Code. In addition, the court 
sentenced Philips to pay the court fees and dismissed the additional claims. 
 
The judgment was appealed by Philips, and at the time of writing this it was still not decided 
whether the French Supreme Court would consider the case or not. 
 
 
 
3.20 SPAIN (1): Barcelona First Instance Court No. 48 
Date of resolution248: July 31, 2003  
3.20.1  Dispute Background 
In this interim resolution249 there is no information of how long River International had been 
selling the triple-headed shavers in Spain, but according to the German decision on November 
5, 2002 by Cologne District Court, the shavers had been marketed in Spain since June 2001. 
Before that, Philips had been the only company in Spain selling triple-headed rotary shavers. 
Philips250 raised a pretension for interim protection to the Barcelona First Instance Court, 
which decided a resolution on the matter on January 27, 2003. The resolution consisted of 
several interim measures in relation to River International, S.A., the company marketing and 
selling the triple-headed shavers251 in Spain. The court decided to decree River International 
to a provisional cessation of the import, distribution and marketing in Spain of triple-headed 
electric shavers, and to deposit the shavers that had been imported and were awaiting 
distribution. Hence, the court protected the rights of Philips as the owner of the international 
trademark IR 587.254 (illustrated in Appendix A) and as a competitor damaged by the 
presumed unfair conduct of River International. The unfair conduct consisted in the launching 
on the Spanish market of electric shavers with a shaving surface that reproduced Philips’ 
distinctive three-dimensional registered device. 
 
River International appealed the resolution, and the interim decision by Barcelona First 
Instance Court No. 48 described in this chapter is the result of that appeal. Since it is just an 
interim decision, the case would normally be pending until the appeal had been properly 
decided in a definite judgment. However, no such judgment would be needed in this case due 
to the result of a complaint by Remington for the cancellation of six Philips trademarks, 
which is described in the following chapter. Nonetheless, the court clarified that the interim 
decision could not in any way pre-judge the merits of the case, i.e. predetermine the sense of 
                                                 
248 Roll No. 239/2003-1, Interim proceedings no. 892/2002. 
249 The term “resolution” is used, as it is not a judgment but a preliminary decision. 
250 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. and Philips Ibérica, S.A. 
251 The shavers were marketed under the REMINGTON brand, which was also clearly displayed on the shaver 
and the packaging. 
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the principal and future decision. Thus, the purpose of the interim decision was to decide upon 
the credibility of success of the principal action exercised by Philips. 
 
3.20.2  Trademark Infringement 
Philips was the owner of the international three-dimensional trademark IR 587.254 (illustrated 
in Appendix A) representing the triangular top part of a triple-headed shaver. The court 
concluded that the trademark rights provisionally protected in the first instance had been 
queried and denied at and by many jurisdictions of European Union member states. The 
reason for invalidation had thus been Philips’ trademark registrations’ presumed infringement 
of the prohibition applied to shapes for technical reasons, as set out in Article 3(1)(e) of the 
Directive. The court declared that the harmonized national legislation on the matter should be 
interpreted in the light of the Directive and in accordance with the ECJ judgment from June 
18, 2002.  
 
After taken the above-stated legal provisions into account, the court concluded that Philips’ 
ownership of the trademark registration was tainted by infringement of the absolute 
prohibition on registration of signs consisting exclusively of the shape necessary to obtain the 
technical result. The court elucidated that the provision was intended to avoid protection of a 
trademark right that grants its owner a monopoly over technical solutions. The court further 
clarified that the obstacle to registration or reason for cancellation could not be overcome by 
an acquired distinctiveness, as set out in Article 3(3) of the Directive.  
 
3.20.3  Competition Law Infringement 
Philips had also claimed that River International’s unfair conduct consisted in the launching 
of shavers incorporating an imitation of the shaving surface of the Philips shaver. The court 
rejected this claim and held that the shape of the shaving surface could not be considered as a 
sign, but must be considered as a part of the product. Philips had claimed that the alleged 
imitation created a likelihood of confusion among consumers regarding the corporate origin 
of the products, by which River International took advantage of Philips’ repute. The court 
established that the likelihood of confusion should be considered by taking into account all 
factors of the specific case that may be pertinent, in relation to the prototype of a consumer 
which the ECJ had drawn up in its decision252 on June 22, 1999, applying to all relations in 
the market: average consumers of the category goods or services in question, who are 
presumed to be normally informed and reasonable, alert and perspicacious. 
 
The court established that River International’s shavers indeed contained the three rotary 
heads registered as a three-dimensional mark by Philips, but that the shavers also visibly 
incorporated the distinctive denominative sign of the product, “REMINGTON”, which was 
clearly intended to identify the corporate origin. The court concluded that, considering the 
differentiating function of the Remington sign displayed on the body of the shaver, the 
principal actions exercised by Philips would probably not succeed, unless objective data was 
provided in the proceedings that would evidence the likelihood of confusion of the corporate 
origin of the products and thus the advantage taken of Philips’ repute. 
 
                                                 
252 Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co. GmbH vs Klijsen Handel BV (C-342/97). 
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3.20.4  Final Decision 
Thus, the court accepted River International’s appeal and accordingly annulled the resolution 
made by Barcelona First Instance Court on January 27, 2003. The restrictions imposed upon 
River International was taken away, and the company was once again allowed to import, 
distribute and market Remington’s triple-headed shavers in Spain. As you will see in the 
coming chapter, the dispute in Spain was not over yet, since Remington had already before 
the annulment of the resolution complained for the cancellation in Spain of six Philips 
trademarks.  
 
 
 
3.21 SPAIN (2): Barcelona First Instance Court No. 13 
Date of judgment253: May 6, 2004 
3.21.1  Dispute Background 
The dispute background is also partially described in the previous chapter. After a pretension 
raised by Philips, River International had on January 27, 2003 been restrained by a court 
resolution from importing and selling triple-headed shavers in Spain. After the appeal by 
River International, the resolution imposing the restricting interim measures was on July 31, 
2003 annulled by Barcelona First Instance Court No. 48, and River International was once 
again allowed to sell the imported Remington triple-headed shavers. However, before the 
decision to annul the resolution but after the preliminary hearing in the appeal case had been 
held, Remington filed a complaint to Barcelona First Instance Court No. 13 requesting the 
cancellation in Spain of Philips’ six international IR trademark registrations254 (see Appendix 
A for illustrations). Since two different courts in the same Spanish city dealt with practically 
the same legal matter at the same time, a joining of cases was requested. The request was, 
however, rejected by Barcelona First Instance Court No. 48, which was dealing with the first 
proceedings, due to technicalities in the law. 
 
Hence, in this very extensive judgment, Remington was the plaintiff and Philips the 
defendant.255 Remington’s referred grounds for cancellation were that the registrations were a 
violation of public order and the Spanish system of industrial property and free competition, 
and were bound by the causes of absolute nullity provided in both the new and the old 
Spanish Trademarks Act. 
 
3.21.2  Remington’s Submissions 
Remington asserted that there was a conflict at world level between the parties, which were 
both major multinationals in the shaving sector. Remington submitted that Philips’ triple-
headed shaver had never been granted patent protection in Spain due to lacking the requisite 
of absolute novelty owing to Philips’ introduction in Australia in 1956 of the same shaver. 
Essentially, it was that same shaver head that was reproduced in the international trademark 
registrations whose nullity was sought by Remington. Remington argued that by granting the 
                                                 
253 Case No: Ordinary Proceeding 241/2003 Section 4, Judgment No. 89. 
254 The three-dimensional international trademark IR 587.254 and the graphic international trademarks IR 
638.663, IR 439.559, IR 430.837, IR 430.836 and IR 430.839. 
255 In the resolution described in the previous chapter, the parties were River International (i.e. Remington’s 
exclusive distributor in Spain) and Philips. 
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trademarks or by attempting to use them in order to monopolize a certain technical or 
functional configuration, the principle of priority of the right of patents over any other type of 
intellectual property would be violated256. It would also cause the “mixed interests” of 
trademark rights to prevail compared to the public interest of patent rights, which according to 
Remington 
 
[f]ormed the basis of the free market and of efficient and equal competition upheld by the 
Constitution and European Community Law, the few exceptions to which are to be found in the 
system of patents due to the necessary availability of the functional or technical shapes, which are 
subjected to a limited monopoly to the benefit of the technological development of the State and of 
the citizens, which is ultimately for the benefit of the former.257 258
 
Remington further contested that the attempt to obtain undue protection for its shaver head by 
virtue of registering it as a trademark or by virtue of competition rules had been 
systematically used by Philips worldwide since 1978. Many courts or registrars had though 
rejected the applications or cancelled the existing registrations, but Philips had kept on filing 
complaints against Remington denouncing trademark infringement or violation of competition 
law. After Remington’s success in the ECJ and UK decisions, the company decided to start 
selling the triple-headed shavers in Spain as well, via its exclusive distributor River 
International S.A., believing in the non-existence of any legal obstacles. Nevertheless, Philips 
sued River International for trademark infringement on November 29, 2002, which gave raise 
to the interim proceedings before Barcelona First Instance Court No. 48259.  
 
Hence, Remington now sought the cancellation of six Philips trademark registrations on the 
grounds that they were all bound by various reasons of absolute nullity pursuant to the 
Spanish Trademarks Act260 and Article 3 of the Directive. Remington argued that the 
trademarks were never lawfully born as they were violating the Spanish system of intellectual 
property and defense of competition. Furthermore, Remington elucidated that in France all of 
Philips’ international registrations, identical to the Spanish ones, had been invalidated. In 
addition, Remington argued that Philips had never used the trademarks in order to advertise 
or differentiate its products on the Spanish market, but instead the product had been used in 
the advertising, in connection with denominative trademarks such as PHILISHAVE or 
PHILIPS. Remington finally contended that the Philips trademarks lacked distinctiveness and 
that there were evident external differences between Philips’ shavers and Remington’s.  
 
3.21.3  Philips’ Submissions 
Philips, on the other hand, argued that the underlying purpose of Remington’s complaint was 
to get around the risk of an adverse procedural result in the proceedings, which at that time 
was in progress before Barcelona First Instance Court No. 48.261 In that parallel proceeding, 
                                                 
256 I had never before heard about this principle of patent priority over other IPRs. I assume it might be a national 
Spanish principle of law. 
257 Page 3 of the judgment. 
258 The Spanish judgment contains extremely long sentences of up to 170 words possessing up to 15 lines. Even 
though impressive in their length, the intended significations of the sentences is often difficult to determine. 
259 See the previous chapter. 
260 Article 5 Sections b), c), d), e) and f) of the Spanish Trademarks Act 17/2001, considered in the earlier 
Spanish Trademarks Act 32/1988 in its Article 11.  
261 As described above, Remington filed the complaint for cancellation of the six trademarks before any decision 
had been taken whether to annul or uphold the resolution imposing restrictions upon River International, 
Remington’s exclusive distributor in Spain. 
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Philips had upheld the complaint from the preliminary proceedings for declaration of 
trademark infringement and unfair competition. Before those parallel proceedings, River 
International had, according to Philips “under the evident guidance of Remington” filed a writ 
of reply requesting the cancellation of three Philips trademarks262. Philips pointed out that the 
arguments and documents, which served as the basis of that reply were identical to those 
established by Remington in the current proceeding.263  
 
Philips claimed that Remington had not submitted any evidence establishing the technical 
features of the trademarks. What had to be determined, according to Philips, was whether 
each and every of the shape elements of the trademarks exclusively performed functions 
necessary for obtaining a technical result, or gave substantial value to the product. 
Furthermore, Philips argued that Remington’s referral to previous patents was irrelevant, as 
the protection of those patents were not extended to the triangular external appearance of the 
shaving surface but only to “specific elements of the shaving function”.  
 
Philips also established that various market surveys had shown that the Spanish consumers 
associate triple-headed shavers with Philips, and an expert opinion issued by the firm 
GESCOM had shown that the Philips trademarks lacked any functionality and was solely 
aesthetically determined. In addition, Remington’s shavers were confusingly similar to 
Philips’ shavers, and Philips’ defense of its trademarks were therefore not to be seen as any 
monopolistic urge but a necessary precaution to protect its consumers from the risk of 
confusion and association. By reason of Remington’s allegation of non-use, Philips held that 
the marketing of Philips’ shavers automatically implied the use of the actual marks. 
 
3.21.4  The Court’s Findings 
The court established that the two main questions disputed in the trial was, firstly, whether or 
not Philips’ registered trademarks were bound by cause of absolute nullity by performing 
technical functions and, secondly, the assessment of the alleged lack of use264 of two of the 
trademarks. The court began its statement of the findings by rendering its conclusion: 
 
As a result of the evidence submitted, it has been accredited that [all six of Philips’ contested 
International Trademarks] whose registration in Spain is sought by the plaintiff to be bound by cause 
of nullity all consists of a graphic representation of a series of shapes which reproduce the shaving 
surface of a defined class of razor, that of three heads, consisting of an inverted equilateral triangle in 
which three equal rotary heads are inserted, constituting a graphic shape or a three-dimensional shape 
which has to be regarded as necessary for obtaining a technical result in each and every one of the 
components of the representation, though it is not certain that said shapes registered as trademarks are 
the only ones possible for obtaining that technical result.265
 
The court’s conclusion had been reached by means of an overall assessment of the evidence 
submitted, with special relevance to the expert evidence. The court then brought up to 
discussion practically the same things as other European courts had expressed in their 
findings: the relevant provisions of the Directive, the national legislation corresponding to it 
                                                 
262 The three-dimensional international trademark IR 587.254 due to its technical functions, and international 
graphic trademarks IR 638.663 and IR 430.837 by virtue of lack of use.  
263 Philips did not further explain in what way the similarities of arguments and documents was important for the 
court’s assessment of the legal matters in the case at hand; it was no secret that River International was 
Remington’s exclusive distributor in Spain and thus cooperated closely with Remington. 
264 However, the lack of use was never again mentioned in the judgment. 
265 Page 14 of the judgment. 
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and the ECJ preliminary ruling referred in detail. I will bring up the parts of the judgment that 
I find interesting or which differ from the view of other courts.  
 
Regarding the purpose of the second indent of Article 3(1)(e) of the Directive, the court 
established that the aim of the provision was to separate the shape protected by the trademark 
system from the shapes protected by the patents system. That demarcation was according to 
the court very important, as the aims and purposes of the two systems were radically different; 
the aim of the trademark system was to grant unlimited protection to trademarks with 
distinctive capacity for reasons of indicating origin, while the aim of the patent system was to 
promote the materialization and dissemination of the results of technological research by 
giving the inventor a time-limited exclusive right if the invention was new, implied an 
inventive activity and was liable to industrial application. Thus, it was deemed important to 
prevent the granting of eternal trademark protection for technologically necessary shapes, 
since the consequences would be harmful for the competitors who would be deprived of the 
use of a product shape indispensable for efficiently competing on the market.  
 
The court further held that when determining whether a shape trademark consists of 
technically necessary shape elements, the first circumstance to be taken into account is 
whether the shape of the product has been the object of the filing or granting of a patent or 
utility model. If it has, the conclusion to be drawn is that the corresponding shape of the 
trademark is technically necessary and thus unregistrable as a trademark.266 Another 
important circumstance accrediting the functionality of a shape was whether the trademark 
owner (or applicant) had highlighted the shape of the product in the advertising as an element 
that provided advantages such as greater efficacy.  
 
The court established that a fundamental investigation needed to be done of the existence of 
alternative shapes providing a product with the same advantages that, in terms of manufacture 
and use, were awarded to it by the trademark shape. The reason for this was that the non-
existence of alternative shapes would evidently be a revealing indication of the functionality 
of the trademark shape.267  
 
Regarding shapes which give substantial value to the goods268, the exclusion from trademark 
protection of such shapes was due to the shape’s effect on the intrinsic value of the product. 
The aim of the provision was, according to the court, to establish a border between the 
trademarks system and the system of designs or industrial models, as the systems had 
different purposes; the trademark system granted protection for reasons of indicating business 
origin, while the design system aimed at promoting efforts directed at obtaining new products 
and decorative shapes. Thus, the exclusion from trademark protection of shapes giving 
substantial value to the product had a particular effect on products of which the aesthetic 
appearance had a direct impact on the consumers’ positive valuation of the product. If it 
happened that the shape made the product more attractive and therefore more saleable, the 
shape probably affected the intrinsic value of the product and thus could not be registered as a 
trademark. This was, according to the court, because the function of the shape did not 
contribute to identifying the product’s business origin but instead the shape was a factor 
functioning to satisfy the consumers’ aesthetic demands. The shape was then aesthetically 
                                                 
266 The importance given to the shape’s former patentability is interesting, and was also brought up in judgments 
from Italy, France and Portugal. The matter is further discussed in Chapter 4.4.3.3 below.  
267 Also this opinion of the court is interesting, and I will comment upon it in the end of the chapter. 
268 See Article 3(1)(e), third indent of the Directive and the corresponding final paragraph of 5.1 e) of the 
Spanish Trademarks Act 2001. 
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functional and would represent one of the factors, which would contribute to the commercial 
success of the product. The court concluded that the more attractive a three-dimensional shape 
was, the less likely it would be that the shape would be granted trademark protection, but the 
court also noted that an aesthetic design could instead enjoy design or industrial model 
protection.269  
 
3.21.5  The Final Verdict 
The court declared that as a consequence of all that had been stated, the Spanish extensions of 
the contested six international trademarks were bound by cause of nullity due to contravening 
the prohibitions established in Article 5.1 e) of the Spanish Trademarks Act, corresponding to 
Article 3(1)(e) of the Directive. Thus, upholding the complaint filed by Remington against 
Philips, the court declared the cancellation of Spanish extension of the six contested 
trademarks. Philips was condemned to pay the procedural costs.  
 
The judgment was appealed by Philips, but no date for a hearing in the appeal case had yet 
been set at the time of writing this.  
 
3.21.6  Comments 
The Spanish court clarified that the exclusion of technically necessary shapes aims at 
separating the shape protected by the trademarks system from the shape protected by the 
patents system. The court also elucidated that the aim of the exclusion of shapes giving 
substantial value to the goods was to establish a border between shapes protected by the 
trademarks system and shapes protected by the designs system; the “substantial value” was 
interpreted to refer to the value of an attractive aesthetic appearance. Unfortunately, the court 
did not apply this view on the contested trademarks nor establish whether also this exclusion 
from protection applied to the trademarks. On several occasions in the judgment the court 
makes statements of the legal situation and the purpose of the legislation, but fails to apply 
those facts on the situation at hand.  
 
A noticeable opinion of the court is the importance given to whether the shape had been the 
object of the filing or granting of a patent. If it has, the court regards it as obvious that the 
shape is technically necessary and unregistrable as a trademark. In only a few of the other 
judgments has this matter been mentioned, but I have to agree with the Spanish court that a 
shape that have been the subject of a patent most likely must be technically determined. 
However, the court did not express any findings of the “patent history” of the shape of the 
contested trademarks.  
 
Even though the court must have been aware of the ECJ’s opinion that the existence of 
alternative shapes made no difference for the exclusion of technically necessary shapes, the 
court held that a fundamental investigation of the alternative shapes had to be made. The court 
meant that if there were no alternative shapes that could obtain the same technical result, that 
would be a strong indication that the shape of the trademark was functional. Even if the court 
                                                 
269 The Spanish court’s discussion and interpretation of the meaning of the ‘substantial value’ of a shape is 
welcomed and interesting, as the purpose and scope of that prohibition of the Directive has been considered as a 
bit unclear. Unlike most other courts before, the Spanish court discusses the purpose and application of the 
prohibition. Unfortunately, the court does not apply the findings on the case at hand, or at least does not express 
what influence the provision had on its final decision. 
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stressed that this was an important investigation to make, it never mentioned the existence of 
alternative shapes again nor made any such investigation. 
 
 
 
3.22 NEW ZEALAND: Intellectual Property Office of New 
Zealand  
Date of judgment270: August 4, 2003  
3.22.1  Background 
As early as on June 26, 1995, Philips Electronics N.V. filed an application to the Intellectual 
Property Office of New Zealand (“IPONZ”) to register as a trademark the three-
dimensional271 shape of the three cutting heads of the top part of an electric shaver (see 
Appendix A for illustration of identical IR 587.254)272. Philips filed on the basis that the mark 
was used, and relied on evidence of use dating from 1977 in support of its application. The 
IPONZ refused to register the mark on a number of grounds; that the mark was a 
representation of the goods themselves and therefore could not be said to describe the goods 
and that there were no additional, capricious or fanciful features that would distinguish the 
shaver from others’ and the shape therefore resulted form the shape of goods themselves. 
Other grounds were that the shape of the goods was entirely functional and that the mark was 
not distinctive since other traders were likely to wish to use the same or similar three-
dimensional shape on their shavers, a shape which they should be free to use. Furthermore, 
the mark was unlikely to indicate to consumers an exclusive source of goods since all it 
showed was simply a three-headed shaver, and the use of the shape had not displaced the 
shape’s common meaning such that it had come to denote the goods of the Philips alone. Also 
the use of the shape in conjunction with other marks that would obviously be taken as 
trademarks (namely “PHILIPS” and “PHILISHAVE”) made it difficult to attribute the sales 
and advertising figures to the mark applied for alone. Philips disputed all the grounds of 
objection and requested a hearing, from which the following decision derives.  
 
3.22.2  Trademark Registration of a Shape  
An initial issue the court had to clarify was whether a shape of goods or part of goods could 
be registered as a trademark under the New Zealand Trade Marks Act 1953. New Zealand had 
new trademark legislation in the form of the Trade Marks Act 2002, but that legislation was 
irrelevant since the case concerned matters that had been decided under the 1953 Act. The 
first part of Section 2 of the 1953 Act, as amended in 1994, provided that “sign” includes a 
device, brand, heading, label, ticket, name, signature, word, letter, numeral, color or any 
combination thereof. The 1994 amendments to the definition of sign were prompted by New 
Zealand’s membership of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) and the requirement to 
comply with the WTO Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (“TRIPS”). The 
amendment to the 1953 Act to use the wider concept of “sign” instead of “mark” was a direct 
result of the TRIPS, in particular Article 15(1). The court established that the change from 
                                                 
270 Case No. T29/2003. 
271 Philips had earlier registered a two-dimensional representation of the shaver head, but that registration was 
not disputed.  
272 The three-dimensional sign that the application concerned corresponds to the international three-dimensional 
registration IR 587.254 (and the identical picture trademark registration IR 638.663) illustrated in Appendix A. 
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“mark” to “sign” was meaningful, and that a sign that is a shape was not so different from the 
other types of signs listed in section 2, which the definition was not limited to. The court 
concluded that shape was not the same as device, but it was not so dissimilar to exclude it 
from the definition of sign. Accordingly, shapes were included and registrable according to 
the definition of “sign” in section 2.  
 
3.22.3  Inherent Distinctiveness 
Section 14 of the 1953 Act provided that distinctiveness was a requisite for registration, and 
section 15 provided that capability of distinguishing was a requisite for registration. Hence, 
both sections required the mark to be distinctive for registrability. The court established that 
both sections incorporated the concepts of inherent distinctiveness and distinctiveness in fact.  
 
The court held that where the trademark applied for is a representation of the shape, or part of 
the shape, of goods, the shape is almost inevitably descriptive of the goods. Such a pictorial 
description of a character or quality of the goods usually means that there is no, or very little, 
inherent distinctiveness in the mark. Philips had submitted that the mark did not describe the 
goods, which was a submission that the court did not accept. The mark was according to the 
court a pictorial representation of Philips’ goods, and it was not relevant that there were other 
ways of representing shavers. The possibility of different shapes for shavers did not mean that 
the mark had inherent capacity to distinguish. The court thus found the mark descriptive of 
the goods, and Philips’ evidence of use, which will be discussed below, did not show use of 
the mark except as it showed pictures of Philips’ shavers. The court hence rejected Philips’ 
evidence of use, and held that there was no other way of representing a three-headed shaver. 
The court further held that Philips was seeking to prevent other manufacturers from making 
three-headed shavers. That was not the ambit of trademark law, but of other intellectual 
property rights. Accordingly, the court concluded that the mark applied for was not inherently 
distinctive. 
 
3.22.4  Acquired Distinctiveness 
Philips had tried to show evidence of use and acquired distinctiveness of the trademark by 
submitting to the court advertising material such as a promotional brochure and a retail sales 
catalogue. The court found that nowhere in the advertising material did the mark appear 
exactly as it was applied for. There were many pictures of the three-headed shaver in total, but 
no representations of the top part other than as part of the goods.  
 
Philips had also submitted evidence of substantial sales and details of Philips’ having a 
significant portion of the market share of the shaver market. The court held that the kind of 
use Philips’ had showed was not use in the trademark sense as denoting of the goods, as 
required for registration. Philips also showed a survey in which seventeen people had been 
interviewed, and eleven of those had identified the mark applied for as a Philips shaver. The 
court stated that Philips’ argument seemed to be that because the three-headed shape could be 
associated with Philips since Philips was the sole trader in that shape, it should be registered. 
On this matter the court referred to the UK Court of Appeal judgment, which held that “in 
circumstances where Philips have been the sole suppliers of rotary shavers in the U.K. the 
evidence relied on does not establish that the trademark has acquired a secondary 
meaning”273. The court established that use is a factor in registrability, but use does not equal 
                                                 
273 See Chapter 3.7 for the UK Appeal decision from 1999.  
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registrability since it cannot always create a secondary meaning. The fact that Philips had 
been the only trader did not overcome the principle. The court held that there had been a lot of 
use, but it was essentially use of something that was 100% descriptive of the goods. The court 
concluded that the use in New Zealand did not give the mark distinctiveness in fact, and thus 
did not convert the mark into something registrable.  
 
3.22.4.1  Use with other Trademarks 
The fact that the mark applied for had been used in conjunction with other Philips marks 
would not exclude registration if the mark could be shown to be distinctive in its own right. 
The court established that the mark did not appear in the evidence without reference to the 
other marks “PHILIPS” and/or “PHILISHAVE”. The survey evidence submitted by Philips 
tended to indicate that some people associate the mark with the applicant without the other 
marks being shown. The court held, however, that such recognition was hardly surprising as 
the applicant was the sole trader of a three-headed rotary shaver. Since the mark was not 
distinctive, it was still unregistrable according to the court.  
 
3.22.4.2  Are Other Traders Entitled to Use the Mark? 
The court held that it was well established that if other traders were entitled to use the 
trademark, it could not be distinctive. Philips had argued that since the mark had acquired 
distinctiveness through use, other traders were not entitled to use the mark. In regards to that 
submission, the court established that since Philips’ evidence did not show that the mark had 
acquired distinctiveness, Philips could not exclude others from making three-headed rotary 
shavers. The court concluded that it was not the function of trademark law to prevent the 
manufacture of goods.    
 
3.22.5  The Court’s Final Conclusion 
The court concluded that the three-dimensional shape trademark applied for was a 
representation of a part of the goods and thus was descriptive of the goods. It was not 
inherently distinctive and it had not become distinctive in fact of Philips’ goods. 
Consequently, the court decided that the trademark as applied for was not accepted for 
registration.  
 
 
 
3.23 ITALY: The Court of Milan 
Date of judgment274: February 26, 2004 
3.23.1  Dispute Background 
On May 16, 2000, Remington275 initiated a judicial action against Philips276 in order to obtain 
a declaratory judgment that the import and marketing in Italy of its triple-headed shavers did 
not constitute an infringement of Philips’ trademarks nor acts of unfair competition. As a 
response, Philips filed a precautionary petition requesting the court to restrain Remington 
                                                 
274 Case No. 31294/2000. 
275 Remington Consumer Products Ltd. 
276 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. and Philips SpA. 
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from any further marketing of the triple-headed shavers, confiscation of the shavers and 
determination of a penalty on the ground that the shavers infringed Philips’ trademark rights. 
However, after an exchange of briefs, Philips withdrew its precautionary petition. In June 
2000 Remington started to sell its triple-headed shavers in Italy277. 
 
When appearing before the court, Philips petitioned the court to reject Remington’s 
applications, and submitted a counterclaim for obtaining a judgment that the trademarks had 
been infringed and that Remington’s conduct constituted unfair competition. Philips also 
requested judgments of restraining order, publication of judgment, penalty and compensation 
for damages. 
 
3.23.2  The Parties’ Claims 
Remington claimed the registrations in Italy of six Philips international trademark 
registrations278 to be invalid. Furthermore, Remington requested a clarification that the 
importation, merchandizing, sale, marketing and advertising in general within Italy of 
Remington’s rotary shavers did not constitute an infringement of the trademarks held by 
Philips, nor had there been any acts of unfair competition directed against Philips.  
 
Philips petitioned the court to establish and declare that Remington by producing and/or 
marketing and/or merchandizing and/or advertising the Remington triple-headed shavers had 
infringed the Italian extensions of six international Philips trademark registrations279, and that 
Remington had performed acts of unfair competition against Philips. Accordingly, Philips 
requested the court to restrain Remington from any further production, importation, 
merchandizing, sale, marketing, and advertising and promotion of any triple-headed electric 
shavers. Philips also wanted the court to impose upon Remington penalty as well as 
compensation for the damage incurred by Remington’s unlawful actions. 
 
3.23.3  The Court’s Findings 
The court established that the main issue to determine was whether or not the triangular 
arrangement of the three rotary heads of the Philips shaver was protectable as a shape 
trademark for the effects of law pertaining to unfair competition. Moreover, the court noted 
that the ECJ decision on the matter had laid down the principle of right of use for the solution 
of the problem. 
 
In support of its three-dimensional trademarks, Philips claimed to have exclusive rights to the 
three cutting heads arranged on a triangular faceplate on the grounds that they represent a 
significant and therefore a relevant part of the shape of the product. The court disagreed and 
stated that the trademarks were invalid as they consisted solely of the shape of the product 
required to obtain a technical result, and such signs was excluded from registration according 
to the Directive.280 The court established that all the details of the shaver performed a precise 
                                                 
277 According to the German judgment from District Court of Cologne announced on November 5, 2002. 
278 See Appendix A for International Registrations IR 430.836, IR 430.837, IR 430.839, IR 439.559, IR 587.254 
and IR 638.663. 
279 The same six international registrations as Remington requested the cancellation of. 
280 Article 3(1)(e) of the Directive. 
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function: the dimensions of the head as well as the number of heads and their arrangement281. 
The court further held that it would not seem redundant to note that the equilateral triangular 
arrangement, among other things, was found in a U.S. patent from 1972282 as well as in other 
patents indicated by Philips itself. The court found that the former existence of a patent 
comprising the three-headed triangular shape proved the obvious technical value of the 
illustrated solution, even if it did not constitute the main technical solution that was the object 
of the patent. Thus, the court concluded that the examination had shown that: 
 
[…] all the defendants’ trademarks therefore represent functional elements for obtaining essential 
technical effects, in particular the adaptation of the optimal shaving surface to the facial profile and 
the insertion of the drive components of the head rotors. Even the margin and contours prove 
functional for placing the skin under tension prior to shaving and thereby for better capture of the 
hairs and improved cutting […]283
  
The court established that the purpose of general interest pursued by the Directive through 
Article 3(1)(e) was that a shape, whose essential features perform a technical function and 
were selected to fulfill that function, should be freely used by everyone and could not be 
registered as a trademark. The court further held that the adverb “exclusively” for the 
purposes of said article284 could only be understood to refer to the nature of the shape features 
specifically selected in relation to the desired technical functionality. It could not be 
understood to refer to the non-existence of alternative shapes, since an interpretation like that 
would, according to the court, be to twist the meaning of the decision. The court established 
that: 
 
The meaning would be obviously twisted if the clause of the decision of the Court that requires shape-
related features performing a technical function to be selected to achieve this function (see § 80) were 
interpreted – as the defendants seem to ask for – in the sense of permitting registration of functional 
shapes that the trademark title holder by its own decision has selected even for other non-technical 
purposes (for example, marketing or esthetics). The correct meaning of the clause seems instead to be 
that of requiring an objectively pertinent relationship between the selected features and the functions 
to be exercised by these features within the context of the actual functionality of the product.285
 
Moreover, the court held that it could not be maintained that the invalidity of the trademarks 
could be superseded by the acquisition of a distinct capacity through the effect of intensive 
and prolonged use of the trademarks on the market. The court found that Philips had not in 
fact proved the existence of any intensive advertising focused on the shape trademarks; 
advertising of the overall image of the product was not sufficient. Furthermore, the evidence 
established that Philips had always and by preference used its own name as a trademark to 
such an extent that it seemed difficult to maintain that the shape had acquired a distinct 
capacity by itself.286 The court discussed the institution of secondary meaning and held that 
                                                 
281 Regarding the arrangement of the heads, the court found that “it is self-evident that the head should occupy as 
little surface space as possible to match the shaving surface, to supply simultaneous support on the skin –which 
in addition to the results from the research by the Dutch firm TNO produced by the defendants […] intuitively 
appears more difficult with an arrangement of the heads ‘widened’ to 120° – and to exploit reciprocal tangency 
to have them moved by a single central cog wheel.” 
282 N. 3.844.033 by Yonkers/Bissel.  
283 Page 11-12 of the judgment. 
284 Article 3(1)(e) second indent of the Directive provides: “ The following shall not be registered or if registered 
shall be liable to be declared invalid: […] signs which consist exclusively of the shape of goods necessary to 
obtain the technical result.”  
285 Page 14 of the judgment. 
286 To me, this discussion seem unnecessary, as the court had already established that the shapes were necessary 
for the technical result, and being an absolute ground for refusal, the exclusion could not be overcome by proof 
of an acquired distinctiveness. 
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the acquired distinctiveness of a name or descriptive indicator had a different character that 
the secondary meaning a functional shape could acquire. Hence, those two cases were not 
equivalent, as the restatement of generic and descriptive names simply leads to a 
monopolization of language, while the restatement of functional shapes may lead to a 
monopolization of the product. In the first case, the original meaning of the generic name is 
lost and a secondary meaning, that of the trademark, is acquired, while in the second case, the 
secondary meaning would come to be acquired simply by preserving the original functional 
value. 
 
Regarding the alleged unfair competition pleaded by Philips, the court established that even if 
there were no directives aimed at harmonization of the field of competition, the exclusion 
from trademark protection on the basis of functionality had the capability to exclude 
recognition of illegality under unfair competition law. Concerning the alleged confusingly 
similarity of the products, the court found all such confusability to be excluded after 
comparing the general impressions of the shavers and making a direct examination of the 
shavers and their the packaging, with recognition of both parties’ constant use of different 
denominations on their shavers and packaging.287 The court further established that it seemed 
like Philips had not given the matter of confusing similarity as such any particular 
exploration; Philips had, on the one hand, maintained that the difference between the 
packages was irrelevant and, on the other hand, rebuked Remington for failing to introduce 
the variations in number, shape, and arrangement of the rotating heads – variations which 
could not be considered “innocent” but technically intended instead. 
 
3.23.4  Final decision 
As the registered trademarks represented functional elements for obtaining essential technical 
effects, the court declared the invalidity of the Italian extensions of Philips’ international 
trademark registrations IR 430.836, IR 430.837, IR 430.839, IR 439.559, IR 587.254 and IR 
638.663. The court thus rejected the pleas presented by Philips, and obligated Philips to 
refund to Remington in their entirety the court expenses288, totaling €33,400, in addition to 
legal expenses.  
 
The judgment was appealed by Philips, and a hearing for the appeal proceedings will take 
place in February 2006.  
 
3.23.5  Comments 
Trademark law and competition law are two areas of law which partly overlap, as the 
purposes of both legislations are similar and aims at enabling free and fair competition. An 
interesting aspect of the Italian judgment is that the court conferred a quite strong connection 
between the two legal areas. The court held that despite the lack of community directives 
aimed at harmonization of the field of competition, the exclusion from trademark protection 
                                                 
287 In the direct examination, the court compared the products’ different variants such as the base, contour, 
double twin heads instead of single, overall shape, and color, and the respective packages’ different text, 
illustrations, colors, and overall impression.  
288 Hence, the losing party was responsible for the expenses, which in view of the nature, quality, and quantity of 
questions deliberated as well as the defense of judgment requested and supplied amounted to a total of €33,400 
(including €25,000 for stipends, €4,000 for fees, €1,500 for expenses, €2,900 for lump-sum expenses) in addition 
to legal expenses. 
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on the basis of functionality had the capability to exclude recognition of illegality under unfair 
competition law.  
 
 
 
3.24 UNITED KINGDOM (3): High Court of Justice, 
Chancery Division, London 
Date of judgment289: June 21, 2004  
3.24.1  Dispute Background 
On the UK market, Philips290 introduced the triple-headed shaver in 1966, and at the time for 
the court proceedings, the triple-headed shavers accounted for about 85% of Philips’ overall 
sales of electric shavers in the UK. Since the 1970s, the other main manufacturer of electric 
shavers has been Izumi, which in the UK has sold its shavers under the name Remington. As 
described above in Chapters 3.6 and 3.7, there had already been litigation in the UK between 
Philips and Remington concerning infringement of Philips electric shaver trademarks. Philips 
had been unsuccessful in both the First Instance Court and the Court of Appeal, and the 
trademark had been declared invalid and expunged in both decisions. The quite minor 
difference between the “208 mark” that was expunged in those decisions and the “452 mark” 
which the following judgment concerns is described below. 
 
3.24.2  The Registered Trademarks 
Philips was the proprietor of a two-dimensional trademark291 that in 1993 had been registered 
in class 8 in respect of electric shavers. The trademark was a picture of the triangular top 
portion of a triple-headed rotary shaver with three rotary cutting heads arranged within a 
raised faceplate of cloverleaf design superimposed on the triangle. In the judgment the mark is 
referred to as the “452 mark”. The only material difference between the “208 mark” that had 
been expunged292 and the 452 mark was that the raised rim on the 208 mark that had followed 
the outer edge of the triangular faceplate, was on the 452 mark instead following the shape of 
the cutting heads, enhancing the clover-leaf impression as described above (see Appendix A) 
Another slight difference was the appearance of the grids on the cutting heads. 
 
Philips also owned three other marks registered as electric shavers in class 8. The three marks 
are all illustrated in Appendix A and were subject of four registrations293 comprising one 
mark alone or a series of all three marks. Two of the marks were registered in 1977, one in 
1979 and one in 1983.  
 
                                                 
289 Case No. HC 2000 No. 00678. 
290 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. 
291 UK trademark registration 1533452, corresponding to the international registration IR 638.663. See Appendix 
A for illustrations. 
292 UK trademark “208” registration No. 1254208, identical with the still existing German trademark registration 
1034262 and similar to international trademark registration IR 430.837. See Appendix A for illustrations. 
293 UK trademark registrations 1080316; 1087357; 1124415 and 1203652. The 1080316 mark is illustrated in 
Appendix A, and corresponds to international registration IR 430.836. 
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3.24.3  The Parties’ Claims 
Philips claimed that Remington294 had infringed the 452 mark by selling triple-headed rotary 
shavers with heads identical or confusingly similar to the 452 mark and by depicting such 
heads on the packaging in which the shavers were supplied. Remington admitted the acts 
alleged, but denied that it had committed any trademark infringement. Remington 
counterclaimed that the 452 mark was invalid and that the registration should be revoked.  
 
Remington also counterclaimed that the three simpler marks were invalid and should be 
revoked, alternatively claimed their revocation for non-use. One of the marks had not been 
used since the 1970s, but the other two had been used on the packaging for Philips shavers. 
 
3.24.4  The Court’s Reasoning concerning the ‘452’ Mark  
3.24.4.1 The Legislation 
The legislation to be applied was the UK Trade Marks Act 1994 (“the Act”), which was 
enacted in order to implement the European Community legislation in relation to trademarks, 
in particular the Directive. The language used in the Act and the Directive is not identical, and 
the court295 explained that it was the Act which was the primary source of law to apply. 
Hence, the court made clear that the Act must be construed to have the same effect as the 
Directive and that regards had to be given to the Directive in interpreting the corresponding 
language of the Act.  
 
The essential provision of the Act was section 3(2)(b), corresponding to Article 3(1)(e) 
second indent of the Directive, which holds that a sign shall not be registered as a trademark if 
it consists exclusively of the shape of goods which is necessary to obtain technical result. If 
that is the case concerning an existing trademark registration, the registration is invalid and 
should be revoked. It was the application of this provision that had been the courts’ main legal 
ground for the invalidation and revocation of Philips’ trademark in the previous litigations. 
 
3.24.4.2 The Precedent of the ECJ Preliminary Ruling  
The court held that since there was only a slight difference in appearance between the 452 
mark and the previously revoked 208 mark, the findings in the previous UK judgments should 
be taken into account in the assessment. Philips had argued that the registered shape was not 
necessary to obtain the technical result since there were other shapes that could achieve the 
same result. The court rejected Philips’ argument and thus agreed with the UK first instance 
court as well as the dissenting judge in the Swedish first instance court. The court also agreed 
with the UK Court of Appeal and the ECJ ruling that the relevant provisions exclude from 
registration shape marks in which the essential features of the shape are attributable only to 
the technical result. The court also noted that there was some lack of uniformity of expression 
in the paragraphs of the ECJ ruling, an inconsistency that also I have commented in the end of 
Chapter 3.17. 
 
Philips argued that if the shape included an essential feature that was non-functional, being 
some form of embellishment, the prohibition had no application. Hence, Philips claimed that 
                                                 
294 Remington Consumer Products Limited had recently before the trial been acquired by Rayovac Corporation, 
and due to the transfer of assets and liabilities, Rayovac Europe Limited was the second defendant. 
295 (Judge) Mr Justice Rimer. 
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the shape of the mark was not exclusively designed to obtain a technical result, since the 
shape included an embellishment on the faceplate described as the ‘cloverleaf’. Philips argued 
that the cloverleaf embellishment was such a non-functional essential feature that took the 
mark out of the exclusionary provisions, with the result that the trademark registration was 
valid.  
 
The court established that the two UK judgments as well as the ECJ decision recognized that 
the shape might incorporate a non-essential and non-functional feature, which would not 
prevent the exclusionary operation of the prohibition. The court found it unfortunate that the 
ECJ had not found it necessary to offer any express guidance as to what it meant by an 
“essential” feature, or what might amount to a “non-essential” feature. The court held, 
however, that the application of the provision required an assessment of the shape in issue and 
an identification of its essential features. If those features were attributable solely to the 
technical result, the sign would be unregistrable as a trademark, and the existence of any non-
essential features would make no difference.  
 
Philips had also argued that the use by the ECJ in paragraph 80 of its decision that the features 
“were chosen to fulfill that function” justified the conclusion that the test as to whether a 
shape fell within the criteria of the prohibition could depend on the subjective intentions of 
the designer of the shape. The court rejected this argument and established that the question of 
functionality or otherwise of the essential characteristics of a shape must be assessed 
objectively.  
 
Furthermore, Philips had claimed that the use by the ECJ of the word “only” in “attributable 
only to the technical result” meant that every part of every essential feature of the shape had to 
be solely functional for the provision to apply. The court was not persuaded that the ECJ 
could have intended its “only” to bear the full weight that Philips sought to load upon it. 
Hence, the court did not accept that the ECJ could have intended that, given a shape whose 
essential features were all attributable to the technical result, the application of the prohibition 
would then depend on whether or not the particular shape also had some aesthetic appeal. The 
court argued that that would make the question of registration dependent on the outcome of an 
essentially subjective assessment and would introduce a grey area of potential uncertainty into 
an important area of commerce, which was anyway complicated enough. An ordinary 
interpretation of the ECJ’s language did not justify the conclusion that the ECJ meant that 
every single part of every single essential feature must be shown to perform a technical 
function. What the ECJ meant was simply that all the essential features of the shape must be 
attributable to the technical result for the provision to apply. The court asserted that if the ECJ 
had intended the word “only” to have a decisive importance, it would have explained it in its 
judgment. 
 
The court also mentioned the recent judgments in France, Sweden, Germany, Italy and Spain 
and concluded that Philips had lost in all of those jurisdictions. The court stated that Philips 
had attempted to establish a monopoly in respect of triple-headed shavers in its seemingly 
endless international litigation with Remington. The above-stated judgments were cited since 
they reflected how those jurisdictions had approached the guidance given by the ECJ.  
 
3.24.4.3 The Function of the ‘Clover-Leaf’ 
The court noted that the previous UK decisions had held that all the essential features of the 
208 mark were attributable to achieving the technical result. That might, according to the 
 110
court, be regarded as an unpromising position from which Philips had to wage the current 
battle, since the only difference between the 208 and the 452 marks was that the latter 
incorporated a faceplate with a clover-leaf design rather than a plain faceplate. In the case of 
the 208 mark, it was the plain faceplate that made contact between the shaver and the skin and 
performed the technical function of stretching the skin and making the hair stand up before 
the cut. In the case of the 452 mark, that function was performed by the cloverleaf faceplate. 
 
Philips claimed that the cloverleaf design was not added for any technical reasons, that it did 
not give any additional functionality as compared with the plain faceplate, and that there was 
no difference in the relative efficiency of the two faceplates. Philips had called a total of 
seventeen witnesses to support its evidence; some of Philips’ top management, a former 
industrial designer of Philips, two witnesses engaged in the sale of shavers as “evidence from 
the trade” and eleven male witnesses using Philips’ shavers presented as “evidence from the 
public”. Remington had called five witnesses, Izumi’s sales director, Izumi’s Vice President 
of engineering, Rayovac Corporation’s Industrial Design Corporate Manager and two expert 
witnesses.  
 
The court established that there was no evidence from those who originally designed the 
cloverleaf feature for Philips shavers as to what motivated the design. Remington’s evidence 
had sought to attribute a more significant role to the cloverleaf by asserting that it was 
developed by Izumi/Remington to promote a smoother shave and thus served an important 
functional feature. The court first considered whether the cloverleaf was an essential feature 
of the 452 mark, and found that it was not. The court even held that the cloverleaf became an 
essential feature of the heads of Philips’ triple-headed shavers for the purposes of the 
litigation. From the evidence presented before it, the court concluded that the cloverleaf 
feature had no particular eye impact on potential buyers or users, and that the purpose of it 
was not to draw attention to the cloverleaf itself, but to the cutting heads and the cutting area. 
Hence, the cloverleaf was not included as a feature for its own sake but as a means of drawing 
attention to the key functional area of Philips’ triple-headed shavers. After deciding that the 
cloverleaf was not an essential feature, the court held that since the cloverleaf was part of the 
overall triangular faceplate, which as a whole obviously formed an essential feature, an 
assessment had to be done whether the faceplate was attributable only to the technical result. 
 
Philips had argued that the material part of the overall triangular faceplate was functionally 
unnecessary and served only an aesthetical purpose of pure decoration. The court held that the 
Philips shavers may well be viewed as so-called lifestyle products, but it was important to 
keep in mind that the litigation was about the business end of a piece of electrical equipment 
whose sole purpose was functional. The court further held that the average consumer probably 
did not buy the shaver as an item with which to “impress others in the gym or to adorn his 
mantelpiece”(sic!). He buys it solely because it will enable him to execute his daily shave in a 
speedy, convenient, comfortable and effective way, and he so regards it because Philips had 
marketed its shavers as pieces of functional equipment that will achieve those objectives for 
him. The court found that evidence had shown that the total surface area of the faceplate, all 
of which came into contact with the skin, contributed to the overall technical objective of 
giving the user a smooth, effective and comfortable shave and that the whole of it therefore 
was attributable solely to obtaining the technical result.   
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3.24.5  Final Conclusion regarding the ‘452’ Mark 
The court concluded its findings that Philips was absolutely precluded by section 3(2)(b) of 
the Act, corresponding to Article 3(1)(e) second indent of the Directive, from registering the 
452 mark as a trademark and hence declared the registration invalid and revoked. The court 
further held that that was the end of Philips’ case on the 452 mark, since even if Philips was 
able to prove that the mark had become distinctive of Philips, acquired distinctiveness could 
not overcome the exclusionary provisions of section 3(2)(b). 
 
3.24.5.1 Infringement 
If the 452 mark was assumed to be distinctive of Philips as a badge of origin and so validly 
registered, infringement was also in issue. Regarding the use of the sign, Remington had 
argued that the use complained of by Philips might well have been a use by it of a “sign” but 
not of “trademark use” as required for infringement. Remington held that it had simply used 
the shaver heads to convey the message that it was part of a rotary shaver, as distinguished 
from a foil shaver, and was not used to denote origin. The court found that the heads of the 
Remington shavers were not used in the trademark sense of an indication of origin of the 
shavers, as they only promote themselves as the working heads of triple-headed rotary 
shavers. The court also found that neither the advertisements of the heads on Remington’s 
packaging had any purpose of denoting origin. Finally, the court stated that Remington had 
made no attempt to emphasize the cloverleaf on its shaver heads.  
 
Even if the question did not arise, the court chose to make findings of fact concerning whether 
the allegedly infringing sign was identical to the 452 mark. The court concluded that there 
was no exact identity between Remington’s signs and the 452 mark, even though the 
differences were minor. The court then assessed whether the allegedly infringing sign was 
confusingly similar to the 452 mark. Remington had argued that even though Philips might 
have shown that the public associated three-headed shavers with Philips, it had not shown that 
the public attached any significance to the cloverleaf when making the association. The court 
held that if it assumed that the 452 mark had become distinctive in the eyes of the public as a 
trademark denoting the Philips’ origin, the heads of Remington’s offending shavers were 
confusingly similar to the 452 mark.296
 
3.24.6  The Court’s Reasoning and Decision regarding the Other Marks 
Remington had counterclaimed asking for the revocation of three other Philips trademark 
registrations as being invalid, alternatively for non-use. The marks are described above under 
“the registered trademarks”, and all consisted of simple, schematic representations of the head 
of a triple-headed rotary shaver. The court agreed with the decisions of the French, Spanish 
and Italian courts, and concluded that the three marks in question were minimalist 
representations of shapes whose essential features were attributable to obtaining the technical 
result. The court found the marks to show three cutting heads and a faceplate in the shape of 
the 208 mark, which had been excluded from registration and revoked. Consequently, all 
three registrations were found invalid by the court, which ordered for their revocation.297  
                                                 
296 Finally, the court also concluded that Remington’s use of its triple-headed shaver heads was not or had not 
been other than in accordance with honest practices.  
297 The court also assessed some other findings of facts, and held that the three marks were not inherently 
distinctive nor had acquired distinctiveness by use. The court further asserted that, had not the marks been 
invalid on other grounds, two of them would have been revoked for non-use.     
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3.25 PORTUGAL: Commercial Court of Vila Nova da Gaia, 
2nd Division 
Date of judgment298: June 23, 2004  
3.25.1  Dispute Background and Claims 
Imporaudio, Lda., a Portuguese importer and wholesaler of electric appliances, had imported,  
marketed and sold Remington’s Izumi-made triple-headed shavers in Portugal since June 
2002.299 Imporaudio was Remington’s exclusive distributor in Portugal of triple-headed 
shavers of the REMINGTON brand.  
 
Philips300 requested an injunction to be issued ordering the cessation and prohibition of the 
importation, distribution, marketing and promotion in Portugal of electric shavers with three 
rotating heads arranged in the form of a triangle by Imporaudio, Lda.. Philips also requested 
that Imporaudio should be ordered to withdraw from the market all electric triple-headed 
shavers, their respective packaging, labels, advertising materials and other documents 
containing the image of the said brands or reference to their importation, distribution and 
marketing in Portugal. In addition, Philips requested a pecuniary penalty of €500,00 for each 
day Imporaudio continued its import or marketing of the shavers or failed to withdraw the 
promotion materials. Imporaudio responded and requested the injunctions not to be granted.  
 
3.25.2  The Court’s Findings of Fact  
Regarding the legal preconditions for an unspecified injunction301, it followed from the 
relevant provisions that there must be a well-grounded fear that the other party may cause 
serious harm, difficult to repair, to the claimant’s right, and that the injunction requests shall 
be appropriate for enforcing the threatened right. 
3.25.2.1  Trademark Law 
The court established that Philips was the owner302 of international trademark registrations IR 
587.254, IR 638.663 and IR 430.837, all three comprising a device representing the head of 
an electric shaver (see Appendix A for illustrations). As grounds for Philips’ request for 
injunction, it held that those trademark rights had been infringed by Imporaudio. The court 
established that Article 231 of the Portuguese Industrial Property Code prohibits the 
registration as a trademark of devices consisting of the form of products which are necessary 
in order to obtain a technical result, and of forms which give a substantial value to products. 
Furthermore, the court held that the it was in order to avoid the perpetuation of private rights 
over designs necessary for obtaining a given technical result and, at the same time, to protect 
and guarantee the return on investment in the development of new technical methods and 
                                                 
298 Injunction proceedings no. 594/03.9TVNG. 
299 According to the German decision from Cologne District Court on November 5, 2002. 
300 Koninklijke Philips Electronics, N.V. and Philips Portuguesa, S.A.. 
301 According to Articles 381, paras. 1 and 2, and 387, para. 1 of the Portuguese Code of Civil Procedure. 
302 Koninklijke Philips Electronics, N.V. was the owner of the trademarks, and Philips Portuguesa, S.A. had been 
granted a non-exclusive license to use and exploit the trademarks. 
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inventions, that the law established other instruments such as patent or the registration of 
designs and utility models. 
 
The court established that registration of trademarks was intended to protect the products or 
services of an undertaking by distinguishing them from others, but that devices comprising 
“the form of the product necessary to obtain a technical result” were excluded from such 
protection.303 Thus, the appropriate process for protecting the “form of the product necessary 
for obtaining a technical result” was not by means of a trademark, but through patenting or 
registration of drawings or utility models, which were the appropriate instruments designed to 
protect new inventions with the potential for industrial application. The court continued and 
clarified that by their nature, patents and the registration of drawings or models only provided 
protection during a limited period of time, in order to assure free competition, the 
development of markets and technological progress, guaranteeing, during such period, a 
return on the investment made in development. The court found that in the present case, by 
registering the trademarks at issue, Philips sought to perpetuate the protection of something 
that, due to its nature, may only benefit from the temporary protection of patents or the 
registration of models or drawings. Moreover, the court clarified that trademark law could not 
be used to prolong other rights artificially, namely rights deriving from patents or the right to 
drawings and models. Instead, it served merely to protect the products or services of an 
undertaking, by ensuring that they can be distinguished from other products or services. 
Consequently, the court held that the exclusive right invoked by Philips was, at the very least, 
disputed. 
 
The court further established that the drawing of the head of Philips’ shavers with three 
rotating heads had been patented because it was considered functional and to possess potential 
for industrial use. Therefore, it could not be subsequently registered as a trademark, as that 
would amount to perpetuation of a private right, to which the law assigned a temporary 
character. 
 
3.25.2.2  Unfair Competition Law 
Philips argued that even if the trademarks were not deemed to having been infringed, the 
activity of importation and marketing of Remington shavers by Imporaudio constituted an act 
of unfair competition. The court disagreed and concluded that Imporaudio had not committed 
any act constituting unfair competition, insofar as it had not infringed any private right of 
Philips, either with regard to trademark law, or with regard to the rules on non-typified 
industrial property rights, for which there was no legal protection304.  
 
The court established that it was common knowledge that the specific purpose of an 
injunction was to avoid serious injury, difficulty to repair, deriving from a delay in the issuing 
of protection for a legal situation. The Portuguese Supreme Court of Justice had stated that 
injunctions were designed to remove the danger of imminent legal damage resulting from the 
delay to which the main proceedings are subject.305 The court found that in the present case, 
in view of the length of time for which the situation had subsisted, none of the conditions for 
an injunction were fulfilled, as there was neither any reason for urgency nor any fear for a 
                                                 
303 According to Article 223 of the Portuguese Industrial Property Code, corresponding to Article 3(1)(e) second 
indent of the Directive. 
304 Unfortunately, the court did not further explain what was meant with “non-typified IPRs”. 
305 Decision of the Portuguese Supreme Court of Justice on May 28, 1986. 
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serious injury difficult to remedy. Philips had invoked an alleged injury, but the court found 
that Philips was incapable of determining the gravity of that injury. 
 
Philips had also invoked damage to image and damage related to return on investments made. 
The damage to image would derive from the shavers distributed by Imperaudio being of 
inferior quality. The court found, however, that Imperaudio’s shavers possessed the same 
quality certificates as Philips’ shavers. Also the damages relating to a drop in sales and 
consequent alteration to projected returns on investment failed to convince the court to issue 
an injunction. The court finally concluded that: 
 
…even if this injunction were to be issued, the alleged rights which the claimants are seeking to 
safeguard would lack adequate protection. In effect, it would only be enforceable against the 
respondent. Now, the respondent is merely a distributor. If the respondent is prevented from selling 
the articles in question in the proceedings, there will be nothing to prevent another distributor from 
taking its place, and distributing the same products. In reality, nothing will stop Remington Products, 
the next day, from entering into new distribution contracts with one or more Portuguese distributors 
who would import and market the products which the respondent had been prohibited from 
distributing, meaning that the proposed injunction would be of little or no use on the terms on which it 
was proposed, and against the respondent against which it is sought. In other words, the result of the 
injunction would not be appropriate to protect any rights which the claimants may have to be 
protected.306
 
 
Accordingly, in view of what it had stated and without the need for any further considerations, 
the court rejected the application for an unspecified injunction brought by Philips against 
Imporaudio. The costs were to be borne by Philips.  
 
3.25.3  Comments 
It find it interesting that the court emphasized the fact that that the drawing of the head of 
Philips’ shavers with three rotating heads had been patented and registered, and obviously had 
been considered functional. The court found that as a consequence of that, it could not be 
subsequently registered as a trademark, since that would amount to perpetuation of a private 
right, to which the law assigned a temporary character. The court thus found Philips’ conduct 
blameworthy and held that trademark law could not be used to prolong other rights 
artificially, such as rights deriving from patents or the right to drawings and models. The court 
therefore meant that Philips could not claim any exclusive rights to its functionally 
determined trademarks. 
 
 
 
3.26 Other Countries 
In all the countries where Philips is no longer the only supplier of triple-headed shavers and 
the Izumi-made shavers have entered the market307, the change on the market has been the 
result of court proceedings, as described in the previous chapters. The companies selling 
Izumi-made shavers, such as British Rayovac, Remington and Swedish Rotary Shaver have 
                                                 
306 Page 6 of the decision. 
307 Izumi-made shavers are currently sold in the U.S.A., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the UK, Ireland, 
Sweden, France, Italy, Spain and Portugal. Hence, the only country where there have been court proceedings but 
yet no sale of Izumi-made shavers is Germany, where Remington is still restrained by an interlocutory 
injunction. 
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obviously not been willing to take the risk of starting to sell Izumi-made triple-headed shavers 
in countries where Philips still has valid trademarks protecting the shaver’s shape. The 
evident risk of trademark infringement claims from Philips has thus affected the competitors’ 
business considerations as to which countries or markets they choose to expand their sales of 
triple-headed shavers to. As a result, Rayovac has filed nullity actions against Philips’ 
trademarks in several countries, requesting the cancellation of trademark registrations 
identical to those that have been invalidated by courts of other countries. So far, Rayovac has 
filed cancellation requests against Philips’ trademarks in Norway, Switzerland, Holland, 
Denmark and Austria. The only two countries I have access to the summons filings from are 
Norway and Switzerland. 
  
In Norway, Rayovac filed a nullity action against Philips on December 23, 2004. Oslo District 
Court was requested to declare the invalidity and deletion of four Norwegian trademark 
registrations, all corresponding to international IR trademark registrations308 (see notes below 
and Appendix A). The grounds for the request for invalidation was that the shape of the marks 
were determined by functional features and could not constitute trademarks as they lacked 
capability of distinguishing the goods of Philips from those of others. Rayovac argued that the 
trademarks never would be perceived as anything else than pictorial representations of a 
shaver, not as a sign denoting commercial origin. For the same reasons, Rayovac submitted 
that the trademarks failed to meet the requirement for distinctiveness as the trademarks were 
descriptive of the registered goods and exclusively indicated the kind and use of the goods. 
Further grounds for invalidation were that the shape of the trademarks resulted from the 
nature of the goods themselves, were necessary to obtain a technical result and that they gave 
substantial value to the goods.309 Rayovac clarified that case law from the ECJ and from other 
EEA310 member states was of significance when interpreting the relevant provisions of the 
Norwegian trademark legislation. The outcome of the Swedish, English, French, Italian, 
Spanish and German litigations were brought up to show that except for the two rulings in 
Germany, the Philips trademarks have been held invalid in all the European cases. 
Furthermore, Rayovac observed that the trademark shapes had been the subject of four 
patents; two in the UK, one in the USA and one European patent311, which proved their 
technical function.   
 
In Switzerland, Rayovac filed a nullity action against Philips to Bern Commercial Court on 
December 21, 2004. Rayovac requested the cancellation of the Swiss portions of five 
international trademark registrations312. The referred grounds for exclusion of the registered 
trademarks from protection were because they were not perceived as trademarks (indication 
of origin), because they were mere representations of the technically necessary product shape 
and because they were not used as trademarks. Rayovac further requested that if necessary, a 
declaratory judgment should be made that Rayovac neither infringes the Swiss portions of the 
international registered trademarks nor commits any other infringement of the law by having 
triple-headed shavers manufactured or by importing such shavers to Switzerland and offering, 
                                                 
308 Norwegian Trademarks Nos. 100 221 corresponding to IR 430.836; 103 733 corresponding to IR 430.837; 
179 254 corresponding to IR 587.254 and 198 607 corresponding to IR 638.663. See Appendix A for 
illustrations. 
309 According to Section 13 of the Norwegian Trademarks Act, mainly corresponding to Article 3 of the 
Directive. Even though Norway is not a member of the EC, the Directive was implemented into Norwegian law 
by the Act of 27 November 1992 No. 113. 
310 The European Economic Area. 
311 UK Patent 836 346; UK Patent 1 348 023; US Patent 4 250 617 (UK 2 011 819B) and EP Patent 0719 203. 
312 Picture marks IR 430.836; IR 430.837; IR 436.097 and IR 638.663, and shape mark IR 587.254. See 
Appendix A for illustrations of all marks except IR 436.097. 
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distributing, or selling them. Another interesting matter brought up in Rayovac’s quite 
extensive nullity filing was the recent decision from July 30, 2004 by the OHIM to refuse the 
well-known LEGO building brick shape mark protection. The Revocation Division of OHIM 
had explicitly referred to the ECJ decision as a “leading case”, and the OHIM’s reasoning 
corresponded largely to that of the ECJ decision and was based mainly on the technical or 
functional necessity of the product shape. Rayovac deduced from the decision that, in 
practical terms, it meant that the registration of technically necessary product shapes applying 
for protection in the entire EU area as shape marks will be refused by the OHIM in the future 
and can thus no longer be protected.  
 
In Ireland Philips quite recently tried to get a three-dimensional trademark depicting the head 
of the shaver registered. The application was opposed by Rayovac, and the case is still 
pending at the time of writing this.   
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4 Legal Analysis: Trademark Law Matters 
This chapter is intended to give an overview of the trademark law issues from the starting-
point of each particular matter of law. I will present all the different trademark matters that 
was brought up in the various proceedings and discuss how the parties and the courts chose to 
deal with them by means of claims, argumentation, findings of facts and final judgments. In 
order to make it easier to follow the development of the parties’ argumentation and the courts’ 
findings, the judgments or court decisions of each sub-chapter are presented in chronological 
order. I have described the common trends as well as the deviations where a parties’ 
argumentation was unusual or where the court’s findings differed substantially from other 
courts’. In some of the chapters I give my own comments to the development of the parties’ 
argumentation and courts’ findings and decisions.313 For reasons of clarity, the country314 
from where the described judgment derives is marked with extra bold type. 
 
4.1 Capability of Trademark Protection 
In almost all of the court proceedings, the registrability of the contested trademarks was 
discussed, and if any obstacles for protection were found, there was reason for invalidating 
the registered trademarks. There are several criteria a trademark has to fulfill in order to 
obtain protection; in most jurisdictions there are requirements of capability of distinguishing 
the product and proof of sufficient distinctiveness. A trademark can have an inherent 
distinctiveness, but distinctiveness can also be acquired through extensive use of the 
trademark (obtain secondary meaning). However, regardless of any inherent or acquired 
distinctiveness, a shape trademark that is subject to one or more absolute grounds for refusal 
can never obtain trademark protection. In the following chapters I will go through the criteria 
for trademark protection one by one, observing the parties’ main claims and arguments as 
well as the courts’ reasoning and assessments of the legal matters. I have also tried to notice if 
the parties’ arguments or the courts’ adjudication has changed over time during the ten years 
of dispute I have analyzed.  
 
4.2 Capability of Distinguishing 
As described in Chapter 2.2.6, Canadian law offers protection of a product’s shape or 
packaging as a distinguishing guise, and as the name reveals, the decisive requirement for 
registration is that the purpose of the shaping or packaging is to distinguish the goods or 
services from those of other manufacturers. The requirement is central in trademark law315, as 
it represents the whole purpose with trademark protection: to distinguish products by 
indicating and guaranteeing the corporate origin. In its preliminary ruling, the ECJ 
established that: 
 
[…] according to the case-law of the Court, the essential function of a trade mark is to guarantee the 
identity of the origin of the marked product to the consumer or end-user by enabling him, without any 
possibility of confusion, to distinguish [my italics] the product or service from others which have 
another origin, and for the trade mark to fulfill its essential role in the system of undistorted 
competition which the Treaty seeks to establish, it must offer a guarantee that all the goods or services 
                                                 
313 More of my own comments are found in relation to the judgments described in Chapter 2. 
314 With the exception of the ECJ judgment and the Opinion of the General-Advocate, which naturally represent 
the whole European Union and no particular countries. 
315 In the Directive, the requirement is found in Article 2. The other fundamental requirement found in the same 
Article is that the sign is capable of being represented graphically. 
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bearing it have originated under the control of a single undertaking which is responsible for their 
quality [ … ].316
 
Philips has consistently argued that its trademarks are capable of distinguishing the shaver, 
while its counterparties317 have contested that the Philips trademarks are not capable of 
distinguishing. In the appeal judgment from Sweden, Philips held that except two of the shape 
elements (the cutting head grids and the linear reference surface surrounding those), all the 
shape elements were arbitrarily chosen and reflected an aesthetic thinking intended to 
distinguish the Philips shavers. In the Australian proceedings, Philips submitted that even 
though the shape of electric shavers of all brands had changed significantly over time, the 
configuration of the head of the Philips rotary shaver had been constant and therefore 
emphasized in the marketing as distinguishing Philips’ shavers from those of others. The 
arguments of Philips’ different counterparties have usually corresponded with the court’s 
opinion of the trademarks’ capability of distinguishing. In the first of the three UK decisions, 
the court concluded that since the capability to distinguish was a fundamental requirement for 
protection, a sign like Philips’ trademark that did not denote trade origin but instead primarily 
denoted function could not be regarded as capable of distinguishing. The UK court 
accordingly established that the Philips sign could never denote only shavers made by Philips 
and no one else, because the sign primarily showed a triple-headed shaver and was thus not 
capable of denoting only Philips goods.  
 
The UK appeal court agreed, and concluded that the capability of distinguishing depended 
upon the features of the trademark itself, not on the result of its use. It was therefore irrelevant 
if the trademark of a monopoly holder denoted his goods exclusively, since that did not mean 
that its features could distinguish the goods from those of a competitor who came into the 
market. The UK appeal court further established that the more a trademark described the 
goods, whether the mark consisted of a word or a shape, the less likely it would be capable of 
distinguishing those goods from similar goods of another trader. The shape shown in the 
Philips trademark was a pictorial description of a product which other traders were entitled to 
make. The court thus concluded that the trademark was not capable of distinguishing Philips’ 
shavers from those of other traders who produce shavers with a similar shaped head. These 
findings of the UK courts are very much similar to what other courts concluded regarding the 
trademarks’ capability of distinguishing.  
 
Also the ECJ discussed the matter in its preliminary ruling, and as an answer to the second of 
the referred questions, the ECJ clarified that in order to be capable of distinguishing a product 
for the purposes of Article 2 of the Directive, the shape of the product in respect of which the 
sign was registered did not require any capricious addition, such as an embellishment with no 
functional purpose. Hence, for a shape to be capable of distinguishing the product from those 
of others and thus guarantee the product’s origin, there was no need for the shape to contain 
any arbitrary elements. 
 
4.3   Distinctiveness  
Whether Philips’ trademarks had distinctiveness or not was discussed in many of the 
judgments. As mentioned above: for a sign that does not have any inherent distinctiveness it 
                                                 
316 Paragraph 30 of the ECJ preliminary ruling (C-299/99). 
317 Philips has had several counterparties which all have in common that they have been selling triple-headed 
rotary shavers manufactured by Izumi: Remington, Windmere, Sears, Ide Line and later Rotary Shaver, River 
International, Rayovac and Imporaudio.  
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needs to be proved that the sign through the use made of it has acquired the distinctiveness it 
initially lacked, in order to be granted trademark protection318. In most countries where 
Philips had registered trademarks depicting the head of a triple-headed shaver, the marks had 
been registered first after Philips had provided sufficient evidence that the mark had acquired 
distinctiveness by use, i.e. obtained secondary meaning. As described in the judgments in 
Chapter 2, almost all jurisdictions found the Philips trademarks that once had been accepted 
for registration to be invalid when the registrability was considered for the second time. In 
most jurisdictions a trademark’s distinctiveness is irrelevant if the trademark is subject of any 
absolute ground for refusal, such as if the shape is necessary for obtaining a technical result 
(see the following chapter). In his opinion, the Advocate-General of the ECJ held that 
natural, functional or ornamental shapes319 are incapable, by express intention of the 
legislature, of acquiring a distinctive character, and that it is unnecessary as well as contrary 
to the scheme of the Directive to consider whether or not such shapes had acquired 
distinctiveness.  
 
In the first instance decision in Sweden, Philips held that the registered trademark consisted 
of non-functional, arbitrarily chosen features giving it an inherent distinctiveness. Philips’ 
counterparty Ide Line AB held that the shape of the shaver was to such extent decided by 
technical demands that the mark lacked distinctiveness. The court found that a market survey 
presented by Philips showed that the electric shaver unit had been extensively used as a 
trademark by Philips and therefore had acquired distinctiveness. The judgment was appealed 
by Ide Line (later Rotary Shaver Sweden AB), but the case was kept pending before the Court 
of Appeal in order to await the ECJ preliminary ruling, which had the consequence that the 
appeal judgment came first seven years after the first instance judgment. In the appeal, Philips 
continued to claim that the mark had an inherent distinctiveness, or that it in any case had 
acquired distinctiveness as a result of the long-time and extensive exposure of it in marketing 
and sales. The appeal court came to a different conclusion than the first instance court, and 
did not even find reason to consider the possible inherent or acquired distinctiveness, since the 
trademark was found to be subject of an absolute ground for refusal of protection. 
 
In the first UK decision, Philips claimed that the trademark had acquired distinctiveness 
through extensive advertising and argued that the top part of the shaver was distinctive of 
Philips as the “face of Philips”. Regarding this, the court established that the presented 
evidence had not shown that Philips’ advertising had been concentrated on promoting the 
trademark as such, but rather the shaver itself. Philips had called thirteen public witnesses to 
establish the trademark’s acquired distinctiveness, and the witnesses’ general reaction when 
being shown a Remington shaver was that they thought of Philips or would have thought it 
was a Philips shaver had it not been marked REMINGTON. The court concluded, however, 
that the sign was devoid of any distinctive character since it primarily showed a triple-headed 
shaver and was thus not capable of denoting only Philips’ triple-headed shavers.  
 
In the UK appeal court Remington argued that the trademark denoted the origin of the goods 
only because Philips had been the sole trader of rotary shavers, and since the mark was purely 
descriptive of the goods it represented, it could not acquire and it had not acquired a 
distinctive character by use. The appeal court found that the evidence clearly showed that the 
                                                 
318 Article 3(1)(b) of the Directive provides that trademarks which are devoid of any distinctive character should 
not be registered or if registered should be declared invalid. According to Article 3(3), the requirement in Article 
3(1)(b) can be overcome if the sign has acquired a distinctive character following the use which has been made 
of it.  
319 As set out in Article 3(1)(e) of the Directive. 
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shape of the mark was exclusively associated with Philips. However, the court further 
concluded that such a purely descriptive mark could not in any way acquire a secondary 
meaning, and in circumstances where Philips had been the sole supplier of rotary shavers in 
the UK, Philips’ evidence on acquired distinctiveness fell short.  
 
The Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand (the “IPONZ”) held in its decision to refuse 
registration of Philips’ trademark that in cases where the trademark applied for is a 
representation of the shape, or part of the shape, of goods, the shape is almost inevitably 
descriptive of the goods. Such a pictorial description of a character or quality of the goods 
usually means that there is no, or very little, inherent distinctiveness in the mark. The IPONZ 
found Philips’ sign to be purely descriptive of the goods, and the possibility of different 
shapes for electric shavers did not mean that the mark had inherent capacity to distinguish. In 
this context, the court further added that Philips was seeking to prevent other manufacturers 
from making three-headed shavers, which was not the ambit of trademark law but of other 
intellectual property rights. In order to show evidence of use and acquired distinctiveness of 
the sign, Philips had submitted to the IPONZ advertising material such as a brochure and a 
catalogue. The IPONZ concluded that nowhere in the advertising material did the sign appear 
exactly as applied for; there were many pictures of the triple-headed shaver in total, but no 
representations of the top part other than as part of the goods. Philips had also submitted 
evidence of substantial sales and details of Philips having a significant portion of the market 
share of the shaver market. The IPONZ established that use is a factor in registrability, but 
that use does not equal registrability and cannot always create a secondary meaning. The 
IPONZ found that there had been a lot of use, but that “use” had been 100% descriptive of the 
goods. Consequently, the IPONZ concluded that the use in New Zealand did not give the 
mark any acquired distinctiveness, and did not convert the mark into something registrable.   
 
In Italy, Milan District Court found that Philips had not in fact proved the existence of any 
intensive advertising focused on the shape trademarks –advertising of the overall image of the 
product was not sufficient. Furthermore, the evidence established that Philips had always and 
by preference used its own name as a trademark to such an extent that it seemed difficult to 
maintain that the shape had acquired a distinct capacity by itself.320 The Milan court also 
discussed the institution of secondary meaning and held that the acquired distinctiveness of a 
name or descriptive indicator had a different character than the secondary meaning that a 
functional shape could acquire. The court established that those two cases were not 
equivalent, as the restatement of generic and descriptive names simply leads to a 
monopolization of language, while the restatement of functional shapes may lead to a 
monopolization of the product. In the first case, the original meaning of the generic name is 
lost and a secondary meaning, that of the trademark, is acquired. In the second case, 
secondary meaning would come to be acquired simply by preserving the original functional 
value. The court thus concluded that in the case of a functional shape mark acquiring 
distinctiveness by use, the sign can not be seen as having obtained any real secondary 
meaning, as the “meaning”, or functional value of it, is the same as before.321
 
                                                 
320 To me, this discussion seem unnecessary, as the court had already established that the shapes were necessary 
for the technical result, and being an absolute ground for refusal, the exclusion could not be overcome by proof 
of an acquired distinctiveness. 
321 I find this discussion quite interesting and it is undoubtedly so that, even if shape trademarks are to be treated 
in the same way as other trademarks, some difficulties arise due to the different character of various types of 
trademarks. 
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4.4  Refusal of Trademark Protection of certain Three-
Dimensional Signs  
4.4.1 Overview 
All the jurisdictions I have read judgments from have one or more absolute grounds for 
refusal from registration, which cannot be overcome by proof of any acquired distinctiveness. 
In the USA, there is an extensive functionality doctrine that prohibits trademark registration 
of functional product features, which evidence of acquired distinctiveness cannot alter. In the 
USA, a feature is considered functional as a matter of law if it is essential to the use or 
purpose of the product or if it affects the cost or quality of the product. In Canada, a 
trademark or distinguishing guise, which is primarily functional from either an ornamental or 
utilitarian point of view, is excluded from registration if the functionality primarily or 
essentially relates to the goods or services covered by the application. This exclusion of 
aesthetically functional shapes corresponds to the EC legislation expressed in the third indent 
of Article 3(1)(e) of the Directive, which excludes from protection shapes that give the 
product “substantial value”, a provision intended to exclude exclusively ornamental shapes322. 
The “utilitarian functionality” discussed in Canadian law can be seen as corresponding to the 
second indent of Article 3(1)(e), which excludes technically determined shapes from 
registration. Hence, in EC law, Article 3(1)(e) of the Directive provides three exclusions from 
registration of signs which are not such as to constitute trademarks and is a preliminary 
obstacle liable to prevent a certain sign consisting exclusively of the shape of the product to 
be registered. The provision excludes from registration signs consisting exclusively of the 
shape which results from the nature of the goods themselves (natural shapes), the shape of 
goods which is necessary to obtain a technical result (functional shapes) and the shape which 
gives substantial value to the goods (ornamental shapes). These grounds for refusal must be 
interpreted in the light of the public interest underlying them; to prevent that trademark 
protection grants its proprietor an unfair monopoly on a certain shape, which would deprive 
competitors of the possibility to use that shape freely. In this thesis, I have focused mostly on 
shapes with technical features, since that has been the most common reason for invalidation of 
Philips’ trademarks. I will start with the parties’ and courts’ holdings regarding natural 
shapes; I will then discuss functional shapes and finally the ornamental shapes.  
 
4.4.2 Shapes Resulting from the Nature of the Goods Themselves323 
The Advocate-General established in his opinion that natural shapes were incapable, by 
express intention of the legislature, of acquiring a distinctive character. The exclusion 
reflected the legitimate concern to prevent that natural shapes would not be free for all to use. 
 
In the first UK judgment, the court found that in order to apply the provision, the “goods 
themselves” needed to be defined, preferably by assessing how the goods are viewed in 
practice as articles of commerce. The court came to the conclusion that the right definition 
when applying the provision on Philips’ trademark must be “electric shavers”, since such 
shavers generally are seen as one type of commercial article, even though there are different 
kinds. The first instance court therefore concluded that the Philips trademark did not result 
from the nature of the goods themselves, since the “goods themselves” referred to electric 
                                                 
322 It is unfortunate that the wording of the Directive does not expressly explain that the intended “substantial 
value” is supposed to be interpreted as the substantial aesthetical value; the word ‘value’ has many other 
meanings.  
323 First indent of Article 3(1)(e) of the Directive.  
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shavers in general, of any kind, i.e. both rotary shavers and vibrating shavers. Thus, the court 
found no reason to invalidate the existing registration on this ground, and a few years later the 
UK Court of Appeal came to the same conclusion. 
 
4.4.3 Shapes Necessary to Obtain a Technical Result324 
As I concluded above, this ground for invalidation of Philips’ trademarks was the most 
common in all the jurisdictions, and also what came to be the main question of the whole 
dispute; the registrability of shapes with features necessary for achieving a technical result. 
The purpose of the exclusion from protection of merely functional shapes is obviously to 
prevent the exclusive and permanent right which a trade mark confers from serving to extend 
the life of other rights which the legislature has sought to make subject to limited periods, 
such as patent or utility model protection. The exclusion of technically necessary shapes is 
thus clearly motivated by the public interest to balance the reward of innovation by granting 
exclusive but time-limited protection and thereby encouraging industrial development, with 
the purpose of making the goods or the design freely available once that time-limit expires.  
 
Regarding the courts’ assessments of the trademarks’ technical features, it was undoubtedly 
the ECJ preliminary ruling that came to affect the dispute the most, as it provided guidance 
for the EU member states on the interpretation of Article 3(1)(e) of the Directive. Before the 
ECJ ruling the EU national courts interpreted the relevant provisions of the Directive in their 
own particular way, which is clearly illustrated by the judgment of the Swedish first instance 
court in comparison to the completely different judgments by the UK first instance and appeal 
courts. However, after the guidance provided by the ECJ decision most of the European 
courts showed conformity in their legal assessments of the interpretation and application of 
the Directive. Because of the strong effects of the ECJ preliminary ruling, it is a natural 
division to separate the judgments into two groups: the judgments pronounced before the ECJ 
ruling and the judgments pronounced after it.  
 
4.4.3.1 Judgments and Decisions before the ECJ Preliminary Ruling 
In Canada, two kinds of trademarks were contested: a design trademark and a distinguishing 
guise. Regarding the design mark, the Federal Court of Appeal referred to what had been 
established by case law and held that if a mark is primarily functional by being a part of the 
goods, registering such trademark would give the applicant a monopoly on functional 
elements or characteristics of their goods. That would mean that the applicant would actually 
get a kind of patent granted, under the guise of a trademark. The court found that to be the 
case if Philips were to keep the registration of the electric rotary head assembly, as the 
contested design mark was primarily functional by clearly depicting the functional elements 
consisting of the triple-headed equilateral triangular configuration and the actual shaver 
heads. The court further established that whatever the portion of the sales market in question, 
registration of a primarily functional mark is a restraint on manufacturing and trade, since it 
effectively amounts to a patent or industrial design in the guise of a trademark. Accordingly, 
the registration of the design mark was declared invalid and expunged. Regarding the 
distinguishing guise, the court established that the public policy basis is the same as for every 
form of trademark, i.e. to distinguish goods from those of competitors by monopolizing not 
the goods but the mark used in relation to them. If the functionality of a distinguishing guise 
relates primarily or essentially to the goods themselves, it will invalidate the trademark. That 
                                                 
324 Second indent of Article 3(1)(e) of the Directive. 
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was the case with Philips’ registered distinguishing guise, which was expunged since the 
court found it to be invalid as extending to the functional aspects of the Philips shaver. 
 
The first European country where the dispute was brought to court was Sweden, where the 
company Ide Line AB wanted to start importing Izumi-made triple-headed shavers. Before 
starting to import, Ide Line sought to expunge Philips’ trademark or otherwise to get a 
declaratory judgment stating that the import and sale of triple-headed shavers would not 
infringe Philips’ trademark rights. The ground Ide Line referred for the revocation claim was 
that the electric shaver unit according to the registration consisted exclusively of a shape that 
was necessary to obtain a technical result. Philips argued that its trademark consisted of a 
non-functional, arbitrarily chosen shape, which did not exclusively consist of a shape which 
was necessary to obtain a technical result: the only features of the trademark that were 
functional elements were the three rotary heads as such. The other elements of the mark were 
arbitrarily chosen, and Philips meant that the chosen design did not give the shaver any actual 
technical advantages. Philips also argued that since the shape of the registered trademark was 
not technically optimal, others could not freely use exactly that shape. Stockholm District 
Court held that when applying the provision, it was not enough that the shape serves a 
functional purpose; it also needs to be necessary for obtaining the technical result. The court 
therefore found it necessary to assess whether there were alternative ways to obtain the same 
technical result; if such alternatives existed, the ‘Philips shape’ was not necessary for 
obtaining the technical result. The majority of the court held that it had been convinced by a 
limited test of a Philips prototype with the three cutting heads placed in a different angle than 
on the trademark, that the same technical result could be obtained with an alternative shape. 
Accordingly, the court found that Philips’ registered shape of goods was not necessary to 
obtain the technical result, and Ide Line’s claim to revoke the registered trademark was not 
accepted. One of the judges dissented, and held that the Directive did not aim to hinder the 
competition by accepting that trademark protection was used to create production monopolies 
for technical solutions that could not be protected otherwise. He had come to the opposite 
conclusion than the majority; holding that all of the trademark’s shape elements were 
necessary to obtain the technical result. The Swedish appeal decision came first seven years 
later, after the ECJ had given its preliminary ruling on the matter. I will describe the appeal 
judgment further down, as I intend to stick to the chronological order in this chapter to better 
show the differences in the courts’ assessments before and after the ECJ ruling.  
 
In the UK, which was the second European country where the shaver dispute was taken to 
court, Philips sued Remington for trademark infringement. Remington counterclaimed that 
Philips’ trademark registration was invalid for several reasons, one of them being that the 
trademark consisted of the shape of goods necessary to obtain a technical result. The court 
found this ground for invalidation to be the most important issue to decide upon. Just like in 
the Swedish proceeding, Philips had argued that since there were alternative ways of 
obtaining the same technical result, the registered sign was not within the exclusion, even if 
the sign was functional as such. The court noted that this doctrine on alternative shapes had 
found favor with the majority of the Swedish first instance court, but that there had been one 
dissenting judge. The UK court agreed with the dissenting Swedish judge that it seemed 
unlikely that the Council and the Commission when writing the Directive had any intentions 
of making it possible to obtain permanent monopolies in matters of significant engineering 
design. When applying the provision, the court proposed that a test should be used asking: In 
substance, does the shape solely achieve the technical result? The court found the answer to 
the question to be positive and established that the shape registered as a trademark consisted 
exclusively of a shape which was necessary to obtain a technical result. Since defeated, 
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Philips appealed the judgment and the case was referred to the Court of Appeal in London. 
The appeal court decided to refer questions for a preliminary ruling by the ECJ.  The court 
nevertheless gave its opinion on the matters of the case. Before the appeal court, Philips 
stressed the findings of the Swedish majority and argued, just like in the first instance, that 
there were alternative shapes giving an equal technical result, and that the shape depicted in 
the trademark therefore was not necessary for obtaining the technical result. Remington, on 
the other hand, submitted that the evidence established that the essential features325 of the 
shape of the Philips trademark was designed to achieve, and did achieve, a technical result, 
and thus should be invalidated. The UK appeal court held that the provision must be 
interpreted in the light of its purpose, being to exclude merely functional shapes from 
registration. The court established that to enable monopolies granted in respect of patents, 
registered designs and the like to be extended by trademark registrations would be contrary to 
the public interest. Therefore, shapes having a technical character should not be monopolized 
for an unlimited period by reason of trademark registration, since that would stifle the 
competition and be contrary to the public good. Furthermore, the court rejected Philips’ 
argument of alternative shapes, and held that if the existence of alternative shapes would 
matter, a trader would be enabled to obtain registration of all possible alternative shapes that 
could achieve the same technical result. That would be to give the provision a meaning that 
would not at all be in accordance with the purpose for which it was intended, as it would 
enable unfair monopolies and stifle competition. Accordingly, the court concluded that the 
Philips trademark was a combination of technical features produced to achieve a good 
practical design, and therefore should be invalidated. A few months later, the court referred 
seven questions regarding the interpretation of the Directive to the ECJ. 
 
The Advocate-General of the ECJ, Mr. Ruiz-Jarabo, pronounced his opinion on the referred 
questions in January 2001, and he had held that “a trademark having the characteristics of that 
at issue […] seems to be the perfect example of a merely functional shape. Indeed, at least in 
appearance, its essential features fulfill a function and are there only in so far as they perform 
that function”. The Advocate-General also rejected the relevance of alternative shapes, since 
that would, just like the UK appeal court had held, enable an undertaking to register as 
trademarks all imaginable shapes which obtained technical results, thus obtaining a permanent 
monopoly over a particular technical solution. Moreover, the Advocate- General held that it 
would also be an unreasonable task for trademark courts to carry out comprehensive 
assessments concerning advanced technical matters.  
 
The Advocate-General’s opinion was seen as a partial victory for Remington, and in the light 
of the opinion, Remington filed a complaint for invalidation of one Philips trademarks to the 
German Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). Hence, Germany was the last European 
country to be introduced to the dispute before the ECJ decided upon the matter. One of the 
grounds for invalidation referred by Remington was that the shape of the trademark was 
necessary for obtaining the technical result. Philips petitioned that the element “necessary” 
was to be interpreted narrowly and that the provision therefore did not apply since there were 
alternative shapes, and further stressed the point that the trademark had acquired market 
recognition. The PTO found Remington’s petition to be unfounded and dismissed it, as the 
contested Philips trademark did not lack capacity for trademark protection and thus was not 
exclusively necessary for obtaining a technical result. The PTO stressed that a large number 
                                                 
325 I find it interesting to note that this was the very first time the phrase ‘essential features’ was used, and later 
those two words would play a central role in the ECJ decision, as the ECJ adopted the term from the referred 
questions of the UK Court of Appeal. Thus, it was Remington who first used the expression, which later would 
be established to be the correct way of interpreting the second indent of Article 3(1)(e) of the Directive. 
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of alternative shapes were conceivable, why a shape comprising a triangular shaver head with 
three cutters was not necessary for achieving the technical result. Remington had pointed out 
several shape features of the trademark that served technical purposes, but the PTO disagreed 
and dismissed Remington’s claim for cancellation.  
 
4.4.3.2 The ECJ Preliminary Ruling 
On June 12, 2002, the ECJ pronounced its ruling, which would be a very important precedent 
for the national courts of the EU member states. The fourth of the UK Court of Appeal’s 
referred questions concerned the interpretation of the second indent of Article 3(1)(e) of the 
Directive; whether the exclusion of technical shapes could be overcome by establishing the 
existence of alternative shapes; whether the provision was to be interpreted to exclude from 
protection shapes which essential features were attributable only to the technical result; and 
whether there was any other appropriate test for determining whether the restriction applied. 
The ECJ concluded that the provision must be interpreted to mean that a sign consisting 
exclusively of the shape of a product is unregistrable by virtue thereof if it is established that 
the essential functional features of that shape are attributable only to the technical result. The 
court also established that the ground for refusal or invalidity of a registration imposed by that 
provision could not be overcome by establishing that other shapes could achieve the same 
technical result. Moreover, the ECJ held that the provision must be interpreted in the light of 
the public interest underlying it, which is to prevent trademark protection from granting its 
proprietor a monopoly on technical solutions or functional characteristics of a product. Hence, 
exclusive rights to technical functions given by trademark protection would clearly limit the 
competitors’ freedom of choice in regard to which technical solution they wish to adopt to 
perform the desired function. Accordingly, the court concluded that for the application of 
Article 3(1)(e) it was irrelevant if there were alternative shapes that could fulfill the technical 
function; the competitors’ freedom of choice would still be limited since the registered 
technical solution could not be used.326  
 
4.4.3.3 Judgments and Decisions after the ECJ Preliminary Ruling 
The only country outside Europe where the dispute was brought to court after the ECJ 
decision was New Zealand, so after the ECJ ruling the dispute was, with that only exception, 
concentrated to Europe and the EU member states.327 The first country to rule after the ECJ 
decision had been announced was Germany, where Cologne District Court confirmed an 
interlocutory injunction restraining Remington from selling or marketing triple-headed 
shavers in Germany on the grounds of unfair competition. Hence, the court had found 
trademark law to be inapplicable and was not affected by the ECJ precedent. Remington 
appealed the judgment, and contrary to the first instance court, the Superior District Court of 
Cologne found trademark law to apply instead of competition law. The court established that 
Philips’ trademarks were distinctive of Philips, and that Remington’s shavers infringed the 
trademarks since they were confusingly similar. Remington had referred to the fresh ECJ 
ruling and claimed the trademarks to be invalid since necessary for the technical result, but 
the court established that it could not take any matters of trademark registrability or 
                                                 
326 My personal opinion, which you can read more about in Chapter 3.17, is that the ECJ judgment could have 
provided an even clearer guidance on the interpretation of the Directive. 
327 Before the ECJ preliminary ruling, judgments or court decisions from the following countries had been 
pronounced (in chronological order): Canada, USA, Sweden (first instance), UK (first instance), UK (appeal, 
referred questions to the ECJ), Australia, (Opinion of the General-Advocate of the ECJ), and Germany (the first 
PTO cancellation case). 
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invalidation into account. This was because of the separation of powers in German law 
between the registration instance on the one hand and the infringement courts on the other, 
and the binding effect of trademark registration. Hence, in Germany only the PTO can decide 
on the registration or cancellation of trademarks, and as long as the PTO has not cancelled the 
particular trademark, the ordinary courts in an infringement dispute are bound by the 
registration as it is and have no review powers of their own. Accordingly, the examination of 
the likelihood of confusion has to be based on the trademarks as they were registered, even if 
that assessment must include features that are exclusively determined by technical 
considerations. The Superior District Court of Cologne thus concluded that there was a 
likelihood of confusion in the legal sense between Philips’ trademarks and Remington’s 
shaver, when basing the assessment on the trademarks as registered, disregarding that the 
registrations perhaps included solely technical features which were not capable of trademark 
protection. Hence, the court upheld the interlocutory injunction restraining Remington from 
selling and marketing triple-headed shavers in Germany. The judgment was appealed, but at 
the time of writing this, in May 2005, the injunction is still in force. 
 
The next country where the dispute ended up in court was France, which was the first county 
to really take into account the precedent ECJ decision. Before Paris First Instance Court 
Remington sought the annulment of seven Philips trademark registrations, mainly on the 
ground that their shapes were necessary for the technical result. The defendant Philips argued 
that the ECJ precedent excluded only the essential characteristics of the shape that were 
attributed only to a technical result. Philips inferred from this that the ECJ acknowledged that 
a shape fell outside the exclusion either when the essential characteristics of the shape were 
not functional, or when they were functional but not solely attributable to the technical result 
performed by the product. Remington, on the other hand, inferred from the ECJ decision that 
a trademark was not valid when the characteristic shape elements forming the sign were 
functional, even when the trademark possessed other features that were not functional. 
Remington further submitted that the OHIM’s case law as well as French case law established 
that the mere addition of arbitrary elements was not sufficient to make a sign distinctive, 
when the sign without those additions would appear as essentially functional. The court 
established that, contrary to what Philips had claimed, it could not be inferred that a shape 
whose essential characteristics were functional but not only attributable to the technical result 
would fall outside the exception. The court concluded that a sign formed of shapes whose 
characteristics were functional and attributable to the technical result could only avoid the 
exclusion from registration if it was also formed of other shapes that were non-functional, 
independent from the technical result and sufficiently distinctive to enable the public to 
distinguish the product with the sign from competing products. That presupposed, however, 
that such non-functional shapes were not secondary, as they must be capable, even when 
taken alone, of distinguishing the sign in the eyes of the public. Consequently, the court found 
it necessary to examine whether or not the shapes forming Philips’ trademarks contained such 
non-functional elements that were capable of distinguishing them. Philips claimed three shape 
elements of its shaver to be non-functional: the arrangement in an equilateral triangle of the 
three grids (i.e. the round rotary cutting heads), the shape of the external triangular outline 
(i.e. the cutting base) and the shape of the edge of the faceplate. Regarding the choice of the 
arrangement of the three heads in an equilateral triangle, Philips claimed that it was an 
attractive result of extended design work and not a result of a functional solution. Philips also 
held that there was no proof that the arrangement of the cutting heads in a circle or rectangle 
would not fulfill their function just as well. Furthermore, Philips argued that the choice of a 
visually balanced equilateral triangle with rounded angles was made to “soften” the shaver’s 
appearance, thus was the result of marketing and industrial aesthetics concerns. The French 
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court established that a single shaving head would be an insufficient solution, and held that 
efficiency of the shave was presupposed by use of several cutting heads arranged in a close 
formation. The arrangement in a triangle easily allowed the user to angle the shaver in 
different ways in order to use only one, only two, or all three of the heads dependant on the 
width of the part of the face to be shaved. The court further stated that the rounded nature of 
the angles was of functional matter, since angles on facial shaver preferably are rounded to 
prevent having sharp angles that might bother or even harm the user. Accordingly, the court 
concluded that even though aesthetic preoccupations might have led to emphasizing the 
rounded shape of the angles and the triangular shape, those considerations appeared only 
secondary with respect to the technical results to which the shapes at issue were mainly 
dedicated. Also the two other shape elements that Philips contended to be non-functional was 
found functional by the court; the triangular external outline necessarily followed the shape of 
the configuration of the base of the heads, and the clover-leaf shaped rim fulfilled the 
technical function of stretching the skin and raising the hairs. The court concluded that it had 
not found any non-functional features of the Philips trademarks which were capable of 
distinguishing them, and therefore invalidated six of the trademarks328. The judgment was 
appealed by Philips and decided by Paris Court of Appeals on February 16, 2005. The French 
appeal judgment was the very last judgment that was pronounced before I finished the work 
with this thesis, and I will come back to it further down to keep the chronological order.  
 
In Spain, Remington’s exclusive distributor River International S.A. started to sell the Izumi-
made, Remington branded triple-headed shavers in June 2001, but was in January 2003 
restrained by a preliminary resolution forbidding the import, sale and marketing of the shavers 
in Spain on the grounds of trademark infringement and unfair competition. River International 
appealed the resolution, and in July 2003 Barcelona First Instance Court No. 48 concluded, in 
the light of the harmonized national law, the Directive and the ECJ decision, that Philips’ 
ownership of the trademark registration was tainted by violation of the absolute prohibition on 
registration of signs consisting exclusively of the shape necessary to obtain the technical 
result. The court elucidated that the provision was intended to avoid protection of a trademark 
right that grants its owner a monopoly over technical solutions. Accordingly, the restraining 
measures imposed upon River International were taken away. In a later Spanish judgment 
from May 6, 2004, further described below, the Spanish extensions of six Philips international 
trademark registrations were expunged after a request by Remington. 
 
In Sweden, the appeal judgment had been kept pending to await the ECJ decision, and before 
Svea Court of Appeal, the appellant Rotary Shaver Sweden AB (former Ide Line AB) claimed 
the trademark to be invalid, inter alia on the ground of technical function. Philips argued, just 
like in the first instance, that the registered trademark consisted of mainly non-functional, 
arbitrarily chosen features. Philips thus claimed that the mark did not consist of essentially 
functional shape elements, and that the shape elements were in any case not exclusively 
determined by the technical result. The appeal court took a completely different position than 
the first instance court had seven years earlier, which is not too remarkable when considering 
all the litigation there had been since then, and in particular the ECJ judgment. The appeal 
court noted that the ECJ had stressed the importance of the purpose of the exclusion from 
registration of technical shapes and that a common interest was that such functional features 
or technical solutions should be free for all to use. The court declared that it had to determine 
whether the essential features of the registered shape were functional and chosen to fulfill the 
                                                 
328 The court invalidated the French extensions of six international IR registrations, but did not invalidate the 
French semi-figurative trademark, as it also comprised the denomination PHILISHAVE and therefore had 
distinctiveness. 
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technical result. If arbitrary considerations could be shown in the design of the essential shape 
elements, there was no reason for revocation of the trademark. The court found three essential 
shape features; the three cutting heads placed in each corner of an equilateral triangle, the 
triangular faceplate with rounded angles and the raised cloverleaf shaped rim surrounding the 
cutting heads on the faceplate. The findings of the court was that the most essential shape 
feature was the three cutting heads, and that the cloverleaf shaped rim was so obviously 
insignificant with no individual importance for the visual impression of the shaver that it 
should not be considered to be an essential feature of the shaver unit. For the assessment 
whether the two remaining essential features (the cutting heads and the triangular faceplate) 
were attributable solely to the technical result, the technical result was defined as an efficient 
and comfortable shave of hair on a human’s face. The court concluded that there was no 
evidence of any arbitrary considerations of the three cutting heads arranged in an equilateral 
triangle, and the cutters and their placement were declared to be attributable solely to the 
technical result; to avoid skin damage and to create a compact and efficient shaver. Also the 
triangular faceplate with rounded angles served the technical function to hold the cutting 
heads on place and to constitute a reference surface for the cutting heads so that the skin did 
not get pinched, and the shape of the faceplate just followed the shape of the rotary cutting 
heads. The court further found that the rounded angles and the slightly bent sides were 
obviously chosen to give a comfortable, close, and efficient shave also of parts of the face that 
could be difficult to reach. Hence, the court concluded that all the essential shape elements of 
the shaver unit were solely attributable to the achievement of the technical result and 
accordingly Philips three-dimensional trademark registration was declared invalid and 
revoked.329
 
In Italy, Milan District Court declared the invalidity of the Italian extensions of six Philips 
trademarks, on the ground that they represented functional elements necessary for obtaining 
essential technical effects. The court found that all the details of the shaver performed a 
precise function: the dimensions of the head as well as the number of heads and their 
arrangement. The court further held that it would not seem redundant to note that the 
equilateral triangular arrangement, among other things, was found in a U.S. patent from 1972 
as well as in other patents indicated by Philips itself. The court found that the former 
existence of a patent comprising the three-headed triangular shape proved the obvious 
technical value of the illustrated solution, even if the shape of the trademark did not constitute 
the main technical solution that was the object of the patent.330  
 
In the second judgment from Spain, Remington used as an argument for invalidation of the 
trademarks because of their technical function that the triple-headed shaver unit had been the 
subject of several patents and patent applications. The court held that when determining 
whether a shape trademark consists of technically necessary shape elements, the first 
circumstance to be taken into account is whether the shape of the product has been the object 
of the filing or granting of a patent or utility model. If it has, the conclusion to be drawn is 
that the corresponding shape of the trademark is technically necessary and thus unregistrable 
as a trademark. However, the court did not specifically express any findings of the “patent 
                                                 
329 As you can see in my comments to the Swedish appeal judgment in Chapter 3.5, I think the court made a 
logical interpretation of the ECJ decision when first determining which the essential shape features were, and 
then one by one assessing whether those were necessary for the technical result. Many other courts did not 
distinguish the being of several different shape elements.  
330 The matter of former patents of Philips’ shaver was later also brought up by the Spanish, Portuguese and 
French courts, which you will see below. 
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history” of the shape of Philips’ contested trademarks, but seemed to have taken account to it 
in the overall assessment leading to the invalidation of the six Philips trademarks.  
 
In Portugal, Philips requested an injunction to be issued, ordering Remington’s distributor 
Imporaudio, Lda. to stop importing, selling and marketing triple-headed shavers in Portugal. 
The Portuguese court rejected Philips’ request both on trademark and competition law 
grounds, and established that features necessary for the technical result was to be protected as 
a patent and not as a trademark. Furthermore, the court established that the drawing of the 
head of Philips’ shavers with three rotating heads had been patented since it was considered to 
be functional and to possess potential for industrial use. Therefore, it could not be 
subsequently registered as a trademark, as that would amount to perpetuation of a private 
right, to which the law assigned a temporary character. The court thus found Philips’ conduct 
to be blameworthy and held that trademark law could not be used to prolong other rights 
artificially, such as rights deriving from patents or utility models. Except rejecting Philips’ 
claim for an injunction, the court also held that Philips could not claim any exclusive 
trademark rights to its functionally determined trademarks. 
 
In the most recent of the decisions from Germany, dated November 12, 2004, the German 
PTO cancelled one of Philips three-dimensional trademarks331 because its shape was deemed 
necessary for the technical result. The PTO found that the ‘main’ feature, the arrangement of 
three cutting heads in the form of an equilateral triangle ensured that all the areas of the skin 
were passed over by the cutter heads during the shave, with the result that no unshaven areas 
could remain on the skin after the shave, irrespective of how the shaver was guided over the 
skin. Philips had argued that the essential functional features of the shape were mainly based 
on aesthetic considerations and that those features were at least not only ascribable to the 
technical result. Philips had thus relied on the wording in the ECJ’s answer to the fourth 
question that the term “only” were to be interpreted as “exclusively”, i.e. that features which 
also have functions other than purely technical functions are not covered by Article 3(1)(e) of 
the Directive. The PTO disagreed with the strict interpretation of the word “only”, and 
established that: 
 
[t]he wording “only [ascribable to] the technical result” in this context can, however, not 
mean that capacity for registration is established if an aesthetic result is also present. Such a 
view would be in conflict with the purpose of the provision in question, rendering it 
practically meaningless, since every technically determined shape has probably also an 
aesthetic effect of whatever kind.332
 
Hence, the reason for the obstacle to protection was to prevent the protection of a trademark 
right giving its holder a monopoly in technical solutions or utility characteristics of a product 
that the user could also expect in the goods of competitors. The PTO asserted that the fact that 
all the essential features of the shape were determined by technical considerations could not 
be altered by the fact that the shape or its essential features also produced an attractive design.  
Thus, a shape whose essential features were only determined by technical considerations must 
accordingly be excluded from trademark protection even if the shape was also selected on the 
basis of aesthetic considerations. Consequently, the PTO decided to cancel Philips’ three-
dimensional trademark registration. 
 
                                                 
331 German Trademark no. 39408350, which corresponds exactly with international trademark registration IR 
587.254 illustrated in Appendix A. 
332 Page 4 of the judgment. 
 130
Just like in the judgments from Italy, Spain and Portugal described above, the appeal court in 
France noted that Philips had claimed the equilateral triangle arrangement in both a British 
patent333 and in an American patent334. The rounded shape of the angles, in addition to the fact 
that it was claimed in the two patents, was found dictated by the concern to avoid sharp edges 
that could injure the user or make the shave uncomfortable. The court held that it was 
indifferent that the rounded shape gave the shaver a more aesthetic aspect, since it contributed 
to the intended technical result. Also the functional nature of the rim surrounding the faceplate 
was supported by the fact that it was described in a European patent335 as skin stretching and 
to control the pressure on the cutting heads to avoid skin cuts. Accordingly, the court found 
the functional nature of the rim to be confirmed by the patent evidence, as the shape was 
exclusively determined by the intended technical result being to stretch the skin and prevent 
skin cuts. Because of the functional nature of the shapes of the trademarks, the court decided 
to cancel the French parts of all six of Philips’ contested international trademarks. 
 
4.4.4 Shapes which Give Substantial Value to the Goods336 
This is the last of the grounds for exclusion from protection set out in Article 3(1)(e) of the 
Directive, and seems to be intended to exclude from trademark protection ornamental shapes 
which give the product a substantial decorative value and thus rather should be protected by 
design protection. The Advocate-General held in his opinion before the ECJ that while 
trademarks protect the goods’ identity, origin and goodwill, designs protect the substantial 
value of the goods, which makes it easier to give protection to designs that combine 
functional and aesthetic features than to trademarks. In the opinion, the Advocate-General 
also clarified that the provision was aiming at excluding ornamental shapes from protection, 
which gave the EU national courts helpful guidance on the interpretation. However, the 
intended meaning of the exclusion has, particularly before the General-Advocate’s opinion, 
been rather unclear and the EU national courts have interpreted the provision in their own 
ways, which is clearly illustrated by the UK courts’ different assessments described below.  
 
In the first UK judgment, the substantial value of the shape was one of Remington’s grounds 
for invalidation of Philips’ trademark. The court established that adding value to the goods is 
the main function of a good trademark, but proposed that the purpose of the provision was to 
exclude shapes which exclusively added some sort of value which was not attributable to the 
trademark function, i.e. the source identification. The first instance court concluded that the 
triple-headed shape was primarily recognized by the public as having an engineering 
function337, and for that reason it added substantial value to the product. Therefore, the 
registered trademark was declared invalid on this ground as well. However, the UK appeal 
court dissented with the first instance court and held that the provision was intended to 
exclude aesthetic-type shapes, not functional shapes as in the previous provision, even though 
the two provisions might overlap. The court established that the fact that the technical result 
of a shape was excellent and the product therefore could command a high price did not mean 
that it was excluded from registration by this provision. An assessment was required in order 
to determine whether the value was substantial, and a comparison had to be made between the 
shape sought to be registered (or invalidated), and the shapes of equivalent products. It was 
                                                 
333 British patent No. 1 348 023.  
334 American patent No. 4 310 968. 
335 European patent No. 0 719 203. 
336 Third indent of Article 3(1)(e) of the Directive. 
337 The court found that Philips in its advertising over the years had clearly focused on educating the public in 
how well its rotary shaver and its triple-headed shape works.  
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only if the shape sought to be registered had, in relative terms, substantial value, that it would 
be excluded from registration. It was therefore irrelevant that Philips’ registered shape had a 
substantial reputation built up by advertising. The UK appeal court came to the conclusion 
that the registered shape did not have any more value than other shapes which were 
established to be as good as, and as cheap to produce as, the shape which was registered. 
Accordingly, the court decided that there was no reason for invalidation of the trademark on 
this ground, and thus changed the decision of the First Instance Court on this matter. 
 
In the second judgment from Spain (the first “real” judgment) where six Philips trademark 
registrations were cancelled, the court held that the exclusion from trademark protection of 
shapes giving substantial value to the goods was due to the shape’s effect on the intrinsic 
value of the product. The aim of the provision was, according to the court, to establish a 
border between the trademarks system and the system of designs or industrial models, as the 
systems had different purposes; the trademark system granted protection for reasons of 
indicating business origin, while the design system aimed at promoting efforts directed at 
obtaining new product looks and decorative shapes. Thus, the exclusion from trademark 
protection of shapes giving substantial value to the product had a particular effect on products 
of which the aesthetic appearance had a direct impact on the consumers’ positive valuation of 
the product. If it happened that the shape made the product more attractive and therefore more 
saleable, the shape probably affected the intrinsic value of the product and thus could not be 
registered as a trademark. This was, according to the court, because the function of the shape 
did not contribute to identifying the product’s business origin but instead the shape was a 
factor functioning to satisfy the consumers’ aesthetic demands. The shape was then 
aesthetically functional and would represent one of the factors, which would contribute to the 
commercial success of the product. The Spanish court concluded that the more attractive a 
three-dimensional shape was, the less likely it would be that the shape would be granted 
trademark protection. The court noted though that an aesthetic design could instead enjoy 
design or industrial model protection. Unfortunately, the court did not express how it applied 
these findings of law on the contested trademarks.  
 
4.4.5 Comments 
The exclusion from trademark protection of shapes necessary to obtain a technical result has 
been the focal issue for the various courts to decide on. Obviously, protection of shapes 
incorporating technical functions rather belongs in the world of patents and utility models, 
and the purpose of the provision is clearly intended to constitute a demarcation against those 
forms of time-limited protection of technical functions. Because of the proximity to patent 
matters, the character of much of the argumentation and the courts’ assessments have rather 
reminded of those of patent proceedings than trademark litigations. And, as the courts of Italy, 
Spain, Portugal and France emphasized, the triangular shaver head had been the subject of 
several patents, in the UK, the USA and in Europe, which according to those courts proved 
the shape’s technical character. It was held in many judgments that it is not the purpose of 
trademark law to enable undertakings to resort to trademark protection once other IP rights 
have expired and thus prolonging the rights deriving from other IPRs artificially.  
 
As stated earlier, there was a clear change in the European courts’ assessments after the ECJ 
ruling compared to before. Naturally, much of the considerations and findings of the courts 
have after the ECJ decision been quite conform, with the exception of a few judgments. 
Almost all the courts elucidated the purpose of the exclusion of technically determined 
shapes, being to enable a fair competition on the market by avoiding granting a trader an 
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eternal production monopoly on technical features. It is undoubtedly so, that all EC law shall 
be interpreted in the light of the main objective of the European Union, which ultimately is to 
ensure free movement within the Union of goods, persons, services and capital. Hence, 
enabling and stimulating a free and fair competition on the European market is one of the 
focal purposes of the European Union, which naturally also has effects on the application of 
all harmonized Community law, which all member states are bound to comply with.  
 
Regarding the parties’ argumentation and the development of it, it can be inferred that it did 
not change significantly during the ten years of dispute I have analyzed. When it comes to the 
claims and argumentation of Philips’ various counterparties338, it has essentially focused on 
the technical character of Philips’ trademarks as grounds for invalidation. Very often the 
courts agreed with the assertions of Philips’ counterparty, so that the court’s view 
corresponded with that of Philips’ counterparty.  
 
While its counterparties’ argumentation did not vary considerably during the course of the 
dispute, Philips’ argumentation has changed a bit more. Before the ECJ ruling, Philips 
consistently argued that since there were alternative shapes of shaver heads that could obtain 
an equal technical result, the shape of its trademarks were not necessary for achieving the 
technical result. Philips claimed that the trademark shape was mainly non-functional and 
consisting of arbitrarily chosen shape elements, but held that even if the shape was shown to 
comprise functional features, the existence of alternative shapes entailed that the particular 
Philips shape was not necessary to obtain the technical result. Hence, Philips applied a narrow 
interpretation on the Directive’s wording ‘exclusive’, and referred to what has been called the 
‘doctrine on alternative shapes’, which is originally a German practice that had spread to 
several other European countries. From being a widely accepted doctrine in some 
jurisdictions, the Advocate-General and the ECJ rejected that any relevance should be given 
to the existence of alternative shapes, since the competitors’ would still be limited as they 
could not use the particular technical solution that the registered shape comprised. The 
Advocate-General also held that nothing would stop an undertaking from registering all 
possible shapes, which would clearly limit the competitors’ freedom and stifle the 
competition. Even though the doctrine on alternative shapes was expressly rejected when 
assessing trademark registrability, it is still a relevant doctrine to use in relation to design 
protection. However, even after the ECJ’s ruling, Philips continued to claim in some courts 
that the shape was not necessary for the technical result since there were other shapes that 
could fulfill the same technical result which.   
 
Even if the Advocate-General and the ECJ preliminary ruling was interpreted to establish that 
the essential features of the shape of Philips’ trademark was attributable solely to the technical 
result, Philips kept on arguing that the shape of its trademarks was mainly non-functional and 
arbitrarily chosen for aesthetic reasons. In the Swedish appeal court, Philips argued that the 
shape elements were not essentially functional, and that they in any case were not exclusively 
determined by the technical result. The Swedish appeal court found no evidence of any 
arbitrary elements of the shape’s essential features. Paris First Instance Court found it 
necessary to assess the non-functional shape features, and held that if those were so distinctive 
that they were capable of distinguishing the shaver, even when taken alone, the shape could 
obtain protection. No such non-functional features were found though, since the few non-
functional arbitrarily chosen features were so minor and secondary that they made no 
                                                 
338 There have been several counterparties, which all have in common that they have sold triple-headed shavers 
manufactured by Izumi: Windmere, Sears Roebuck & Company, Ide Line AB and later Rotary Shaver Sweden 
AB, Remington, River International, Imporaudio, Rayovac and of course, Izumi. 
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difference for the visual impression of the shaver. However, Philips has kept holding that the 
essential features of the trademarks are mainly aesthetical also in the most recent proceedings. 
 
When analyzing the development of Philips’ argumentation, it is interesting to see Philips 
current view on the matter in order to compare it with earlier submissions. In the most current 
judgment, pronounced on February 16, 2005 by Paris Court of Appeals, Philips held that the 
chosen shapes of its trademarks, such as the upside-down equilateral triangle shape, were the 
result of a combination of functional and non-functional features that were not exclusively 
related to the technical result. Philips argued that the exception of the Directive was to be 
construed narrowly and that a complex shape may be considered as non-necessary to the 
technical result, even though its features, when considered separately, have a functional role 
and even though its non-functional elements do not in themselves constitute its essential 
characteristics. The appeal court did not agree, and held that the signs consisted exclusively of 
a shape that was necessary to achieve the technical result and that protection of the trademarks 
would result in depriving competitors of the possibility of using the shape freely. The 
conclusion to be drawn from this is that Philips has kept mainly the same argumentation, but 
has adjusted it to better correspond to the last years’ court findings on the matter. In a way 
you could also say that Philips has tried to benefit from the weaknesses of the somewhat 
unclear wording of the ECJ ruling, by inferring from it the possibility of a narrower 
interpretation of the Directive than the various national courts have construed.  
 
Regarding the deviations, the most different legal assessments have undoubtedly come from 
Germany. A main reason has been the separation of powers in German law between the 
registration authorities on the one hand and the infringement courts on the other, in 
combination with the principle of binding effect of a German trademark registration. In 
Germany only the PTO can decide on the registration or cancellation of trademarks, and as 
long as the PTO has not cancelled the particular trademark, the ordinary courts in an 
infringement dispute are bound by the registration as it is, and have no review powers of their 
own. The Superior District Court of Cologne held that even if the Philips trademarks may 
include features that are exclusively necessary for the technical result and thus is not capable 
of trademark protection as registered contrary to the provisions of the Directive, the 
infringement assessment must still include all those features, as originally registered. The 
court concluded that there was a likelihood of confusion in the legal sense between Philips’ 
trademarks and Remington’s shaver, when basing the assessment on the trademarks as 
(perhaps wrongfully) registered, and the court upheld the interlocutory injunction restraining 
Remington from selling and marketing triple-headed shavers in Germany. The judgment was 
appealed, but at the time of writing this, in May 2005, the injunction is still in force. Perhaps 
because of the separation of powers in German law, Germany is the only country in the world 
where Remington is restricted by a court decision to sell Izumi-made triple-headed shavers. 
Moreover, until now three of Philips’ international trademarks have been cancelled in 
Germany on the grounds of functionality.339
 
4.5 Trademark Infringement  
It is important to separate the trademark registrability or invalidation matters from the 
trademark infringement matters, as those two areas of trademark law represents completely 
different components of the legal protection of trademarks. In many countries Philips sued the 
                                                 
339 Two other trademarks have been contested but held still valid by the German Federal Patent Court, which 
handles the appealed PTO decisions.  
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company selling Izumi-made triple-headed shavers for trademark infringement, and in most 
cases that company counterclaimed Philips’ trademarks to be invalid. Alternatively, the 
company selling Izumi-made shavers requested the cancellation of Philips trademark, 
whereupon Philips replied by suing for infringement. However, often the courts found no 
reason to investigate the alleged infringement, since the trademarks was declared invalid on 
grounds of functionality and, obviously, could not be infringed. In some cases, for example in 
the UK judgments, the court chose to comment the alleged infringement even though it had 
already invalidated the trademarks and an assessment of the infringement claim was 
unnecessary.340 In some countries, such as Sweden, Italy and Switzerland, the company 
selling Izumi-made shavers filed a request to the court for a declaratory judgment declaring 
that the company’s sale of triple-headed shavers was not an infringement of Philips trademark 
rights, as the trademarks were technically determined.  
 
Article 5(1) of the Directive provides that a trademark is infringed if an identical or similar 
sign is used in the course of trade for identical or similar goods, and there is likelihood for 
confusion and/or association with the trademark. In the first UK judgment, Philips had held 
that the Remington shaver was identical with Philips’ registered trademark. The court found 
the argument to be “hopeless”, as even though the registration covered a three-dimensional 
shape, the actual mark registered was only a picture. The court’s Judge Jacob J made his point 
clear when concluding that “I think a consumer would notice the difference between shaving 
with the [Remington shaver] than doing so with a picture”. However, the court established 
that there were visual differences between the trademark picture and the top part of the 
Remington shaver, and even though the differences were slight, the Philips trademark and the 
Remington shaver were not identical and no infringement had occurred on that ground. As to 
if the Remington shaver and the trademark were similar, the same court found the top part of 
the shaver to be confusingly similar to the registered trademark, but held that it was so in a 
“non-trademark manner”.341 When it came to Remington’s infringement defense under Article 
6(1)342, the court found that the Remington shaver’s top part was an indication as to the kind, 
quality, intended purpose etc. of the goods. The court concluded that Remington’s use of its 
shaver was merely descriptive, since it just denoted a triple-headed shaver. Hence, the top part 
of Remington’s DT55 model did not denote trade origin and accordingly was within the legal 
scope of non-infringement. The UK appeal court noted the first instance court’s findings that 
Remington had not used the top part of its shaver as denoting trade origin, but held that any 
use of a sign in the course of trade could constitute an infringement, not just “trademark use”. 
Consequently, the appeal court disagreed with the first instance court and rejected 
Remington’s defense of non-trademark use, which meant that Remington would have been 
guilty of infringement if the trademark had not been declared invalid.  
 
In Australia, Remington’s alleged trademark infringement of Philips’ trademarks was the 
main question, and the court had to determine whether or not Remington had used its shaver 
as a trademark, which in Australia is a decisive factor when assessing a trademark 
infringement. Philips contended that its two trademarks were infringed by the use of the 
triple-head configuration of the Remington shaver, as well as the use of photographs or 
                                                 
340 Hence, even if the infringement claim was irrelevant, the court found that since evidence from the parties had 
been submitted on the matter, a declaratory comment was motivated. 
341 Since the registration was already declared invalid, the court saw no reason to get into whether the 
infringement provisions also covered such “non-trademark” similarity. I find it a bit unfortunate that the court 
gave no explanation to its expression “non-trademark manner”, which at least I would have welcomed. 
342 Article 6(1) of the Directive provides that “The trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit a third 
party from using, in the course of trade, (a) his own name or address; (b) indications concerning the kind, 
quality, quantity, intended purpose, value […] or other characteristics of the goods or services […] “.   
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images of the three-headed faceplate on packages and in brochures and advertisements. 
Philips argued that all those matters were to be seen as use as a trademark of a sign that is 
substantially identical with or deceptively similar to one or both of Philips’ registered 
trademarks. Remington disagreed that Philips would have such exclusive rights to the triple-
headed shaver design, and further contended that in any event the design of the head of the 
Remington shaver had not been used as a trademark of the triple-headed shaver. The court 
established that depicting and describing the shaver head was common use in shaver 
advertising and the emphasis on the shaver head was not intended to suggest a distinctive 
association with the shaver’s origin, Remington.343 Accordingly, the court concluded that the 
use by Remington was not a use of either of Philips’ marks as a trademark, and Remington 
had thus not infringed Philips’ trademark rights. 
 
Neither the Advocate-General nor the ECJ found any need to comment the three last 
questions that had been referred to the court concerning trademark infringement, since that 
was irrelevant due to the interpretation and application of Article 3. In the third UK judgment 
from June 2004 (the second UK first instance judgment), the court invalidated the contested 
trademark but nevertheless commented the alleged infringement. Regarding the use of the 
sign, Remington had argued that the use complained of by Philips might well have been a use 
by it of a “sign” but not of “trademark use” as required for infringement. Remington held that 
it had simply used the shaver head to convey the message that it was part of a rotary shaver, 
as distinguished from a foil shaver, and was not used to denote origin. The court found that 
the heads of the Remington shavers were not used in the trademark sense as an indication of 
origin of the shavers, since they only promoted themselves as the working heads of triple-
headed rotary shavers. The court further found that neither the advertisements of the heads on 
Remington’s packaging had any purpose of denoting origin. Finally, the court stated that 
Remington had made no attempt to emphasize the ‘cloverleaf’ design on its shaver heads. 
Even if the question did not arise, the court also concluded that there was no exact identity 
between Remington’s signs and Philips’ trademark, even though the differences were minor. 
The court further chose to assess whether the allegedly infringing sign was confusingly 
similar to the Philips’ trademark. Remington had argued that even though Philips might have 
shown that the public associated three-headed shavers with Philips, it had not shown that the 
public attached any significance to the cloverleaf when making the association. The court held 
that if it would hypothetically assume that Philips’ trademark had become distinctive in the 
eyes of the public as a trademark denoting the Philips’ origin, the heads of Remington’s 
offending shavers would have been confusingly similar to Philips’ mark. Hence, these 
findings did not matter, since the trademark was invalidated and revoked as being attributable 
solely to the technical result. 
 
 
 
                                                 
343 The court also declared that to state in the advertising that the shaver was “the quickest, smoothest thing on 
three wheels” was not to suggest that three “wheels” were an exclusive or distinctive characteristic of Remington 
shavers. Furthermore, the court found that much more emphasis was put on the feature of the Remington “dual 
track” cutters and the wet/dry function than on the fact that the faceplate was triangular and had three rotary 
cutting heads. 
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5 Legal Analysis: Design and Competition Law Matters 
5.1 Design Law 
Design protection was only claimed and discussed in two of the judgments: the first UK 
judgment from December 1997 and the Australian judgment from June 1999. In the UK, 
Philips was the proprietor of a registered design representing a whole triple-headed rotary 
shaver from four different angles. Philips claimed that Remington’s DT55 shaver model was 
within the scope of protection of its registered design, and thus infringed it. Remington denied 
any infringement and counterclaimed for revocation of the registered design on the grounds of 
invalidity. In the infringement assessment, the court took guidance in previous case law and 
described and compared in detail the various elements of the two designs. The court 
concluded that the designs were different, and those differences excluded the possibility of 
infringement of the registered design. Regarding the validity, the court concluded that even if 
the scope of the protection of the registered design did not cover the Remington shaver, there 
was no reason to invalidate the registration. Hence, the design registration was considered still 
valid but of limited scope. 
 
In Australia, Philips was the owner of a design representing a triple-headed shaver. Philips 
had sought orders consisting of permanent injunction and a declaration that Remington had 
infringed Philips’ registered design. Philips claimed that the Remington shaver was nothing 
but an obvious or fraudulent imitation of the registered design, inconsistent with the relevant 
provisions of the Australian Designs Act. Remington cross-claimed for rectification of the 
Register of Design by expunging Philips’ design registration. Remington’s primary case was 
that Philips’ design was valid but that the Remington shaver was not infringing it. Remington 
sought an order to expunge the registered design only in the event that it was held that, 
assuming validity, there was infringement. The court declared that the essential questions 
were, first, whether the allegedly infringing design was based on or derived from the 
registered design and, second, whether the differences were so substantial that the result was 
not to be described as an imitation. The court found that Remington had had knowledge of the 
Philips shavers when designing the Remington model DT45, the model on which the DT55 
was based. There had been samples of Philips shavers in the Izumi factory, and on internal 
notes and drawings from Izumi the Philips shavers were mentioned and compared with. It was 
also clear that Remington was aware of the United States registered design equivalent of the 
design in suit. The court held that it was not an infringement to produce a product that was 
close in design to a registered design, if the design of the product was not an imitation. It 
would, however, be an imitation if the element of “fraud” was proved, which it could be even 
if the copy showed apparent differences as long as it could be shown that the differences had 
been made merely to disguise the copying.344 However, if there were substantial differences 
of a material kind between the article and the registered design, there was no imitation and no 
infringement. The court concluded that there were some significant similarities between the 
design in suit and the Remington shaver, but that there were also strikingly different features. 
The court found substantial differences of a material kind between the registered design and 
the Remington shaver, which gave the latter a distinctively different appearance from the 
former345. Accordingly, the court concluded that there had been no imitation, neither 
                                                 
344 The evidence in the case established that Remington would have preferred a smaller head of the DT55 but 
could not achieve it because of the size of the internal components and the need to waterproof the machinery. 
The court found that that difference, the size of the head, existed not because Remington wished to disguise any 
copying but because the character of the particular machine dictated it. 
345 The differences found were principally the size of the head base, the size and shape of the handle and the look 
of the faceplate. 
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fraudulent nor obvious, of Philips’ registered design. Philips design was considered still valid 
but had not been infringed by the Remington shaver. 
 
5.2 Competition Law 
In almost half of the countries where the dispute (so far) has been brought to court, Philips has 
alleged its new competitor on the triple-headed shaver market of breaches of competition law. 
In the USA, Australia, Germany, Spain, Italy and Portugal the judgments have included 
competition law matters. In three of the countries; Australia, Germany and Spain, Remington 
respective River International was restrained by interlocutory injunctions from selling and 
marketing triple-headed shavers. In Germany the injunction is still in force but is appealed by 
Remington; the Australian injunction was in force for two years between June 1997 and June 
1999, and the Spanish injunction was in force only between January and July 2003. In this 
chapter I will refer the parties’ claims and argumentation and the courts’ findings regarding 
the raised competition law matters. 
 
In the USA, Philips filed its first suit in Florida in October 1984, charging the American 
company Windmere with unfair competition regarding the Philips design impression, after 
finding out that Windmere was going to sell Izumi-made triple-headed shavers in the USA. 
Philips lost the case, as the jury found that Philips did not possess any cognizable trade dress 
right346. Philips won a motion for a new trial, but also the second jury’s decision resulted in a 
defeat for Philips. While the Florida litigation was pending, Philips filed a suit in Illinois, 
charging another American company, Sears Roebuck & Company, for unfair competition on 
the same grounds as in the Florida litigation. Since Philips had been unsuccessful in its earlier 
litigations concerning the same matter, the Illinois court advised Philips to settle. Philips 
refused, the court dealt with the case and Philips lost its case once again. The Illinois court 
had found that Philips did not prove any cognizable trade dress claims that could rebut Sears’ 
strong evidence on functionality347, and thus rejected Philips’ allegations of unfair 
competition.  
 
In Australia, Remington had been restrained by an interlocutory injunction for two years, and 
Philips sought orders consisting of permanent injunctions and a declaration that Remington 
had infringed Philips’ registered design and trademarks. Philips sought the relief on the basis 
that Remington’s conduct to sell or import for sale Izumi-made triple-headed shavers in 
Australia, as well as infringing the registered design and trademarks, amounted to passing 
off348 and infringed Sections 52 and 53349 of the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974. Philips 
alleged in its claims that either by reason of the appearance and/or the packaging or 
marketing, the Remington shaver was likely to be taken by the trade and by the public as 
being the shaver of Philips, manufactured and distributed either by Philips or with the license 
or approval from Philips. The court established that Philips until 1997 had been the only 
supplier of triple-headed rotary shavers on the Australian market, and that Philips had made 
extensive advertising in Australia mainly consisting of a picture showing the shaver head in 
connection with the name “Philips” or the trademark PHILISHAVE. It was undisputed that 
these facts had made consumers very likely to associate the triangular shape of the shaving 
head with Philips shavers. Remington had been a well-known brand in Australia for many 
                                                 
346 An introduction to the matter of trade dress is given in Chapter 2.2.5. 
347 The essence of the American functionality doctrine is described in Chapter 2.2.5. 
348 The tort of passing off is further explained in Chapter 2.3.3. 
349 These provisions are described under “passing off” in Chapter 2.3.3 as well as in the Australian judgment in 
Chapter 3.8. 
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years. The evidence showed that Remington at the time in Australia had a larger share than 
Philips of the overall “personal care” products market, but had a substantially lesser share of 
the total electric shaver market. The court found that the evidence showed that Philips’ 
triangular shaver head through intense marketing was strongly associated with Philips by the 
consumers. The evidence did not, however, establish that the Remington shaver was likely to 
be taken by the trade and the public as being neither the shaver of Philips nor manufactured 
and distributed by Philips. The last of Philips’ claims was the possibility that the Remington 
shaver was likely to be taken as produced with the license or approval of Philips. The court 
concluded that even though the image of the shaver head was powerful and associated with 
Philips, its use in the particular context in relation to a shaver visibly marked with the well-
known name REMINGTON would make it clear that, of the products of two substantial 
competitors, this was a Remington. The court thus found that Remington’s conduct was not 
calculated to mislead or deceive consumers, particularly since it was very likely that the 
consumer would be faced with a display of shavers including both brands. Accordingly, the 
case based on the Trade Practices Act failed. The claim of passing off had the same basis as 
the Trade Practices Act claim, and the alleged misrepresentations which is an essential 
element of passing off was hence found non-existing by the court. Accordingly, the passing 
off claim failed as well.  
 
As already expressed above, a German court issued an interlocutory injunction in Germany 
on the grounds of unfair competition and forbade Remington from offering for sale, 
advertising or putting into circulation triple-headed electric shavers in Germany. The legal 
grounds referred were four sections of the German Act against Unfair Competition. 
Remington lodged an objection to the interlocutory injunction, and the matter ended up in 
Cologne District Court, which would come to completely different conclusions concerning 
unfair competition than the Australian court. Philips claimed that Remington’s sale of triple-
headed shavers was a breach of competition law from the point of view of avoidable 
deception of origin and exploitation of reputation. Remington petitioned that competition law 
was not applicable as the provisions of trademark law applied and were exhaustive.350 
However, contrary to Remington’s submission and what the Cologne appeal court later would 
establish, the court found trademark law non-applicable to the case and instead permitted 
supplementary protection through competition law.351 The court found that Remington’s 
design was an imitation of Philips’, and that Remington had committed an avoidable 
deception of origin, without having done everything possible and reasonable to prevent that 
the public gets misled. Hence, there was a risk for confusion of the business origin for the 
consumers, and the denomination REMINGTON on the shaver made no difference, since the 
public might believe that Remington was commercially or organizationally linked to Philips. 
A requirement in German unfair competition law is that the product that is claimed to be 
imitated has competitive individuality, i.e. features capable of enabling the public to 
distinguish it from similar products of other manufacturers. The court established that Philips’ 
shavers had such competitive individuality, which related to the external aesthetic design of 
the cutting surface, which through the interaction of several individual shape elements of the 
Philips shaver acquired a character indicating origin. The court agreed with Remington that 
features that must necessarily be used for technical reasons in similar products do not 
                                                 
350 Remington contended that account should be taken to the recent ECJ decision from which it followed that the 
three-cutter-head shape was exclusively determined by technical reasons, and accordingly should be denied 
trademark protection. 
351 Interesting to note is that the Superior District Court of Cologne, where the case later ended up on appeal, 
made the opposite finding than the first instance court and thus agreed with Remington on the correct source of 
law; it found that trademark law applied, which excluded the application of competition law.  
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establish competitive individuality in the light of the principle of the freedom of the state of 
the art. But contrary to Remington’s view, the court held that the design of the cutting surface 
of the Philips shaver was not necessary for technical reasons so as to deny competitive 
individuality. This was because the individual design of the cutting surface selected by Philips 
was not the only technical solution to achieve the same shaving effect. Furthermore, 
Remington was found guilty of unfair conduct since it had acted in knowledge of Philips’ 
products without taking suitable measures to exclude confusion, and so attempting to 
dishonestly attach itself to the good reputation of Philips’ products. Accordingly, the court 
upheld the interlocutory injunction on the grounds of unfair competition. Remington appealed 
the judgment, and also the Superior District Court of Cologne upheld the injunction but on the 
grounds of trademark law instead of competition law. 
 
In Spain, River International Ltd., which is Remington’s Spanish distributor, was restrained 
by an interlocutory injunction from importing, distributing and selling the Izumi-made triple-
headed shavers in Spain. The injunction was, however, withdrawn six months later after a 
decision by Barcelona First Instance Court No. 48. When requesting the injunction, Philips 
had, except claiming trademark infringement, contended that River International was guilty of 
unfair conduct consisting of the launching on the Spanish market of electric shavers 
incorporating an imitation of the shaving surface of Philips’ distinctive triple-headed shaver, 
which was also registered as a three-dimensional trademark. The court rejected this claim and 
held that the shape of the shaving surface could not be considered as a sign, but must be 
considered as a part of the product. Philips had claimed that the alleged imitation created a 
likelihood of confusion among consumers regarding the corporate origin of the products, by 
which River International took advantage of Philips’ repute. The court established that the 
likelihood of confusion should be considered by taking into account all factors of the specific 
case that may be pertinent, in relation to the prototype of a consumer which the ECJ had 
drawn up in its decision on June 22, 1999352. The consumer prototype applied to all relations 
in the market and was described as the average consumer of the category goods or services in 
question, who is presumed to be normally informed and reasonable, alert and perspicacious. 
The court established that River International’s shavers indeed contained the three rotary 
heads registered as a three-dimensional mark by Philips, but that the shavers also visibly 
incorporated the distinctive denominative sign of the product, REMINGTON, which was 
clearly intended to identify the corporate origin. The court concluded that, considering the 
differentiating function of the Remington sign displayed on the body of the shaver, the 
principal actions exercised by Philips would probably not succeed, whereas the resolution 
ordering the injunction was annulled.  
 
In Italy, which was the fifth country to deal with competition law aspects of the dispute, 
Remington sought a declaratory judgment confirming that the import and marketing of triple-
headed shavers in Italy was neither trademark infringement of Philips’ trademarks nor any act 
of unfair competition. Philips first responded by filing a precautionary petition requesting the 
court to restrain Remington from any further marketing of the triple-headed shavers and 
confiscation of all imported shavers, but later withdrew the petition. In the court proceedings, 
Philips submitted a counterclaim for obtaining a judgment that the trademarks had been 
infringed and that Remington’s conduct constituted unfair competition. The court established 
that even if there were no EC directives aimed at harmonization of the field of competition, 
the exclusion from trademark protection on the basis of functionality had the capability to 
exclude recognition of illegality under unfair competition law. Concerning the alleged 
                                                 
352 Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co. GmbH vs Klijsen Handel BV (C-342/97). 
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confusingly similarity of the products, the court found all such confusability to be excluded 
after comparing the general impressions of the shavers and making a direct examination of the 
shavers and their packaging, with recognition of both parties’ constant use of different 
denominations on their shavers and packaging.353 Hence, there was no evidence of unfair 
conduct and thus no breach of competition law.  
 
Portugal is, so far, the last country where Philips has resorted to competition law to try to 
stop its competitor from selling triple-headed shavers. Philips requested an injunction to be 
issued, prohibiting Imporaudio Lda., Remington’s distributor, to import, sell and market 
triple-headed shavers in Portugal on the grounds of trademark infringement and acts of unfair 
competition. Philips contended that even if the trademarks were not deemed to having been 
infringed, the activity of importation and marketing of Remington shavers by Imporaudio 
constituted an act of unfair competition. The court disagreed and concluded that Imporaudio 
had not committed any act constituting unfair competition, insofar as it had not infringed any 
private right of Philips, either with regard to trademark law, or with regard to the rules on 
non-typified industrial property rights for which there was no legal protection. Furthermore, 
the court established that it was common knowledge that the specific purpose of an injunction 
was to avoid serious injury that was difficult to repair, deriving from a delay in the issuing of 
protection for a legal situation. The court found that in the present case, in view of the length 
of time for which the situation had subsisted, none of the conditions for an injunction were 
fulfilled, as there was neither any reason for urgency nor any fear for a serious injury difficult 
to remedy. Accordingly, the court rejected Philips’ application for an injunction. 
 
Finally, it can be noted that all the courts except the German first instance court established 
that there had been no infringement of competition law. Most of the courts have discussed 
essentially the same matters in their assessments of the alleged unfair competition. All the 
courts considered whether there was a likelihood of confusion of the corporate origin and if 
the Izumi-made shaver was calculated to mislead or deceive the consumers and thus exploit 
Philips’ reputation. All courts but one found that the visible incorporation of the 
REMINGTON sign on the shavers and the packaging was clearly intended to identify the 
corporate origin of the shaver. The German court disagreed and found that Remington had not 
taken suitable measures to avoid confusability since the differentiating function of the 
REMINGTON brand on the shaver was not sufficient. Another disparity was that the 
Australian court held that the Philips and Remington shavers would be sold in a specialty 
shops where it was very likely that the consumers would be faced with a display including 
both brands with good possibilities for comparison, while the German court held that the 
shavers would be seen in isolation to each other.  
 
                                                 
353 In the direct examination, the court compared the products’ different variants such as the base, contour, 
double twin heads instead of single, overall shape, and color, and the respective packages’ different text, 
illustrations, colors, and overall impression.  
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6 Philips’ Strategy and the Market Effects 
6.1 The Strategy 
Except analyzing the dispute from a legal point of view, it has also been my ambition to 
determine Philips’ strategy for enforcing its valid or invalid IPRs. It is interesting that Philips 
despite repetitious expensive losses has continued to initiate litigations and take other legal 
actions. I have therefore tried to assess how successful or unsuccessful the strategy has been 
for Philips and what consequences the strategy has had for Philips’ competitors and the 
competition on the global electric shaver market. I have also tried to determine how well the 
purpose of intellectual property law has been fulfilled during the course of this dispute.  
 
Philips had been the sole supplier in the world of triple-headed shavers, which have given 
enormous market advantages in form of no competition at all. Both in the USA and in Europe 
Philips had patents covering technical functions of its rotary shaver, such as the skin-
stretching clover-leaf shaped rim surrounding the rotary cutting heads.354 By the beginning of 
the 1990s, all the patents were expired. In order to keep some kind of protection, Philips 
applied in numerous jurisdictions for obtaining trademark registrations comprising the three-
dimensional shape of the shaver head, and thus increasing the great number of shaver 
trademarks it had already registered. Most jurisdictions agreed to register the marks after 
proof of acquired distinctiveness, and Philips also registered the shaver as a design in some 
countries. When a competitor showed up trying to enter the market, Philips realized that its 
monopoly status on the triple-headed shaver market was threatened, and had to take 
immediate action and do whatever possible to keep any competitor out of the market. I 
suppose it was by that time Philips developed the offensive litigation strategy that is still in 
force today. In order to stop the new competitor, Philips initiated litigations in two states in 
the USA on the grounds of unfair competition and trademark infringement. All ready in the 
USA Philips was defeated several times, and when the dispute spread to other continents, 
Philips kept on losing its cases. Philips was only successful in the first Swedish litigation and 
in some of the German cases355, and has had repetitive defeats in first instance as well as 
appeal courts all over Europe. In the wake of Philips’ setback in the ECJ, it was Philips’ main 
competitor Remington that initiated the litigations in France and Italy for invalidation of 
Philips’ trademarks to eliminate the risk of infringement suits. However, Philips has 
obviously not abandoned its offensive litigation strategy, as demonstrated by the most recent 
lawsuits. Philips was as late as June 2004 denied a recently submitted request for an 
interlocutory injunction against the Portuguese distributor of Remington triple-headed 
shavers. In the last UK judgment, from October 2004, Philips had sued Remington for 
trademark infringement, but lost and instead got the trademark invalidated on several grounds.  
In the most recent judgment from Paris Court of Appeals on February 16, 2005, Philips had in 
its appeal inter alia claimed trademark infringement of six (already invalidated) trademarks, a 
declaration forbidding Remington to sell triple-headed shavers, destruction of all shavers, 
packaging, leaflets and other promotion material as well as compensation of € 950,000 for the 
loss Philips had had due to the alleged trademark infringement. These not too modest claims 
                                                 
354 However, the mere configuration with three rotary cutting heads arranged on a triangularly shaped faceplate 
has not been the subject of any patent. 
355 Even though the decision is appealed, Germany is the only country in the world where a Philips’ competitor is 
still restrained by a court decision from selling triple-headed shavers. The interlocutory injunction was upheld 
because of the separation of powers between the registration authorities and the infringement courts, and the 
principle of binding registration. Thus, the infringement court was not allowed to review the trademark 
registrability but could only assess the infringement based on the (perhaps invalid) registration. 
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clearly illustrates that Philips in no way has abandoned its strategy to give its new competitors 
on the market a hard time. 
 
Philips’ strategy has thus consisted in claiming rights inferred by competition law as well as 
enforcing trademark rights, which in one country after another has been invalidated and 
cancelled. As early as after the USA litigations, Philips must have suspected that more defeats 
were to come and that sooner or later its monopoly position would fall. The objective of 
Philips during the remainder of the dispute must have been –and still today is– to try to delay 
the competitors’ entering on the market as much as possible. However, litigating is expensive, 
and Philips’ combined litigation costs have been roughly estimated to amount to 
approximately 50 million US dollars.356 This is undeniably a large sum, and at first one might 
wonder why a company would spend an amount like that on court cases that mostly are 
doomed to be lost. However, when assessing what Philips has actually gained on all the 
litigating and the strong enforcement of its soon-to-be invalidated trademark rights, one 
realizes that the strategy in several ways has been successful.  
 
One cannot underestimate the enormous value of being the only supplier in the world to 
provide a highly demanded product, which also has a shape that is subject of trademark 
protection in numerous jurisdictions even though it incorporates advantageous technical 
features. The profit of keeping such a valuable monopoly for as long as possible must have 
covered all the litigation costs. Every day that Philips has managed to keep competitors out of 
the triple-headed shaver market has been highly profitable, and in a way it is therefore 
understandable that Philips has tried so hard to keep its monopoly position on the triple-
headed shaver market. It is also worth mentioning that out of all the electric equipment that 
Philips manufactures, it has always made a big profit on the electric shavers357. This might 
explain why Philips reacted so strongly when realizing that the profitable income from sales 
of triple-headed shavers was threatened. It is impossible to say how many years of maintained 
monopoly Philips has gained in different countries on its, in a legal sense, unsuccessful 
litigations. In most countries the competitor’s launch has been delayed for several years; for 
instance it took ten years for the Swedish importer of triple-headed Izumi shavers from the 
first filing for a non-infringement declaration in 1994 until the company was actually allowed 
to sell the shavers in 2004. During those ten years Philips maintained the advantageous 
position of being the only trader of triple-headed shavers in Sweden. 
 
Another advantage of delaying the competitors’ launch is that Philips has had plenty of time 
to prepare for the coming competition. Philips has used the lead to increase its range of 
shavers and offering a wider selection of shavers by developing new models. The shavers 
have different looks and features, and also represent various price levels. The purpose of this 
kind of marketing strategy is to get more shelf space in the stores than the competitors. Hence, 
by getting more shelf space with a wider range of products, the competitors’ shelf space will 
be reduced. On many markets, Philips has been ready with a wider selection of shavers when 
the competitor could finally enter the market. As the Izumi-manufactured shavers are 
considerably cheaper than the Philips shavers, Philips also had time to develop cheaper 
models so to meet Izumi’s lower prices.     
 
                                                 
356 The estimation has been made by William Androlia, who is Izumi’s external legal supervisor. 
357 Bohman, Bengt, telephone interview. April 29, 2005. 
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6.2 Market Effects 
In all the countries where Philips is no longer the only supplier of triple-headed shavers and 
the Izumi-manufactured shavers have entered the market, the change on the market has been 
the result of court proceedings, as described in previous chapters. The companies selling 
Izumi-made shavers, such as British Rayovac, Remington and Swedish Rotary Shaver have in 
many cases not been willing to take the risk of starting to sell Izumi-made triple-headed 
shavers in countries where Philips still has valid trademarks protecting the shaver’s shape. 
The evident risk of trademark infringement claims from Philips has thus affected the 
competitors’ business considerations as to which countries or markets they choose to expand 
their sales of triple-headed shavers to. As a result of this, Rayovac has filed nullity actions 
against Philips’ trademarks in several countries, requesting the cancellation of trademark 
registrations identical to those that have been invalidated by courts of other countries.358 
However, the countries where there is now competition and Izumi-made triple-headed shavers 
are being sold are: the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, the UK, Ireland, 
France, Italy, Spain and Portugal.359  
 
By suing companies selling Izumi-made shavers, Philips managed to create an uncertainty 
amongst the possible competitors, making them reluctant to getting into the business of rotary 
shavers as it seemed risky and could entail high litigation costs. Hence, the message sent to 
the other actors on the market was that Philips intended to actively defend its market position 
from any company trying to enter the triple-headed shaver market. Izumi was the first 
manufacturer who dared to challenge Philips’ monopoly, and still today it is only companies 
selling Izumi-manufactured shavers that are competing with Philips on the triple-headed 
shaver market. It seems like all other companies are still scared away, reasoning that a try to 
enter the market would not be worth the risk of being sued by Philips. Since Izumi and its 
related parties have taken the fight with Philips and the market has now opened up in many 
countries, we will probably see more competitors on the triple-headed market in the future.  
 
To illustrate the significant change on the market when Philips’ monopoly position could no 
longer be upheld, the following example is descriptive. In 1989 there was approximately 
59,000 Izumi-made shavers of the vibration kind sold in the USA. After the triple-headed 
rotary shaver market has been opened up, there are now in the USA over one million Izumi 
shavers sold per year, which is as much as seventeen times more than before.360 Purely 
hypothetically, it is likely that a quite large part of that million shavers would have been sold 
by Philips if there had still not been any competition on the triple-headed rotary shaver 
market. Obviously, not being the sole supplier anymore has been quite a setback for Philips.  
 
It is therefore interesting to see how Philips has dealt with the new competition. In the USA, 
after Philips had lost both the Florida and the Illinois cases, Izumi and Philips have been 
competing on price and features of the shavers. After the launch of Izumi-manufactured 
shavers in the USA, Canada and Australia, Philips has had to reduce its prices and develop 
new models. There are now low price models of Philips’ triple-headed shavers, which are 
significantly cheaper than ever before. In these countries, Philips and the Izumi-made shavers 
are often demonstrated side by side in the same product catalogues. In the UK, France, Italy 
                                                 
358 Rayovac has so far filed cancellation requests against Philips’ trademarks in Norway, Switzerland, Holland, 
Denmark and Austria.  
359 The only country where there has been court proceedings but yet no sale of Izumi-made shavers is Germany, 
where Remington is still restrained by an interlocutory injunction. 
360 Androlia, William, 2005, telephone interview. May 11, 2005. 
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and Spain Philips has offered retailers advertising money and margin guarantees as long as 
the retailers do not buy much Izumi-made shavers.361  
 
6.3 Final Words 
One can conclude that it is interesting from a legal point of view that Philips ultimately has 
not been able to stop the use of the triple-headed design by any legislation or legal protection. 
In a legal context, Philips has lost big since numerous trademarks have been invalidated and 
no infringement claims has been successful. It is, however, a fact that Philips’ actions from a 
strategic marketing point of view has been a success, as the temporarily maintained monopoly 
position obviously has given satisfactory return of the money ‘invested’ in legal actions.  
 
When analyzing Philips’ quite aggressive legal strategy, which has been upheld despite 
repetitious defeats, it is difficult to avoid thinking of this conduct from a moral point of view. 
In the last US judgment, the Illinois court held that Philips since the late 1970s has attempted 
to stop competition in the market and harass and intimidate those who posed a threat to its 
strong position on the electric shaver market. The US court further concluded that Philips’ 
motives and actions clearly constituted a malicious, fraudulent, deliberate and willful 
behavior, as Philips had forced other companies into spending large sums of money to defend 
themselves against Philips’ unsupported claims. Other courts have expressed similar opinions 
of Philips’ actions. Philips itself held in the Spanish judgment from 2004 that the defense of 
its trademarks were not to be seen as any monopolistic urge but a necessary precaution to 
protect its consumers from the risk of confusion and association.  
 
Royal Philips Electronics is one of the world’s biggest electronics companies, and the largest 
in Europe, with 160,900 employees in over 60 countries and sales in 2004 of €30.3 billion.362 
For the moment Philips owns 115,000 patents, 22,000 trademark registrations, 11,000 
registered designs and over 2,000 domain name registrations.363 Thus, Philips is a huge 
company with an advanced IP organization guaranteeing a strong enforcement of its IPRs. 
Our economy is becoming more and more intellectualized, and IPRs play a greater role today 
than ever before. There is, however, a negative side of IPRs, namely that it is generally 
expensive to enforce them or for a competitor to challenge them. As a consequence, it is often 
money that decides which companies can enforce their IPRs or which companies can afford to 
challenge the validity of other companies’ IPRs. 
 
Philips has had sufficient monetary and organizational resources to use the existing IP and 
legal systems to uphold a monopoly position by enforcing rights inferred by trademarks that 
have ultimately been declared invalid and cancelled. Hence, Philips has managed to keep 
competition out of the market for a long period by enforcing the rights of trademarks, which 
were wrongfully registered in the first place –registered contrary to the law. It is also so, that 
when you have a trademark registration you can initiate litigations to defend it without risking 
having to pay damages, even when the chances of winning are obviously small. It is well 
motivated to ask whom the IP system benefits if it can be used in this way, for a strong actor 
to maintain a monopoly position on a particular market by enforcing an ‘illegally’ registered 
trademark. This possibility is not consistent with the purpose of trademark protection, being to 
                                                 
361 This information of the market effects has been given by William Androlia. 
362 Philips: “Global Profile”. Published in 2004-2005, available at 
http://www.philips.com/about/company/article-14054.html (2005-06-14) 
363 Philips: “Company Profile, Other activities”. Published in 2004-2005, available at 
http://www.philips.com/about/company/businesses/section-14159/ (2005-06-14) 
 145
ensure fair competition by guaranteeing products’ trade origin to prevent the public’s risk for 
confusion, while protecting the economical value of the trademark. Healthy competition is a 
heavy cornerstone in a market economy system, and for the European Union free competition 
on the European market is a main objective. Instead of facilitating a fair competition on the 
market, the trademark protection in the cases described in this thesis has served, and still 
serves, to uphold a monopoly position on a technical feature, which seriously stifles the 
competition. The main problem, as I see it, is that the trademarks managed to become 
registered in the first place. They were registered despite the legislators’ express wish to avoid 
registrations of technical features, which was one of the conditions for allowing trademark 
protection for product shapes in the first place. Hence, it is exactly this kind of situations that 
provisions like Article 3(1)(e) are intended to prevent. It seems to be quite often so, that the 
registration authorities’ examination practices when investigating the registrability of a sign is 
not very thorough, and that it is not until the mark is contested by a competitor that there is a 
proper assessment of its registrability. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that 
registration authorities ought to be much more careful in the initial assessment of a sign’s 
registrability, as a wrongful registration can have fatal consequences for the competing 
companies and the overall competition on that particular market. The global dispute analyzed 
in this thesis is strong evidence for how the competition on the triple-headed shaver market 
has been seriously stifled primarily because of wrongfully registered trademarks. It is an 
undisputed fact that it is not the object of trademark law to provide protection for technical 
features of a product’s shape.  
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Appendix A –Illustrations of the trademarks 
 
 
IR 638.663 (figure trademark) 
IR 587.254 (shape/3D trademark) 
 
 
 
 
 
IR 430.836 (figure trademark) 
 
 
 
 
 
IR 430.837 (figure trademark) 
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IR 430.839 (figure trademark) 
          
 
 
IR 439.559 (figure trademark) 
 
 
 
 
 
Germany: 1034262 (figure trademark) 
United Kingdom: 1243208 
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France: 95/563.306 (semi-figurative mark) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
United Kingdom: 
 
       1124415        1087357        1080316 
 
 
All three marks are also part of registration1203652. 
 
 
 
 
 149
Reference List 
 
Treaties and Conventions 
Paris Convention 
 
Treaty on European Union  
 
TRIPS (Agreement of Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights) 
 
Madrid Agreement (1891) 
 
Madrid Protocol (1989)  
 
 
EC Secondary Legislation 
Council Regulation (EC) No 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community trade mark 
 
First Directive 89/104/EEC of the Council, of 21 December 1988, to Approximate the Laws 
of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks 
 
Directive 98/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 1998 on the 
legal protection of designs  
 
Council Regulation (EC) No 6/2002 of 12 December, 2001 on Community Designs 
 
 
National Legislation 
Australian Trade Practices Act 1974.    
Australian Trade Marks Act 1995 
Australian Designs Act 2003 
 
Canadian Trademarks Act 
 
French Intellectual Property Code 
 
German Trademark Act 
 
New Zealand Trade Marks Act 1953 
New Zealand Trade Marks Act 2002 
 
Portuguese Code of Civil Procedure 
Portuguese Industrial Property Code 
 
Spanish Trademarks Act. 
 
 150
Swedish Trademarks Act (1960:644) 
 
UK Trademarks Act 1994 
 
United States Lanham Act (trademark law)  
 
 
European Court of Justice 
Costa v. ENEL (Case 6/64) 
 
Springenheide and Tusky. Case C-210/96 (1998) ECR I-4657 
 
Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co. GmbH vs Klijsen Handel BV (C-342/97) 
 
Windsurfing Chiemsee. Joined Cases C-108/97 and C-109/97 (1999) ECR I-2779 
 
Philips Electronics N.V. v. Remington Consumer Products Limited. Preliminary ruling of the 
European Court of Justice of the European Communities. Case C-299/99. June 18, 2002 
 
 
Opinion of Advocate-General of the ECJ 
Philips Electronics N.V. v. Remington Consumer Products Limited, delivered on January 23, 
2001, Case No. C-299/99. Opinion of General-Advocate Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer 
 
 
National Case Law –the Judgments Analyzed 
Australia 
Philips v. Remington. Federal Court of Australia –New South Wales District Registry 
(Sydney). Case No. NG 637 OF 1997. June 18, 1999 
 
Canada  
Remington v. Philips, Federal Court of Appeal, Ottawa, Ontario. Case No. A-633-93. 
December 12, 1995 (appeal) 
 
France 
France (1): Paris First Instance Court. Case No. 01/13079. June 13, 2003 
 
France (2): Paris Court of Appeals. Case No. 03/14961. February 16, 2005 (appeal) 
 
Germany 
Germany (1): German Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Division. Ref. No. S 279/00 
Lösch. October 18, 2001 (cancellation proceeding) 
 
Germany (2): Cologne District Court. Case No. 33 O 325/02. November 5, 2002 (for the issue 
of an interlocutory injunction)  
 
 151
Germany (3): Superior District Court of Cologne. Case No. 6 U 192/02. May 9, 2003 (appeal) 
 
Germany (4): Federal Patent Court, Trademark Appeal Division. April 14, 2004 (appeal of the 
non-cancellation decision of Germany (1)) 
 
Germany (5): Federal Patent Court, Trademark Appeal Division. Case No. 28 W (pat) 131/01. 
April 14, 2004 (appeal of a non-cancellation decision) 
 
Germany (6 and 7): Federal Patent Court, Trademark Appeal Division. Case No. 28 W (pat) 
147/02 concerning the IR 587 254 registration and Case No. 28 W (pat) 149/02 concerning 
the IR 638 663 registration. May 4, 2004 (appeals of non-cancellation decisions) 
 
Germany (8): German Patent and Trademark Office, Trademark Division. Case No. S 198/03 
Lösch, Register No. 394 08 350.4/08. November 12, 2004 (cancellation proceedings) 
 
Italy 
The Court of Milan. Case No. 31294/2000, Decision No. 5080/04, File No. 4364/04. February 
26, 2004 
 
New Zealand 
Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand. Case No. T29/2003. August 4, 2003 (registration 
proceeding) 
 
Portugal 
Commercial Court of Vila Nova da Gaia, 2nd Division. Injunction proceedings No. 
594/03.9TVNG. June 23, 2004 (injunction proceedings) 
 
Spain 
Spain (1): Barcelona First Instance Court No. 48. Roll no. 239/2003-1, Interim proceedings 
No. 892/2002. July 31, 2003 (interim decision) 
 
Spain (2): Barcelona First Instance Court No. 13. Case No: Ordinary Proceeding 241/2003 
Section 4, Judgment No. 89. May 6, 2004 (judgment) 
 
Sweden 
Sweden (1): Ide Line v. Philips. Stockholm District Court. Case No. T 7-1316-94 and T 7-
249-97. June 25, 1997 
 
Sweden (2 -appeal): Svea Court of Appeal, Stockholm. Case No. T 7-1316-94 and T 7-249-
97. January 28, 2004 
  
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom (1): Philips Electronics N.V. v. Remington Consumer Products. Patents 
Court, Chancery Division, England & Wales. Case No: Ch. 1995-P-No.7585. December 22, 
1997 
 
United Kingdom (2 -appeal): Philips Electronics N.V. v. Remington Consumer Products 
(1999) Court of Appeal (England and Wales), London. Case No. 98/0103. (RCP 809) May 5, 
1999 
 
 152
United Kingdom (3): High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, London. Case No. HC 2000 
No. 00678. June 21, 2004 
 
United States of America 
Philips v. Sears, United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois. Case No. 85 C 
S366. May 21, 1996 
 
 
National Case Law –Other 
Australia 
Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v. Puxu Pty Ltd  (1982) 
 
Canada 
Imperial Tobacco Company of Canada Limited v. The Registrar of Trade Marks (1939) 
 
Parke, Davis & Company v. Empire Laboratories Limited (1964) 
 
Pizza Pizza Limited v. the Registrar of Trade Marks (1989) 
 
UK 
Benchairs v. Chair Centre (1974) 
 
USA 
Noxell Corp. v. Firehouse No. 1 Bar-B-Que Rest. (D.C.Circuit 1985) 
 
NuPulse. Inc. v. Schlueter Co. (7th Circuit 1988) 
 
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc. (1995) 
 
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc. (2001) 
 
 
Text Books 
Bernitz, Ulf and Kjellgren, Anders: Europarättens grunder, 1st edition, Norstedts Juridik AB, 
Stockholm 1999 
 
Koktvedgaard, Mogens and Levin, Marianne: Lärobok i immaterialrätt, 7th editition, 
Norstedts Juridik AB, Stockholm, 2002 
 
Kylhammar, Anders: “Teknisk funktion som utesluter varumärkes- och mönsterskydd”, 
Festskrift till Kaj Sandart (Sandart & partners advokatbyrå 50 år), Glossator Förlag, 
Stockholm, 2003 
 
Tufegdzic, Goran: EG-varumärke – en sammanställning av praxis avseende tolkningen av 
atrikel 7(1) CTMR. Skrifter utgivna av Institutet För Immaterialrätt och Marknadsrätt vid 
Stockholms Universitet, nr 105, Stockholm, 2000.  
 
 153
Wessman, Richard: Varumärkeskonflikter: Förväxlingsrisk och anseendeskydd i 
varumärkesrätten. Norstedts Juridik AB, Stockholm, 2002  
 
 
Articles 
Brand News 06/2002: “Svårare med design som varumärke”, page 16-19 
 
 
Interviews 
Androlia, William, telephone interview, May 11, 2005  
 
Bohman, Bengt, telephone interview, April 29, 2005  
 
 
Internet 
Australian Government -IP Australia: “Designs”. Published in 2005, available at 
http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/designs/index.shtml (2005-06-14) 
 
Australian Government -IP Australia: “What is a design?” Published in 2005, available at 
http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/designs/what_index.shtml (2005-06-14) 
 
Australian Government -IP Australia: “Designs”. Published in 2005, available at 
http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/designs/index.shtml (2005-06-14) 
 
Australian Intellectual Property Locus: “Passing Off”. Published in 1995/6, available at 
http://members.ozemail.com.au/~pxc/iplocus/passing_off.html#materials (2005-06-14) 
 
Canadian Intellectual Property Office: “A Guide to Trade-marks: The Basics.” Published on 2005-04-11, 
available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc_mrksv/cipo/tm/tm_gd_basic-e.html#section01 (2005-06-14) 
 
Canadian Intellectual Property Office: “Practice Notice: Three-dimensional Marks”. Published on 2004-06-14, 
available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc_mrksv/cipo/tm/tm_notice/tmn2000-12-06-e.html (2005-06-14) 
 
Canadian Intellectual Property Office: “A Guide to Industrial Designs: Introduction”. Published on 2004-06-14, 
available at  http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc_mrksv/cipo/id/id_gd_intro-e.html#section01 (2005-06-14) 
 
Canadian Intellectual Property Office: “A Guide to Industrial Designs: the Process”. Published on 2004-06-14, 
available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc_mrksv/cipo/id/id_gd_process-e.html#section08 (2005-06-14) 
 
Daley, Annamarie: “Supreme Court Defines Scope of Trade Dress Protection for Product Design” (Robins, 
Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi L.L.P.) Published in 2000, available at http://www.rkmc.com/article.asp?articleId=108 
(2005-06-14) 
 
International Association for the Protection of Intellectual Property (AIPPI): “Three-dimensional Marks: the 
borderline between trademarks and industrial designs”. AIPPI Reports Q 148 (no publishing date), available at 
http://www.aippi.org/reports/q148/gr-q148-e-usa.htm (2005-06-14) 
 
Izumi: “Izumi Products Company Electric Appliances Only Chronological Order”. Published in 2004, available 
at http://www.izumishavers.com/about/history.asp (2005-06-14) 
 
Izumi: “About Izumi”. Published in 2004, available at http://www.izumishavers.com/about/ (2005-06-14) 
The sales number was measured in March 2004, but I assume it represents the total sales for 2003. 
 154
 
Izumi: “Izumi Products Company, Company Profile.” Published in 2004, available at http://www.izumi-
products.co.jp/english/profile-e/profCompany Profilei-e.htm (2005-05-14) 
 
Managing Intellectual Property 04/2003: “Brand building the Dutch way” (cover story). Published in April 2003, 
available at 
http://www.multilaw.com/Template.cfm?Section=Legal_Specialties&template=/ContentManagement/ContentDi
splay.cfm&ContentID=2070 (2005-06-14) 
 
Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trademarks and Designs) (OHIM): “Community design” (no 
publishing date), available at http://www.ohim.eu.int/en/design/default.htm (2005-06-14) 
 
Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trademarks and Designs) (OHIM): “The registered 
Community design –leaflet” (no publishing date), available at http://www.ohim.eu.int/en/design/pdf/leaflet1.pdf 
(2005-06-14) 
 
Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trademarks and Designs) (OHIM): “Community design” (no 
publishing date), available at http://www.ohim.eu.int/en/design/default.htm (2005-06-14) 
 
Oz Netlaw: “Fact sheets: Trademarks, Domain Names and Passing Off”. Published on 2003-04-15, available at 
http://www.oznetlaw.net/facts.asp?action=content&categoryid=239 (2005-06-14) 
 
Philips: “History”. Published in 2004-2005, available at 
http://www.philips.com/about/company/history/index.html (2005-06-14) 
 
Philips: “Global Profile”. Published in 2004-2005, available at http://www.philips.com/about/company/article-
14054.html (2005-06-14) 
 
Philips: “Company Profile, Other activities” Published in 2004-2005, available at 
http://www.philips.com/about/company/businesses/section-14159/ (2005-06-14) 
 
Wikipedia –The Free Encyclopedia: “passing off”. Published on 2005-04-01, available at   
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Passing_off (2005-06-14) 
 
WIPO: “Madrid System for the International Registration of Marks”, available on 
http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/ (2005-06-14) 
 
 
 
 
 155
